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FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1327963-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 3  
Page 10 ~ b6; b7C;  
Page 87 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 88 ~ Referral/Direct;

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1204749-1

Total Deleted Page(s) = 3  
Page 10 ~ b6; b7C;  
Page 87 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 88 ~ Referral/Direct;

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont

~~SECRET~~

DATE: May 24, 1956

FROM : R. R. Roach

b1 per CIA  
b3SUBJECT: DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES,  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Liaison Agent Sam Papich learned from a liaison  
contact at CIA last night that Allen W. Dulles, Director of the  
Central Intelligence Agency, has been in [redacted] for the past (S)  
two or three days. [redacted]

As you know, [redacted]

ACTION:

Any further information of this nature will be promptly  
reported. Should we learn of the results of Dulles' trip, you will  
be advised.

RRR:mls (5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Papich
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Roach

Classified by *sp6bjal/mw*  
Declassify on: OADRb6  
b7C

240/403

7/23/85

62-83338-26

17 MAY 25 1956

RECORDED-37

FOI #366904

CLASSIFIED BY *SP-2 ALM/EHL*  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

6/18/99

[ ] CLASSIFIED PER  
OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/00

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 09-27-2010

Per OGA review  
letter dated 9/7/10~~SECRET~~

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mason \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 20, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CIAALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/23/85 BY SP6 bja/1mw

Tolson	✓
Nichols	✓
Boardman	✓
Belmont	✓
Mason	✓
Mohr	✓
Parsons	✓
Rosen	✓
Tamm	✓
Nease	✓
Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Holloman	✓
Gandy	✓

The "Washington Daily News" of 7-10-56 carried an article on the society page indicating that Karl Buresch, son-in-law of Allen Dulles, might be the next Austrian Ambassador to the U. S.

On 7-19-56 Dulles advised Liaison Agent Papich that the newspaper story was absolutely false. He stated there is no indication whatsoever that his son-in-law, an Austrian diplomat, would come to this country as an ambassador. Dulles stated that his son-in-law is actually a very minor official in the Austrian foreign service and is now stationed in Tehran.

ACTION: For information.

SJP:dje (4)

RECORDED  
INDEXED

JUL 27 1956

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Section tickler
- 1 - Mr. Papich

52 AUG 1 1956



## 'The Final and Real Test'

Like nearly everybody else, Director Allen W. Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency still is not quite sure of all the whys, wherefores and possible consequences of the Kremlin's continuing anti-Stalin campaign. But some of his conjectures—as voiced the other day in a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council—throw at least a little additional light on the great puzzle. And they have the further virtue of serving as a warning against optimistic conclusion-jumping of a kind that might beguile the free world into letting down its guard.

It is possible, of course, to read a number of hopeful meanings into what Russia's "collective leaders" are doing to deglorify Stalin and dissociate themselves from him, though they were once his closest and most fawning collaborators. Mr. Dulles believes that they have been motivated only in part by a desire to acquire international respectability; the more basic reason for their action, in his judgment, is that they have been driven to it by domestic pressures. There are now great numbers of educated people in the Soviet Union, and they have grown increasingly critical and restive with the passing of the years. So it is not unreasonable to assume that Nikita Khrushchev and company have found it wise and perhaps even imperative to placate this body of opinion by carrying out a "purge of Stalinism"—a purge containing a promise of higher standards of living, an end to one-man tyranny and steady progress toward genuine individual liberty and democratic government.

However, although the deglorification ~~line~~ creates serious problems for the internal unity and discipline of the Soviet and international Communist movement, and although it conceivably may be the forerunner of great liberalizing developments in the USSR, there is a world of difference between a mere promise and its fulfillment. For his own part, while not ruling out the possibility that the Kremlin's present course may lead eventually to good changes, Mr. Dulles is not inclined to be optimistic. As he sees the situation, "A dead and dishonored Stalin... is likely to be merely a device with which the long-suffering Russian people are, I fear, to be deceived in their expectation of a freer and better life." He suspects, in short, that Mr. Khrushchev and the other "collective leaders" are simply doing what they are impelled to do to consolidate themselves in power, and he also suspects that they may yet narrow down to another one-man tyranny.

In any event, as the CIA director has warned, "The final and real test of the Soviet leaders will remain their willingness to accept those basic institutional changes that can give the Russian people and the world in general genuine assurance that a one-man or three or four-man dictatorship cannot again plot in secret the massive domestic or international crimes" carried out by the Kremlin under Stalin. In that respect, the changes that are most needed call for the creation of opposition parties, an independent judiciary and a free press. Quite obviously, until such institutions are brought into being in the USSR, there will be a dangerous tyranny over there, and we and our allies had better not slacken in our armed vigilance against it.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mason \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MR. W. W. WIGAN

*File*  
*5-1-56*  
*W. W. Wigan*

*W. W. Wigan*

Wash. Post and Times Herald \_\_\_\_\_  
Wash. News \_\_\_\_\_  
Wash. Star A-12  
N. Y. Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Mirror \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
Daily Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
The Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
New Leader \_\_\_\_\_

Date APR 18 1956

162-83331

NOT RECORDED  
76 MAY 1 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/23/85 BY SP6BJA/IMW

10 23 AM '56

681-7021ICE  
REC'D OFFICE

58 JUN 1 1956

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 30, 1956

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

Tolson ☒  
 Nichols ☒  
 Boardman ☐  
 Belmont ☐  
 Mason ☐  
 Mohr ☐  
 Parsons ☐  
 Rosen ☐  
 Tamm ☐  
 Nease ☐  
 Winterrowd ☐  
 Tele. Room ☐  
 Holloman ☐  
 Gandy ☐

SUBJECT: <sup>①</sup> ALLEN W. DULLES  
 DIRECTOR  
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

On 7-27-56 Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised Liaison Agent Papich that Dulles will be leaving on an extended trip which will take him to Europe and very likely the Far East. He is scheduled to depart about August 19, 1956, and will be gone approximately one month. Edwards indicated that during some of this period Dulles will also be vacationing.

ACTION:

In the past, Dulles has paid courtesy calls at the offices of some of our Legal Attaches. Although he has never initiated any official business with our representatives, it is nevertheless believed advisable to alert our Legal Attaches in Europe and Tokyo, Japan, concerning Dulles' travel. There is enclosed a letter to the appropriate Legal Attaches instructing them to extend the usual courtesies in the event Dulles contacts them but not to get involved in any official matters without prior check with the Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 9/11/85 BY SP6 bja/lmw

Enclosure

SJP:fjb  
 (5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED-99

no OGA deletions per letter dated 9/7/10

62-83338-28

20 AUG 9 1956

SENT DIRECTOR

7-31-56

~~SECRET~~  
LEGAL ATTACHE  
LONDON, ENGLAND  
DIRECTOR, FBI

ALLEN W. DULLES  
DIRECTOR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

RECORDED-99

108 62-83338-28

This is to advise that Allen W. Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is expected to leave on an extended trip for Europe and the Far East. He will depart about August 18, 1956, and will be traveling for approximately one month. It is expected that during this period he will also do some vacationing.

In the event Mr. Dulles contacts your office, you should extend the usual courtesies but you should not get involved in the discussion of any official matters without first contacting the Bureau.

1 - Paris

1 - Madrid

1 - Rome

1 - Bonn

1 - Tokyo

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)

SJP:fjb  
(12)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9/1/85 BY SP6 bja/lmw

~~Classified by~~  
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

Cover memo Roach to  
Belmont 7-30-56  
Captioned as above.  
SJP:fjb

RECEIVED 1956

15 23 64 22

AUG 1 1956

SENT FROM D. O.  
TIME 6:09 PM  
DATE 7-31-56  
BY [Signature]

RECEIVED READING ROOM  
JUL 31 3 22 PM '56  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
FBI



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
THE FOREIGN SERVICE

OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Embassy  
Paris 8, France

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mason \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Date: August 24, 1956

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Paris (66-128)

Subject: RELATIONS WITH CIA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

ReBulet to London 7/31/56 concerning the visit  
of ALLEN W. DULLES, Director of CIA, in Paris.

On 8/20/56 the Legat had an opportunity  
briefly with ALLEN DULLES

Mr. DULLES expressed his pleasure over the friendly  
relationship which existed between this office and  
He also spoke very kindly of SA SAM PAPICH of the  
Bureau. The usual amenities were exchanged, but no policy  
matters were discussed.

ROL: C

Classified by ~~SP6 bja/lmw~~  
Declassify on: ~~OADR 7/31/85~~

RECORDED-68

INDEXED-68

62-83338-29

per oga referral 5/24/10

02 04 .28

02 31 1 22 54 .28

FOI/PA #

APPEAL #

CIVIL ACT #

7.07 #

ATE 7/28/85

INITIALS /mw

EX-117

SEP 6 1956

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ELH  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

6/18/99

MARKED per  
OGA letter  
of 5/24/00

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 06-03-2010


16-9-56 *203-1*

*REMOVED*

*U.S.*

①

b6  
b7C



PLEASE WIRE SO THAT WE CAN EXPEDITE THIS MATTER. FOUR.

*sol # 366904*

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE *6/21/99* BY *SP2 RNM/ENL*

CPA. ED-010005-001375 1956 ALAN JACK DODGE

*INDEXED*

*62-83338-30*

NOT RECORDED

14 OCT 16 1956

*53* OCT 22 1956

*FBI*

*EX-127*

*SP*



# CIA HEAD WARNS OF RED STRATEGY

A. W. Dulles Says New Plan  
of 'Parliamentary Conquest'  
is Aimed at 3 Nations

By C. P. TRUSSELL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 1—Soviet peace smiles brought a warning today from Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Dulles said free people should watch and combat a new Kremlin strategy of "parliamentary conquest." The principal targets, he stated, are Italy, France, and Indonesia. He cited situations indicating important Soviet gains in these fields.

At the same time, Mr. Dulles deplored an apparent free-world indifference to a fact that the Russians could attain controls even with minority conquests in parliamentary bodies.

"Today . . . the danger of parliamentary compromises with the Communists, even in Europe," he stated, "is not to be ignored."

Mr. Dulles spoke frankly in an analysis of Soviet cold-war techniques that surprised many in Washington. The C. I. A. is perhaps the most hush-hush organization in the Government. Even Congressional investigating committees have not yet pried into its secrets where American security is involved.

However, Mr. Dulles responded to a request from the House Un-American Activities Committee to analyze current Communist tactics. Such a request had been made to more than 100 other prominent Government officials, military leaders, educators, journalists, labor officials, business executives and political scientists. Before the committee publishes the full findings it will call in experts on communism from Europe, the Far East and Africa. The panel is headed by Representative Francis B. Walter, Democrat of Pennsylvania.

Follow Lenin Pattern

The findings of the C. I. A. were made public this afternoon. Mr. Dulles had concentrated upon the dangers of the Soviet's "parliamentary" approach to conquest. This approach, he said, followed a pattern laid down by Lenin in the Nineteen Twenties.

Communist penetrations into free parliaments to date, he held, were far more serious than statistics would imply.

In no country, Mr. Dulles brought out, have Communists attained a majority in a parliamentary body. This fact, he contended, has created a complacency that is highly dangerous.

"A few years ago," he reported, "I would have thought that Communist parties in Europe would have grown in popularity ever again among allies among any non-Communist parties. Today, however, the danger of parliamentary compromises with the Communists, even in Europe, is not to be ignored."

Mr. Dulles then reported on the target spots he cited.

"In Asia," he stated, "this threat is even greater because it is generally less well understood. A recent Indonesian Government permitted Communist influence to reach far into the Ministry of Defense. More than in Europe the Communist parties have managed in many countries to acquire a dangerous degree of 'respectability' and of acceptance as just another political party."

In the "target countries," Mr. Dulles stated, the Soviet penetrations had become "serious."

143 in Office in Italy

"In the Italian Parliament of 590 members," he stated, "there are now 143 Communist members. To these must be added seventy-five Nenni fellow-traveling left-wing Socialists, or a total of 218 who consistently vote and act with the Communists. Together, in the last elections in 1953, their total popular vote was 9,600,000, or 35.6 per cent of the total."

"The French Chamber of Deputies presents another situation which the Kremlin may be studying. There are today about 150 Communist members in the Chamber out of a present total of about 600."

"In Indonesia, the Communist party received 6,000,000 votes, or 17 per cent of the total electorate in the elections of September 1955, and they have a representation of thirty-nine members, or fifteen per cent of the total of the Indonesian Assembly."

Despite these official minority representations, Mr. Dulles said, the Communists had "moved in."

Mr. Dulles referred to the recent smile-and-peace pronouncements of the Soviet leaders. He said:

"Translated into a little less flamboyant language this means that the Communists propose to infiltrate our free legislative systems, to take over our parliamentary Governments, and to use freedom which our system of government gives to destroy all vestiges of that system . . ."

"The Kremlin leaders have told us what they propose to do. It is up to the leaders of the free world, working together as allies and friends, to help to uncover and to frustrate this Communist design, which otherwise could threaten to wreck the free institutions of many countries and even endanger our own."

Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Mason  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Parsons  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tamm  
Mr. Nease  
Mr. Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Holloman  
Miss Gandy

b6  
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/15/80 BY 60304/MLM  
INDEXED - 1

NOT RECORDED  
191 SEP 12 1956

EX-108

File in  
Foreign  
Political  
Matters - Russia  
REC'D - FBI  
Index  
Foreign Political  
Matters - Italy  
Foreign Political  
Matters - France  
Foreign Political  
Matters - Indonesia

SEP 2 1956

N. Y. TIME

51 SEP 17 1956

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 61

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 6, 1956

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3/15/82 BY SP6 bja/1PT  
10/15/83 SP6 bja/1mtSUBJECT: STATEMENT BY ALLEN W. DULLES,  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA),  
ISSUED BY HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN  
ACTIVITIES (HCUA)

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Enclosed statement of Dulles, which was released by HCUA on September 2, 1956, was reviewed by Central Research Section. Dulles' statement begins by recalling that during the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February, 1956, several Soviet leaders commented on the fact that, in certain nations, it is now possible for the communists to gain control through parliamentary means without the need for force and violence. Dulles then points out that the communists have never gained control of any nation through the free electoral process. He points out that the decisive factor in the communist seizure of power in the European satellite nations, with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia, was the presence of the Soviet army in overwhelming strength in those nations. He traces the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia and Hungary to show how the communists arrested, blackmailed, and terrorized noncommunist political leaders, thereby eliminating all effective opposition. Dulles then emphasizes that, when the communists gain an effective minority position in any parliamentary body, it is a "sign of danger." He states that, at the present time, the communists have a sizable representation in the parliaments of Italy, France, and Indonesia. He then cites the danger that, once the communists have established themselves as a political factor to be reckoned with, the noncommunist political leaders can be persuaded to join forces with them. In Dulles' view, while the danger of "parliamentary compromises" between communists and noncommunists in Europe should not be ignored, the principal danger lies in the nations of Asia where the communist parties have gained a "dangerous degree of respectability," and where the menace of communism is generally underestimated. Dulles concludes by calling on the noncommunist political leaders of the free world "to uncover and frustrate" this communist program of "subversion and cajolery."

**COMMENT:**

Dulles' comments regarding the communist seizure of power in the European satellite nations agree generally with the findings of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression of the U. S. House of Representatives (Kersten Committee) released in 1955.

Enclosure

JFC:mjh

63 SEP 11 1956

Section tickler

1 - Mr. Belmont

ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED

103 SEP 11 1956

11 SEP 11 1956

b3 per CIA

1 - Mr. Nichols

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont from W. C. Sullivan

b3 per CIA



Dulles makes no mention of the fact that Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, during the course of his report to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, also stated that in nations "where capitalism is still strong...the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp class revolutionary struggle."

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For the information of the Director and yourself.

*WCS*

*AK*  
*cd*

*sm*

*HB*  
*cd*



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: September 5, 1956

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT:

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mason \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to my memorandum of September 4, 1956, regarding the statement put out by the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA) which had been given it by Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA, regarding Soviet leaders' alerting the world that the communists are resorting to a parliamentary conquest of free nations. We obtained a copy of Dulles' statement from the HCUA. The Director noted: "I thought there was a House publication containing this & statements by others."

Liaison with the committee today disclosed that it will be another ten days to two weeks before the committee's pamphlet containing the statements of other prominent persons will be ready and that the committee released the Dulles statement individually as the first of a series of statements from more than 120 prominent Americans on various aspects of techniques of Soviet aggression. Special Agent Joseph Connors of the Washington Field Office advised today that there has been some thought of releasing the statement the Director gave the committee separately, but a date when this may be done has not been fixed. Connors is following this and the Bureau will be advised should the committee decide to release the Director's statement separately. In addition, arrangements have been made to obtain a copy of the House publication containing all of the statements as soon as it is available.

cc - Mr. Boardman  
 cc - Mr. Belmont  
 cc - Mr. Jones

Followed 9-12-56

JJM:rm  
 (6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 63581  
 DATE 3/15/82 BY SP6bjal/pt  
 10/15/85 SP6bjal/lmn

NOT RECORDED

176 SEP 10 1956

18 SEP 7 1956

ORIGINAL FILED IN 61-16-1111

68 SEP 12 1956

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: September 4, 1956

FROM : L. B. Nichols 

SUBJECT:

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mason \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to the Washington City News Ticker item dated September 1, 1956, 1:40 p. m., quoting Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA, as stating Soviet leaders have alerted the world that the communists are resorting to a parliamentary conquest of free nations. The statement by Dulles was put out by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The Director asked that we get a copy of this publication. Through liaison with the committee, two copies of Dulles' statement have been obtained and are attached, one to the original of this memorandum and the second to the copy designated for Mr. Belmont.

Enclosure

JJM:rm  
 (4)

cc - Mr. Boardman  
 cc - Mr. Belmont, with copy of enclosure

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 10/15/85 BY sp6bjp/lmw

*I thought there  
 was a House  
 publication  
 containing this &  
 statements by  
 there.*

NOT RECORDED  
 126 SEP 10 956

25 SEP 7 1956

SEP 10 1956

68 SEP 11 1956

ORIGINAL FILED IN 1795

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mason \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

63581  
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 3/15/82 BY SP6BJA/lpt:  
 10/15/85 SP6BJA/lmw/40,403

(RELEASE AT 7:00 P.M. EDT)  
 (CIA)

ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SAID SOVIET LEADERS HAVE ALERTED THE WORLD THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE RESORTING TO A "PARLIAMENTARY" CONQUEST OF FREE NATIONS.

DULLES, IN A STATEMENT MADE PUBLIC BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, CITED ITALY, FRANCE AND INDONESIA AS THE PRIME TARGETS OF THE KREMLIN'S NEW STRATEGY FOR WORLD CONTROL.

HE SAID "THE COMMUNISTS PROPOSE TO INFILTRATE OUR FREE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEMS, TO TAKE OVER OUR PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS AND TO USE THE FREEDOM WHICH OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT GIVES TO DESTROY ALL VESTIGES OF THAT SYSTEM."

THE COMMITTEE ISSUED DULLES' STATEMENT AS THE FIRST OF A SERIES FROM MORE THAN 120 PROMINENT AMERICANS ON TECHNIQUES OF SOVIET AGGRESSION. DULLES' STATEMENT WAS WRITTEN JUNE 22.

DULLES, IN AN ANALYSIS OF MORE THAN 500,000 WORDS DELIVERED BY SOVIET LEADERS AT THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS IN MOSCOW LAST FEBRUARY, SAID "THEY HAVE TOLD US IN NO UNCERTAIN WORDS WHAT THEY PROPOSE TO DO." HE CITED SPECIFICALLY AN ADDRESS BY COMMUNIST PARTY BOSS NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

"A FEW YEARS AGO," HE SAID, "I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT COMMUNIST PARTIES IN EUROPE WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN EVER AGAIN OBTAINING ALLIES AMONG NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES."

"TODAY, HOWEVER, THE DANGER OF PARLIAMENTARY COMPROMISES WITH THE COMMUNISTS, EVEN IN EUROPE, IS NOT TO BE IGNORED," HE SAID.

"IN ASIA THIS THREAT IS EVEN GREATER BECAUSE IT IS GENERALLY LESS WELL UNDERSTOOD," HE SAID.

9/1--PA140P

162-73338-  
 NOT RECORDED  
 176 SEP 10 1956  
 176 SEP 10 1956

68 SEP 12 1956

WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

ORIGINAL FILED IN 161-16-176

ESP SEC

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *att*

DATE: December 4, 1956

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *R*SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/23/85 BY SPL/bja/lmw

Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Nichols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Boardman	<input type="checkbox"/>
Belmont	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mason	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mohr	<input type="checkbox"/>
Parsons	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rosen	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tamm	<input type="checkbox"/>
Nease	<input type="checkbox"/>
Winterrowd	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	<input type="checkbox"/>
Holloman	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gandy	<input type="checkbox"/>

You may be interested in the following information volunteered to Liaison Agent Papich by Mr. Dulles on December 3, 1956.

Dulles confided that he recently was confronted with a decision as to whether he should submit his resignation to the President as is customarily done by Presidential appointees such as Cabinet officers. Dulles stated that he discussed the matter with Sherman Adams. He told Adams that he personally did not feel that the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should be placed in a category of a political appointment. He, therefore, wanted to set a precedent whereby, from now on, the Director of CIA will not submit his resignation after a Presidential election. Dulles did not volunteer any information as to what views may have been expressed by Adams.

Dulles commented to Papich that he was just about finishing 4 years as Director of CIA and that this was the longest tenure of office held by any CIA Director so far. He gave the impression that he took great pride in this particular achievement and he then stated "Of course, I never expect to establish a record like your Director."

Dulles' position regarding the submission of a letter of resignation to the President coupled with his other comments and in light of the spirit in which they were presented, gave the Liaison Agent the definite impression that Dulles personally would like to continue as Director of CIA. This is not surprising because he has always indicated that he liked his job. It would further indicate that to date the White House has not openly manifested any move to get rid of Dulles. Dulles may also be maneuvering to determine just where he stands with the White House.

ACTION:

For your information.

RECORDED-31

EX-117

62-83338-311

16 DEC 11 1956

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Roach
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:amk  
(5)

67 DEC 17 1956

 UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-80750-1  
 (1) Autostat

GIR 1

JBW

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Nease	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

72658

# STALINISM DEAD, C. I. A. HEAD SAYS

Allen Dulles Lays 2 'Fatal'  
Errors to New Soviet Team  
—Gives Yale Lecture

By RICHARD H. PARKE  
Special to The New York Times.  
NEW HAVEN, Nov. 27—The  
director of the Central Intelli-  
gence Agency expressed doubt  
today that the Soviet Union  
would return to Stalinism.

Allen W. Dulles, addressing a  
Yale Law School audience, said  
the new Soviet leaders had made  
two "fatal errors if they propose  
to retain the hard dictatorship  
which the teachings of Lenin and  
Stalin envisage."

First, he said, they "admitted  
to respectability the Tito experi-  
ment in Yugoslavia." Second, he  
said, they mistakenly believed  
they could introduce mass edu-  
cation and still "close off their  
people from access to the reali-  
ties of the outside world."

Sees Conversion of Serfs  
"In the industrial and educa-  
tional progress which they have  
made," Mr. Dulles said, "they  
have gone far towards turning  
serfs into thinking human  
beings."

"They have seen satellites  
move dramatically toward free-  
dom, and it is not too much to  
predict that the Soviet Union  
can never be the same as it was  
in the days of Stalin."

Discussing the uprising in  
Hungary, Mr. Dulles said it  
showed the people of that coun-  
try were unwilling to "accept a  
half-way station toward liberty."

"In so doing," he added, "they  
have tended to disprove the the-  
ory, so long held, that revolt  
against a tyranny equipped with  
the modern weapons of war was  
foredoomed to failure."

"Whatever the final outcome

in Hungary, those who have  
sacrificed themselves will not  
have failed. They have alerted  
the world once more to the  
meaning of Soviet despotism,  
and have struck a blow for free-  
dom which will rank in history  
with the American and French  
Revolutions."

Mr. Dulles noted that his  
agency had been criticized for  
being caught "flat-footed in sit-  
uations such as in the Middle  
East, Poland, Hungary and the  
like."

"Such criticisms have to be  
left unanswered, not because  
they are justified, but because  
the information available to us  
cannot be advertised before the  
event," he said.

Mr. Dulles spoke as this year's  
Lamont lecturer. The lecture  
was part of the university's ob-  
servance of the Woodrow Wilson  
Centennial.

*Will*  
*pp*  
*q/w*  
*Rogers*

62-25338-  
NOT RECORDED  
149 DEC 7 1956

NOV 28 1956

N. Y. TIMES

52 DEC 10 1956

NOT RECORDED  
149 DEC 7 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/21/85 BY SP4BJL/mv

# CIA Chief Sees Stalinism's End

NEW HAVEN, Conn., Nov. 28 (AP).—Allen W. Dulles said yesterday Soviet leaders made two errors fatal to the Kremlin dictatorship in the "Tito experiment" and in introducing mass education to the Russian people.

"It is not too much to predict that the Soviet Union can never be the same as it was in the days of Stalin," Mr. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said.

In a "Lamont Lecture" at Yale University on the life of President Woodrow Wilson, Mr. Dulles said, "We are now going through dramatic days in our relations with the Soviet Union and it seems that some inexorable laws are at last catching up with the Soviet system."

## Raised Question in 1955

He said he had raised the question 18 months ago in view of Kremlin approval of "the Tito form of heresy." How could the Soviet Union "deny the European satellites the right to a similar heresy?"

"I only wish that this question had been a prophecy," Mr. Dulles said, "because it is proving to be true. Poland has already made moves in this direction. In Hungary the people were unwilling to accept a halfway station toward liberty and have electrified the world by their struggle for complete independence. In doing so, they have tended to disprove the theory so long held that revolt against tyranny equipped with modern weapons of war was foredoomed to failure."

"Whatever the final outcome in Hungary, those who have sacrificed themselves will not have failed. They have alerted the world once more to the meaning of Soviet despotism, and have struck a blow for freedom which will rank in history with the American and French revolutions."

## Mass Education Backfires

Mr. Dulles said the Kremlin made a fatal error in calculating that it could safely introduce mass education into the Soviet Union and that those who were educated in science and technology would not come to think in political terms as well.

"Education has made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Soviet leaders to continue to close off their people from access to the realities of the outside world," he said.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
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Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*file*

*MR. BOARDMAN*

*Page 1*  
*See page 2*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/23/80 BY SPUBJA/IMW

Wash. Post and Times Herald \_\_\_\_\_  
Wash. News \_\_\_\_\_  
Wash. Star B-19 \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Mirror \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
Daily Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
The Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
New Leader \_\_\_\_\_

162-230-  
NOT RECORDED  
191 DEC 3 1956

NOV 28 1956  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

NOV 28 1956

58 DEC 1956

RECORDED -2

Legal Attache, London

Director, FBI

ALLEN W. DULLES

DIRECTOR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 1 - Yellow  
1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Liaison Section  
August 1, 1957  
1 - Mr. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

For your information, Mr. Dulles is scheduled to leave Washington, D. C., on August 1, 1957, for a trip to Europe where he will call at various Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stations. He will spend some time vacationing, very likely, in Switzerland. (S)(u)

If Dulles calls at offices of any Legal Attaches, he should be treated courteously but you should not get involved in the discussion of any official business without first consulting the Bureau.

- 1 - Paris  
1 - Madrid  
1 - Rome  
1 - Bonn

366904  
6/21/99  
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

- 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)

SJP:bjt  
(11)

Classified by SP6 bja/lmw  
Declassify on: OADR  
7/23/85

Cover memo Roach to Belmont  
7/30/57, same caption SJP:bjt

no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
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Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

6/0 AUG 13 1957

Mail Room

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL  
ON 6/13/00  
PER OGA Review  
ON 5/24/00



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *BH*~~SECRET~~

DATE: July 30, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *R*SUBJECT: <sup>⑤</sup> ALLEN W. DULLES  
DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
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Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

The Liaison Agent has been informed that Allen Dulles *dr* will depart from Washington, D. C., on Thursday, August 1, 1957, for a trip to Europe, where he will be calling at various Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stations. He will also be vacationing, very likely, in Switzerland. *(S)(U)*

ACTION:

Enclosed herewith is a letter to our Legal Attaches in Europe. In the past, Dulles has paid courtesy calls on some of our Legal Attaches. It is not expected that he will bring up any official business but the Legal Attaches are being instructed not to get involved in such matters without first checking with the Bureau. *M 3-1*

Enclosure Serial 6-1-57

SJP:bjt  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Foreign Liaison
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

no deletions per OGA ltr  
9/7/10Classified by *606 bjallmw*  
Declassify on: *OADR*

Fol # 366904

CLASSIFIED BY *SP 2 ALM/EHL*  
DECLASSIFY ON: *25X 6*

6/21/99

EX-110

RECORDED - 77

AUG 7 1957

# 366904  
DECLASSIFIED BY *SP 2 ALM/EHL*  
ON *6/13/00*PER OGA REVIEW ON *5/24/00*~~SECRET~~



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(uc/baw 60324)  
DATE 09-10-2010

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SEE REVERSE  
SIDE FOR  
CLASSIFICATION  
ACTION

per oga letter dated 9/7/10  
DATE: April 5, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

Tolson  
Nichols  
Boardman  
Belmont  
Mason  
Mohr  
Parson  
Rosen  
Tamm  
Nease  
Winter  
Tele. Rm.  
Holloman  
Gandy

SUBJECT: JOSEPH ALSOP  
IS - R

FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS  
TO DISSEMINATION  
SEE FILE 100-354477-208

On April 4, 1957, Agent Papich met with Allen Dulles and James Angleton of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), at which time Dulles volunteered some comments concerning the instant case. Dulles had just finished reading a summary of information concerning Alsop compiled by the Bureau. Dulles remarked, "This is really a tough one." He stated that as far as he was concerned, it would be most important to identify homosexuals in Government who might have been utilized by Alsop as sources, since such individuals would naturally be vulnerable to recruitment by the Soviets. [Dulles expressed the opinion that Alsop very likely would not divulge very much information along these lines.] (\$)(X)(S)(U)

Shortly after, Agent Papich met with Angleton; Dulles was not present. Angleton advised that a cable had just been

Angleton read from the cable. The following was the pertinent information: (\$)(X)(S)

Alsop manifested a casual attitude relative to the interview and tried to give the impression that he was not disturbed about his situation.

nevertheless, describe Alsop as being under "heavy emotional strain." Alsop admitted that he had engaged in homosexual activity with several Government clerks in Washington, D. C. He emphasized that most of his homosexual activity had taken place in New York City. He emphatically refused to identify any individuals. He claimed that he did not know of any top Government officials who were homosexuals. He told Welch that he expected that an investigation was being conducted in Washington, D. C., concerning his activities and as far as he was concerned, this would be "fruitless." He stated that while Guy Burgess, former British diplomat, was in Washington, D. C., he and Burgess had the same boyfriend. He refused to identify the boyfriend. Alsop stated that while in Moscow, he did not see or seek Burgess. He claimed that he has never engaged in any homosexual activity. (\$)(X)(S)

SJP:bal (4)  
67 APR 29 1957  
1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Liaison Section  
1 - Mr. Papich

~~SECRET~~

20 APR 11 1957

NOT RECORDED  
66 APR 12 1957  
INITIALS ON FILE

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Memo Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont  
Re: JOSEPH ALSOP

~~SECRET~~

(U) with any Soviet other than with the exception of the recent incident in Moscow. Alsop indicated that he would remain in Europe; that he was proceeding to Cairo, Egypt; that he planned to travel to satellite countries; and that he expected to return to Moscow for a visit. (~~S~~)(X)(S)

(U) Angleton advised Agent Papich that the foregoing information had not yet been furnished to Dulles and that for the time being, he was furnishing it strictly for the Bureau's information. He stated that complete details

(S) of the interrogation would be furnished to the Bureau (~~S~~)(X)(S)(u)

(S) Angleton then volunteered some observations on a b1 per CIA strictly confidential basis. He stated that at the present b3 time in CIA the only individuals who were familiar with the recent Alsop development were: Allen Dulles, General Cabell, Frank Wisner, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, [redacted]

[redacted] and Angleton. Angleton stated that Dulles himself had been a good friend of the Alsops and that when Dulles first came to Washington a few years ago, he stayed at the Alsop home. In Angleton's opinion, this had been a stupid move on the part of Dulles. Angleton personally feels that Dulles is a man of integrity and that he has never left himself in a position where he could be compromised by Alsop. Angleton was particularly referring to possible leaks of information from Dulles. Angleton stated that a few weeks ago, Dulles and Alsop had a bitter argument as a result of some information which Alsop had printed in one of his columns. The information was directly related to a briefing which Allen Dulles had made before the National Security Council. Dulles called Alsop and charged him with "treasonable conduct." (~~S~~)(X)(S)(u)

(U) With regard to Wisner, Angleton advised that this was a different situation. He stated that Wisner, for years, has been a close friend of Alsop's and Angleton is now greatly concerned because Wisner might be inclined to adopt a subjective rather than an objective attitude toward the case. Angleton stated he is doing everything possible to make certain that Wisner does not assume a dominating or directing position with regard to action taken by CIA in this matter. (~~S~~)(X)(S)(u)

Angleton stated that another individual who presents a problem is Robert Amory, Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA. Amory is one of the key men in CIA's preparation of intelligence estimates. According to Angleton, Amory has been a close friend of both Alsops. (~~S~~)(X)(S)(u)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memo Roach to Belmont  
Re: Joseph Alsop

Angleton made the observation that both CIA and FBI should not forget the fact that in the past, at least, Carmel Offie was friendly with Joseph Alsop. Offie has been reliably reported to be a homosexual. (S)(X)(S)

(S) Angleton raised one question with the Liaison Agent. He stated that in his opinion, [redacted] by now, must have some knowledge of the Alsop incident in Moscow. Angleton inquired if the Bureau had any objection if he checked with [redacted] on this matter. He plans to inquire as to exactly what the [redacted] might have. (S)(X)(S)(U)

OBSERVATION:

Although Angleton feels that Allen Dulles himself is not vulnerable as a result of his associations with Alsop, the Liaison Agent received the very strong impression on April 4, 1957, when he met with the Director of CIA, that Dulles was extremely worried. Dulles undoubtedly is going over in his own mind concerning all meetings he ever had with Alsop. Furthermore, he undoubtedly cannot forget the fact that many of his own employees have been closely associated with the subject. In this connection, we should bear in mind that several CIA officials have been very active in the Georgetown social set, which included Alsop. (S)(X)(S)(U)

ACTION:

(S) If you approve, Liaison will advise Angleton that any decision he makes concerning contacting the [redacted] is his own; that contact with the [redacted] on this matter will not interfere with Bureau operations; and that if he develops any information of interest to the Bureau, we would like to be advised. (S)(X)(S)(U)

I note Ch. 2 is answered in another memo.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

1. OK.
2. I would like to know [redacted] if his status [redacted] were told he resigned [redacted] signed [redacted] 1952



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
American Embassy  
Paris 8, France

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Parsons  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tamm  
Mr. Trotter  
Mr. Nease  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Holloman  
Miss Gandy

Date: August 30, 1957  
To: Director, FBI  
From: Legat, Paris (66-128)  
Subject: ALLEN W. DULLES  
DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ReBulet to London 8/1/57.

This is to advise that while Assistant Legal Attache [redacted] was in Switzerland during the period August 19 - 21 last, it was ascertained that Mr. DULLES was in Zurich on August 19 and on August 20 was visiting in Bern. While in Bern, Mr. DULLES was the guest of Ambassador HENRY J. TAYLOR. Assistant Legal Attache [redacted] was not in personal contact with Mr. DULLES on either of the foregoing occasions.

WFD:CM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9/11/85 BY sp6 bja/lmw

no deletions per OGA letter 9/7/10

RECORDED - 25 62-83338-33

SEP 11 1957

EX-07

JAISON

766 SEP 10 1957

GIR 1

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: September 18, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *3*SUBJECT: *9* ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mason \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

The Liaison Agent was informed on September 17, 1957, that Allen Dulles is departing for the West Coast on the afternoon of September 18, 1957. He is scheduled to make a speech at a dinner affair sponsored by the Advertising Council, Incorporated. It is believed that the speech will be made in Los Angeles.

On September 17, 1957, James Angleton of the Central Intelligence Agency confidentially advised that Dulles had been requested by his brother, the Secretary of State, to make the speech which reportedly will have ramifications in our foreign policy field.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

*JSB* *Ambo* *sm* *WZ* *1/8* *1/8* *C*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 9/11/88 BY sp6/bja/lmw

- 1 - Mr. Nichols
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED

62-83338-341

3 SEP 20 1957

no deletions per OGA letter 9/7/10

00 SEP 20 1957

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: September 25, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES  
 ADDRESS MADE BEFORE  
 ADVERTISING COUNCIL, INC.  
 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA  
 SEPTEMBER 19, 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/23/85 BY SP6/bja/lmw

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mason \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosed herewith is a copy of a speech entitled "The Communists Also Have Their Problems," made by Allen Dulles before the Advertising Council, Inc., at San Francisco, California, on September 19, 1957. This document was furnished to the Liaison Agent on September 23, 1957, by Dulles.

This speech has already been publicized in newspapers. Dulles states that the ideological fervor "is seeping out of the international revolutionary communist movement, particularly in the Soviet Union." He states that Marxism was not designed for the atomic age and Russia is now confronted with numerous and complex industrial and technological problems which can't be resolved by applying Marxist and Leninist principles. Dulles claims that collective leadership in Russia has failed, as evidenced in the disposals of Molotov and Kaganovich. According to Dulles, the claim that the purpose of recent changes in the Soviet administration was to return to pure Leninist communism is "camouflage." Dulles asserts that communist and Marxist theories did not play decisive roles in the struggle in Russia and, to the contrary, "it was a question of power politics."

Dulles stated that the Soviet leaders are divided on three issues: (1) The decentralization of industry. He points out that this decentralization will remove some of the power from the central government at Moscow to the provinces and, thus, create a problem. (2) The agricultural problem. Dulles refers to this as the "Achilles heel" of the Soviet system. He states that Khrushchev's responsibility for the policy of investing heavily in the semi-arid and virgin lands is great and may put Khrushchev on the spot. He points out that 45% of Soviet labor is on farms as compared with the figure of 10% in the United States. (3) Foreign policy and policy toward the European satellites. Khrushchev continues to be vulnerable because of the policy followed with regard to Yugoslavia and for promoting a doctrine of "differing roads to Socialism."

Dulles maintains that the Russian people still live in a dream world, considering everything outside of Russia. He is of the opinion that the Russians will continue to restrict their people from

Enclosure

SJP:bjt (6)

1 - Mr. Nichols

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED-46

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 94-36377-1

62-83338-35

ENCLOSURE

OCT 7 1957

W.C. Sullivan

Liaison

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont  
RE: ALLEN W. DULLES  
ADDRESS MADE BEFORE  
ADVERTISING COUNCIL, INC.  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA  
SEPTEMBER 19, 1957

learning what goes on in the outside world. He states that there is student and intellectual unrest in Russia which may develop into a serious problem. He further points out that the Soviet leaders can't hold back the desire of their scientists and technicians to learn and expand their knowledge.

Dulles states that today communism is more valuable as an article of export than it is as a solution for the Soviet problems. He states that communism continues to have an appeal in undeveloped areas but in those countries where industrialization has expanded, communism is losing its appeal.

Dulles makes an interesting analogy in comparing communism as a revolutionary movement with the French Revolution. He describes the pattern as follows: Intellectuals assert themselves and adopt a "reform program." Revolutionary elements then take over from the intellectuals which leads to a reign of terror. Successive groups of leaders are destroyed with each change in the revolution. "Eventually human nature rebels and demands a more normal life. Then the practical political and military leaders depose the extremists." Dulles comments on the foregoing by stating that military dictatorship is one of the possible lines of evolution in the Soviet Union.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

*[Handwritten signatures: "W", "SM", "HBR", and a checkmark]*



*Rec.  
from A. Dulles  
9/23/57  
WWS*

"THE COMMUNISTS ALSO HAVE THEIR PROBLEMS"

ADDRESS BY ALLEN WELSH DULLES,  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
BEFORE THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL, INC.,  
19 September 1957  
ST. FRANCIS HOTEL,  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

It is a privilege to have this opportunity to recognize publicly the generosity of the Advertising Council in devoting so great a share of its time and resources in the general welfare. You have freely supported those great causes which promote domestically and internationally the ideals of our people. You have been in the forefront of campaigns to alert the people of this country to the dangers of alien and destructive movements such as international communism. As one in Government who has had the opportunity of judging of the effectiveness of this work, I wish to express gratitude.

It may seem a bit paradoxical that the Director of Central Intelligence should be addressing the Advertising Council. You represent the trend -- which seems quite irresistible -- that "it pays to advertise."

*Memo Roach to Belmont  
9-25-57 SP/lyx*

I am the head of the silent service and cannot advertise my wares. Sometimes, I admit, this is a bit irksome. Often we know a bit more about what is going on in the world than we are credited with, and we realize a little advertisement might improve our public relations. For major reasons of policy, however, public relations must be sacrificed to the security of our operations.

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DATE 7/23/85 BY *spubja/lmw*

ENCLOSURE

62-83338-35



You and we, however, have much in common. We are both deeply concerned with the impact of ideas on human behaviour. In carrying out one of the Central Intelligence Agency's important tasks -- that of estimating future developments in the foreign field -- the ability to analyze public reactions is essential in our job. We, as you, have to judge whether ideas have a transitory value or will have an enduring effect upon the behaviours of people.

In particular, it is a fascinating study to follow the development of the ideas behind certain of the great revolutionary movements. Some such movements were promoted by religious fervor, some by brute military force, many by a combination of might and assertions of right. These movements have had their day -- long or short. Some have had broad geographic appeal -- some were limited to a particular area and the history of some has never really been deciphered. Our civilization, despite the dark ages, has been tough enough to survive the most vigorous and long-lived revolutionary assaults on mind and body.

Tonight I propose to give you the results of an analysis of the recent happenings within the Soviet Communist world and I shall be bold enough to draw certain conclusions which support my conviction that radical changes are taking place and more are in the making.

The initial ideological fervor, I believe, is seeping out of the international revolutionary communist movement, particularly in

the Soviet Union. Marxism was not designed for the atomic age of the mid-twentieth century. Effective as Communism has been in establishing control of two powerful nations and imposing its will on a number of Satellite countries, it is beginning to encounter difficulties in coping with the complex industrial and technological problems of today. Further, while some of the industrial and military achievements of both the USSR and Communist China have stirred the pride of its citizens, Communism has failed to devise a political system capable of commanding the loyalties of governed peoples without resort to the cruel barbarities of mass terror. It has satisfied neither the ideals, the aspirations, nor the needs of the people subject to its domination.

Accordingly, the leaders of international communism are being forced to review their situation and to consider major changes--changes which strike at the very heart of the system. The theories of Marx and Lenin proved useful window-dressing behind which the Communists established their monopoly of political power--the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. These ideas are of little aid in guiding the Communist dictatorship in meeting the challenge of the world today.

What prophet is there left in Soviet Russia? Marx and Lenin are given lip service, but their advice and counsel have little applicability today. Stalin has been discredited - though his embarrassing remains are still on view in the Kremlin. Khrushchev is unlikely to blossom out as a creator of new Communist doctrine though his impetuosity and unpredictability remain a matter of grave concern in an international situation as tense as that of today. Mao retains his role as a prophet in China, but he, too, is having his troubles.

When Stalin disappeared from the scene a little less than five years ago, he left a clouded heritage. His later years of dictatorship had brought the Soviet Union close to war and disaster. Ventures in Greece, at Berlin, and finally in Korea had opened the eyes even of the credulous abroad. Domestically, harsh measures of forced industrialization and military buildup, successful as they were technologically, had left little place for meeting the needs of the people.

Moreover, the systematic cruelties of the secret police had created popular unrest, suspicion and despair. Khrushchev told us the story of how terror-ridden Soviet life had become in his now well-known secret speech at the 20th Party Congress over a year ago--a speech still unpublished in the Communist world. It was too strong medicine for popular consumption, although bits and pieces of it were allowed to leak out.

Stalin's successors had the difficult task of tempering a dictatorship but yet maintaining complete authority, of doing away with the Stalinist type of secret police repression and yet keeping the people under iron discipline, of maintaining a tight rein but still creating the impression, and giving some of the substance, of a new measure of freedom.

Beria found it hard to fit into this picture. He did not want to relinquish his personal control of the secret police through which he hoped to gain the top position. His plot was discovered and he was liquidated. Since then the military seems to have become the decisive element where force or the threat of force was required to support a political decision.

After the Beria crisis we were told that the dictatorship of the proletariat had become a collective leadership--more properly described as a collective dictatorship. True enough, the crisis of readjustment to the post-Stalin era brought together in uneasy harmony the surviving members of the governing body known as the Presidium of the Party. Many here at home and abroad wrongly estimated that this might be an enduring form of government. Actually bitter personal rivalries and basic differences of philosophies and outlook remain unreconciled.

The ultimate authority to make crucial decisions must rest firmly somewhere and that "somewhere" is unlikely for long to be

in a collective. Majority rule is appropriate for legislative and judicial bodies, but it does not function satisfactorily in the executive field, where decisiveness of action is essential.

For a time after Stalin's disappearance from the scene, Malenkov tried to lead the collective team, seemingly down a course which promised a better break for the people than they had ever had before. In 1955 he was forced to confess his incapacity and Khrushchev took over, committing himself, like his predecessor, to the collective rule formula.

Then, last June, the inevitable irreconcilable conflict of opinions emerged, the collective broke down and, with the approval of the military, in particular Zhukov, Khrushchev eliminated his rivals—Molotov and Kaganovich, who really felt that the old Stalinist and foreign policies were preferable, and Malenkov, who due to his relative youth, political experience, and apparent popularity, was a dangerous potential rival. At the moment, Khrushchev is busily engaged in implicating Malenkov in the crimes of Stalin's later days, classing him as "shadow and tool" of Beria. Since Beria was shot for treason, the threat to Malenkov is naked enough for all to see.

So the history of Soviet governmental changes repeats itself, although in a slightly different pattern from that of the two previous decades. Those recently purged have not yet been liquidated.

like Beria or eliminated by mock trials such as those of the late 1930's. With a touch of almost sardonic humor, the miscreants have been assigned to the oblivion of Siberia or the darkness of Outer Mongolia.

It was the hand-picked Central Committee of the Communist Party, with the backing of the Army, which played the decisive role in last summer's changes in the high command. This suggests that the Presidium on its own can no longer deal with recalcitrant members, at least in a situation where the issues are closely drawn and where those to be eliminated are not in a hopeless minority.

The claim that the purpose of these changes was to get back to the pure Leninist Communism of the past is camouflage. No differing theories of Communist and Marxist dogma played a decisive role in this struggle. It was a question of power politics in a situation where hard decisions had to be made in both the domestic and foreign fields. There were in fact very deep and fundamental divergences of views among the members of the Presidium and the collective failed to function because the differences were not susceptible of compromise.

Three main issues divided the Soviet leaders. The first concerned the decentralization of industry.

After years of extolling the virtues of a centrally planned economy, some of the Soviet leaders have recently begun to stress

the need of local initiative to improve efficiency at the plant level. By the use of local resources, it was hoped to ease the burden on transport facilities, minimize duplication of effort and stimulate managerial initiative. Acting on these theories, Khrushchev recently forced through a program to decentralize away from Moscow many elements of control of the great Soviet industrial machine, in the most sweeping reorganization of the economic management machinery since the first Five Year Plan was adopted in 1928. Some 27 specialized economic ministries in Moscow were abolished and replaced by 105 regional economic councils.

Last June, several of Khrushchev's colleagues tried to reverse all this.

The reason for the reorganization is readily understandable if one tries to conceive of the bureaucratic mess which we would have if we attempted to manage from the Capital all the details of a growing industrial complex more dispersed geographically than that of the United States and approaching one-half of its size.

There should be eventual economic benefits from the decentralization, but Khrushchev's plan will create as many problems as it solves.

A long period of transitional confusion is certain while new administrative command and coordination channels are worked out. In the longer run, there is the danger for the Soviet Union that a

kind of economic provincialism will develop to threaten the dominance of the central government.

The reason for the bitter fight against this reorganization by many of Khrushchev's colleagues is clear. The decentralization will remove some of the power from the central government in Moscow and transfer it to the provinces. Here only two members of the Presidium are in a position to exercise real influence, Khrushchev, through his control of the party machinery throughout the Soviet Union, and the military, presently represented by Marshal Zhukov.

The second issue dividing the Soviet leaders in June last was the agricultural problem, often called the Achilles heel of the Soviet system. Khrushchev has been pressing for ever-increasing areas of State-controlled farm lands, on the pattern of the huge development he had started in the so-called "virgin lands" east of the Caspian, in order to make good the shortcomings of Communism's greatest fiasco -- the collectivized farm system. This involves some 80 - 100 million acres; larger than the entire wheat acreage of the United States.

For many years Soviet emphasis on heavy industry and military strength drained manpower and capital investments away from the farms, making agriculture the stepchild of the Stalinist economy. In contrast with the rapid growth rate of other parts of the Soviet economy, for the past twenty years Soviet production



of agricultural commodities has failed to increase as fast as the population of the USSR.

After all, soil conditions, rainfall and temperature do not favor the Soviet Union despite its vast area. Less than 10% of the country is likely to produce reasonable agricultural yields in normal years. Moreover, the combination of bureaucratic mismanagement, and Communist neglect of the motivating force of personal incentives had resulted in an inefficiency of farm labor so great that it takes about one farm worker to feed and supply every four persons in the USSR, whereas the ratio in the United States is about one for every sixteen persons. Hence, 45% of Soviet labor is on the farms as compared with 10% of American workers.

Khrushchev's responsibility for the policy of investing heavily in the semi-arid, agriculturally marginal "virgin" lands is very great. So far he has been lucky, with one excellent crop and one fair one. This year (1957) promises to be only fair and there is no doubt that many Soviet leaders fear a major crop failure as the moisture is used up in the new lands. Even Mikoyan, who has stuck with Khrushchev so far and now is probably the number two man in the party, is said to have been dubious about the "virgin" lands program.

The final success or failure of the program is still to be determined and Khrushchev's personal reputation is deeply involved.

He has promised his people equality per capita with Americans in milk and butter by 1958 and in meat by 1961. This latter would involve an increase of 3 1/2 times in Soviet meat production which, to say the least, is an ambitious program, even taking into account the noted fertility of the rabbit, which is included in the Soviet calculations as well as their claimed ability to produce a larger number of twin lambs.

Finally, a third point at issue between Khrushchev and his opponents lay in the related fields of foreign policy and policy toward the European Satellites. Here Khrushchev was attacked by Molotov and his followers for having weakened the Soviet position by his policy of reconciliation with Yugoslavia and by his Austrian settlement. He was, in fact, vulnerable to the charge of having opened the flood gates to revolt by stimulating support for the doctrine of "differing roads to Socialism," a heresy that is now threatening the monolithic structure of the Soviet empire.

For a time during the Hungarian Revolution, the ranks in the Soviet leadership had closed and Khrushchev personally as well as his opponents must bear the responsibility for the ruthless intervention in November 1956. The scars of dissent remained, however, and in the indictment of Molotov by the Central Committee, his Yugoslav and Austrian policies are the subject of particular criticism. Hungary goes unmentioned.

Moscow's future policy toward the European Satellites remains unresolved. Though Molotov was vigorously attacked for his mistaken attitude, Khrushchev, since the Polish and Hungarian revolts, has feared the contagious influence of granting more freedom anywhere. Certainly none of the Soviet leaders cares to remember the precepts of Lenin, who had this to say in 1917:

"If Finland, if Poland, if the Ukraine break away from Russia there is nothing bad about that....

No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations."

These were the major issues on which Khrushchev fought for, and by an eyelash won, the leadership of the Soviet Union.

There are many other burning problems facing the new group ruling the Soviet Union.

First of all, they have the problem of East-West contacts, which for propaganda purposes at least they strongly claim to favor. Can the leaders really permit the people of the USSR to have knowledge of the facts of life? Do they dare open up to the press, to radio, to television?

Except for certain supervised and guided tours, the answer to this so far seems to be "no." We can guess how frightened they are from their panicky warnings to Soviet youth about being deceived by the words of the American boys and girls who went to Moscow

recently for the big Soviet Youth Festival.

Similarly, they do not dare publish such documents as the Khrushchev secret speech, the U.N. report on Hungary, nor the basic attack on Communist doctrine by the Yugoslav, Djilas, in his recently published book, "The New Class."

Instead of dealing with such criticisms openly, Soviet leaders try to sweep them under the rug and keep their own people in the dark.

There was recently published in Moscow a highly realistic novel, with the eloquent title Not By Bread Alone. It evoked great popular interest in the USSR because it showed some of the seamier side of political life and bureaucracy in the Soviet Union today. All the big guns of the Soviet regime began to fire at the author, Dudintsev, and Khrushchev himself recently lambasted the book as misguided and dangerous. It is significant that they have not yet banned it. Probably they were too late in realizing its subtle attack on the foundations of the Communist system.

By and large the bulk of the Russian people still live in a dream world about everything outside the USSR, and the most tragic part about this is the distorted facts and fancies the Soviet leaders give their own people about the allegedly hostile attitudes of Americans toward them. The exchange of a few controlled travelling delegations is not enough. The barriers to information and knowledge must be torn down.

The Soviet leaders also have to deal with the problems created by their own educational system and by the development of an industrial and technical elite. Under the lash of its pell-mell industrialization program, the USSR in the past decade has enormously speeded up the education of the Russian people, particularly in the scientific and technical field. As a result, the USSR is turning out hundreds of thousands of graduates of schools corresponding to our high schools and colleges.

It is true that in their educational system they emphasize scientific and technical fields much more than social sciences and the humanities. But knowledge is not an inert substance. It has a way of seeping across lines and into adjacent compartments of learning. The Soviet leaders, I firmly believe, cannot illuminate their scientific lecture halls and laboratories without also letting the light of truth into their history and economics classrooms. Students cannot be conditioned to turning off their analytical processes when the instructor changes a topic.

Student and intellectual unrest is a troublesome challenge to a dictatorship. The Chinese Communists experimented briefly with placating critics by liberalizing their thought-control system -- enunciating the doctrine known as "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend." In the face of the far-reaching criticisms promptly voiced by Chinese intellectuals,

the Peiping regime quickly reversed itself and has only a few weeks ago resumed the practice of publicly executing students who dared to suggest that China's ills result in part from flaws in the Communist system itself.

The education which Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders give their people is a dangerous commodity for a dictatorship. Men and women who have their critical faculties sharpened are beginning to question why the Russian people cannot be freed from rigid Communist Party and police-state discipline, given a greater economic share of the fruit of their labors, and allowed to participate -- at least by an effective expression of consent -- in their own governing.

In the past the Soviets counted particularly upon their ability to appeal with success to the youth and the students. In 1905 Lenin wrote, "We are the party of the future but the future belongs to the young. We are the party of innovation, and it is to the innovators that youth always gladly gives its allegiance. We are the party of self-sacrificing struggle against the ancient rot, and the young are always readiest for sacrificial combat -- and we shall always be the party of the youth of the advanced class."

That proud boast could not be made today. The Hungarian students were ready for combat, but against the Soviets, not for them. The deep disillusionment of the Polish youth with the

Soviet-imposed version of Communism can be read in their brilliantly edited publications, and in spite of Soviet censorship there is evidence that they are read eagerly by those who can obtain them in the Russian universities.

The Soviet government can still organize massive propaganda circuses like the recent Moscow Youth Festival. They can train an ever increasing number of young scientists and technicians. They can bribe the ambitious with the rewards of power and special privilege in the swollen bureaucracy. But they are finding it increasingly difficult to enlist in their cause the self-sacrificing and idealistic young men that Lenin once so counted on and who are the real motive power of successful revolutionary movements.

The Soviet leaders also have the growing problem of the technical and managerial elite which has been created to run Soviet industry -- now being decentralized. It will not be easy to restrain this class of people from using its critical skills to question the cumbersome governmental and Communist Party bureaucracy and what it is doing -- or not doing -- to give the members of that elite a better life.

Probably it is out of respect for the growing perceptiveness of the people of Russia, and at least out of recognition of popular yearning for peace, that Soviet leaders have been forced to give lip service to disarmament, another grave problem before the Moscow

leaders. Now that the issue of conceding some form of inspection and control in the USSR is squarely presented, they are hesitating. This prospect goes against every tradition and instinct of the secretive and suspicious Communist dictators.

These are some of the practical issues which Khrushchev now faces. There is no easy solution. After all, dictatorships, whether of the Stalin or of the Hitler type, can for a time exact great sacrifices from their peoples and achieve great materialistic accomplishments. In fact, for a limited period, it may be easier for a dictatorship to make steel than bread and butter -- easier to build a mighty war machine than to satisfy the moral, spiritual and material needs of a great and diverse people. This is certainly the case with the Communist dictatorship in the USSR.

Today Communism is more valuable as an article of export than it is as a solution for the problems of a country like the Soviet Union, which is making great strides in fields of material progress, but which has still found no way of creating a government which can meet the needs and aspirations of its people.

Undoubtedly in many areas of the world, particularly those recently freed from Colonial rule, the image of Communism still has an appeal. It seems to combine the advantages of strict discipline at the top with the promise of quick industrialization.



These factors appeal to new nations struggling with the task of making a government work among peoples who have had little experience with it and who at the same time have the desire to become quickly an industrial force in their own right.

The politically unsophisticated peoples of the underdeveloped nations have yet to learn what the peoples of the Communist world are slowly coming to understand about Marxism and industrial growth. Djilas, the Yugoslav Communist heretic, put it well:

"Modern Communism began as an idea with the inception of modern industry. It is dying out or being eliminated in those countries where industrial development has achieved its basic purposes. It flourishes in those countries where this has not yet happened."

In fact, I would add to this that the force of ideological Communism seems weakest in those countries like the USSR, where it has been the longest in control. It has its strongest appeal to the minds of these peoples in the underdeveloped areas of the world where they have had no practical experience with it.

Viewed in broad perspective, Communism is only one of the many great revolutionary movements that have swept into world history. Such movements seemed to combine an ideology or a faith expressed as a program of action; and a discipline through a

political or military machine capable of organizing the energies of the people in order to carry out the ideas that have captured their imaginations and loyalties.

I realize that historical analogies are notoriously treacherous. But there may be food for thought in comparing the evolution of Soviet Communism with the classical periods of revolutionary movements. Possibly the closest parallel in history is with the French Revolution.

The pattern seems to be this: the intellectuals desert their political institutions and adopt what they call a "Reform Program." Then, revolutionary elements take over from the intellectuals and seize power, generally beginning with the moderates of the Danton type, and passing through the extremists like Robespierre, with a reign of inhuman zeal and terror. Successive groups of leaders are destroyed with each change in the tempo of the revolution. As Vergniaud said in the course of the French Revolution, "The Revolution, like Saturn, devours its own children." Eventually, human nature rebels and demands a more normal life. Then the practical political and military leaders depose the extremists.

Finally, in the case of the French Revolution, there was the temptation, to which they quickly yielded, to indulge in foreign military adventure, and -- eventually the access to power of the military man on horseback, Bonaparte. There is, naturally,

considerable speculation these days as to whether this last phase of the French Revolution will be repeated in the case of Soviet Communism. I have no crystal ball answer, but certainly military dictatorship is one of the possible lines of evolution in the Soviet Union.

From this analysis of developments in the Soviet Union, it is fair to conclude that I believe that the old Communist dialectic of Marx, Lenin and even Stalin does not answer the problems of the Soviet Union today -- either those of its industrial growth or of its lasting control over the great peoples living within the Soviet Union.

It would flow from this that Khrushchev and whoever he may associate with himself in the leadership, assuming he keeps his control for a time, will have to determine how they are going to accomplish this dual task. Will they meet it by further relaxation, thereby increasing the moral and industrial potential of the Soviet Union itself, and the prospects of peace, but risking the loss of the Satellite countries? Will they attempt a reversion to something like Stalinism under another name as some of the tough, uncompromising language and actions from Moscow of recent days would suggest? Or will they be tempted to risk foreign venture with a view to uniting their people and their energies to meet alleged enemies they claim are encircling them?

These are the issues. I would not wish to suggest that what I have referred to as the decline of the Marxist Communism has left the Soviet Union materially weak in facing them. The Soviet may be ideologically less menacing, technologically its power is still increasing.

Throughout the entire revolution, once the Communist regime was firmly established in Russia, the emphasis was placed on heavy industry, and on building up the war machine. This has been a constant policy and has been one phase of Soviet life that has not been affected by changing leaders or interpretations of Communist ideology. After all, the men who are at the helm in the Soviet Union are not the original revolutionary heroes. Khrushchev and Mikoyan and their henchmen belong to the ever-present class of political careerists who see in a revolutionary movement the path to power and privilege. They did not make the revolution, like Lenin. It made them, and they want above all else to preserve their positions.

While Marxism at one time or another has invaded most segments of Soviet life, including the army with its political commissar and indoctrination agents, those who have planned the Soviet military buildup have been little hampered by it. In their concentration on the fields of nuclear energy, aircraft design and construction, and the development of guided missiles, they experienced little ideological interference except during brief periods of Stalin's last hectic days.

Take, for example, the case of guided missiles. Here they never ceased work from the days of 1945 when they took over the German missile installation at Peenemuende with its rockets of a range between 150 to 200 miles. Now we know they have developed modern missiles of many times the power and efficiency of the German wartime models.

The Soviet Union which we face today presents a series of contradictions. Its leader has practically unrestrained power except for such control as the military may exercise, backed by a formidable war machine--a leader committed by his express policies to improve the lot of his people, and presumably committed also to relax the harsh controls of Stalin which he has described so vividly himself and which he purports to abhor.

At the same time, this leader, Khrushchev, faces the dilemma that any substantial relaxation at home or abroad, given the nature of the Communist dictatorship as it has evolved, may spell his own downfall. For he faces, and he knows it, a people who are questioning the basic tenets of Marxist Communism, and in particular a student body that is becoming more and more vocal in demanding the truth and may not be satisfied with half measures.

The Communist leaders are also facing a growing body of highly educated, technologically competent men and women in the

field of industrial management and production. It may prove impossible for them to stop the growing wave of intellectual unrest in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev cannot turn back education or stop technological development and keep the USSR a great power.

Yet Khrushchev seems to be in a hurry to solve a whole series of such problems as I have described and gain the personal success necessary to maintain his own position.

In addition to all this, he has deeply committed himself in certain foreign adventures, particularly in the Middle East -- partly, it may be assumed, to distract attention from problems at home and in the Satellites. All this rightfully makes us cautious in our judgments and does not suggest that there are any quick or easy ways out in our relations with the USSR.

But over the longer range, we can rest assured that revolutionary Communist tyranny cannot provide a final answer or a satisfactory answer to the needs of a civilized community. No power on earth can restore the myth that Communism is the wave of the future after 10 million Hungarians, after a decade of experience with it, and at the risk of their lives, gave it such a resounding vote of no confidence.

The people of Russia, if given the time to continue their evolution to freedom out of the narrow bounds of Communist dictatorship, will themselves help to find a peaceful answer.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 6, 1958

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT:

ALLEN DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/23/85 BY SPUBJA/llmTolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosed herewith are the contents of a speech which was made by Dulles on February 3, 1958, at a conference on "America's Human Resources to Meet the World Scientific Challenge," held at Yale University.

In his speech Dulles outlined the nature of military, subversive and economic challenges of Russia as faced by the U. S. today. He emphasized that the Soviet scientific resources have been directed toward increasing and strengthening Soviet military power, whereas in this country we have concentrated our efforts on the betterment of the lot of the individual. He spoke in favor of more exchange of scientific information with our allies.

Dulles stated that there was no evidence indicating that the Soviet Union presently intends to follow a policy which would involve the serious risk of nuclear war with the U. S. He further stated that he did not know of any American experts who take the position that the Soviet Union has an over-all military capability superior to our own.

Dulles advised that the "mobilization of human and other resources to meet the Soviet challenge in the military field will be an easier task than to mobilize to meet international communism's programs of subversion and economic penetration." He declared that by ignoring warning signs and becoming missile minded, the sputnik could become a kind of a Trojan horse.

ACTION:

EX-131 REC-56 62-83338-36

None. For your information.

FEB 25 1958

SJP:jlko  
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont.
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

MAR 3 1958

RECORDED

56

EX-131

WC SA 154

LIAISON

NEW HAVEN  
CONN

memo rack to  
Belmont 2-6-58.  
SPP/gk



I appreciate the security reasons often advanced for moving slowly and here is a field in which I can speak with some authority. The security factor deserves consideration but when properly balanced against the gain from freer scientific exchange, there will be plenty of leeway to go further than we have.

If legislative bars against certain phases of our cooperation with other countries in the nuclear field are removed, it will be a major step forward. Exchanging ideas on weapons development will certainly be of value in the field of intelligence since it would improve our ability to analyze and understand the nature of the Soviet nuclear threat.

Other informational exchanges between countries where each has the capacity to help the other will advance the common cause. For us and our allies to keep scores of top scientists working separately and mutually uninformed on the same problems may be a waste of scarce resources that we can ill afford.

In your earlier meetings today I understand you have been considering the building up and marshaling of America's human assets, particularly in the scientific field, to meet the Soviet threat. In the somewhat circumscribed area of my own work, much of my time during the last seven years has been directed to a somewhat

similar end, namely how scientific assets and techniques can be most effectively used to increase our overall ability to interpret developments in the Soviet Union.

One result of this study has been to emphasize the need for current appraisals of our relative position to the Soviet in technical fields of critical importance to national security. The missile field is a good example.

Relative positions of course change from time to time as one side or the other places greater emphasis in a particular field of endeavor. This calls for constant study and re-study, but with a proper perspective of where we stand relative to the Soviet Union we can develop our foreign and defense policies with a better basis for sound decision.

During the past few months the world has had a spectacular demonstration of the great technical competence of the Soviet, notably in the field of earth satellites and ballistic missiles.

To those who have been closely following developments in the Soviet Union these came as no great surprise.

Contrary to what may be the generally accepted view, these happenings have not caused us to make any basic changes in our earlier estimates of the Soviet challenge. It was serious before. It appears to be slightly more so today.

Here and there time tables of when various Soviet new weapons might come into use have been moderately advanced, particularly in the ballistic missile field. Soviet Sputniks and recent ballistic missile tests have not altered the overall appraisals of Soviet capabilities and intentions reached a year or more ago.

We must really thank the Soviet for having dramatized their competence and mightily reduced, in this country at least, the ranks of those who could not bring themselves to believe in the high technological capability of the Russians.

Long complacently accustomed to being first, it has been a shock to the American public to find that that is not the case in a particular field and an important one. We were first in the development of long range aviation, in the dramatic break-through in the atomic field and in thermonuclear fusion, and then, as evidenced by the atomic submarine, in the application of atomic power in an important military area. On analysis one would find that the margin of our lead, here and there, had been tending to narrow.

Then in a dramatic way the Soviets had their "first" and there is a tendency to feel that there was some failure to keep the American people advised as to Soviet scientific progress which led to this result.

Also, many have instinctively assumed that in the fields of scientific achievement a free enterprise system would inevitably lead a state like the Soviet whose economy was controlled by a communist-type state dictatorship.

Achievements do not depend so much on the type of government, so long as the latter is technically competent and has a willing or subservient people at its beck and call. It depends on the goals and priorities set, the promptness and the correctness of the decisions reached, and the energy applied in terms of man hours with the proper tools and equipment.

Under normal conditions a liberal free enterprise society concentrates on the development of what the people want to improve their living standards. In a society controlled by dictatorial leaders, with the centralization and socialization of production, the leaders are able, for a time at least, to fix the goals and priorities. What the mass of the people want comes second. I have said "for a time." It may be difficult to carry on such a policy indefinitely. Some day the people may rebel against such programming.

The USSR has a national product of some 40% of our own. If one includes on our side the segment of the free world allied with us and adds to the Soviet the questionable assets of the unhappy European satellites, the margin in favor of the West is much greater.

Yet the Soviet today are producing in the military field, hardware and assets very nearly equivalent to our own. The fact that they are able to do this with less than half of our industrial

potential is due largely to three factors: (1) the different cost basis for military manpower as contrasted with that for us; (2) the larger percentage of gross national product devoted to military ends; (3) the concentration of scientific competence in military fields.

Under these circumstances is it surprising that from time to time we will have the shock of finding that the Soviet have outstripped us in some particular military field where for longer periods of time they have put in more concentrated effort than we, as for example, in the missile field.

Granting something like equality of brain power applied on each side, the answer comes close to being a mathematical one and there is no reason to seek any mysterious or sinister cause.

The fact is that since shortly after the close of the war in 1945, when they took over the German missile hardware and a large group of German scientists with their blueprints and plans in Peenemunde and elsewhere, they have spent in this field more man hours than we. They have done it under highly competent Soviet scientific and technological leadership with the necessary tools, equipment and priorities. While they profited greatly by German technological achievement up to 1948, during the last decade it has been largely a native Soviet achievement.

History is full of examples where the high standard of living countries -- placing emphasis upon those things which make the rounded, developed and cultured human being with leisure for a broadened life -- have failed to comprehend the extent and nature of external threats from the Spartas which have concentrated on military might. All you need do is read your history from the Greek and Roman days right down to England and France before World War II, or even our own history.

A free people such as ours seem to require at periodic intervals dramatic developments to alert us to our perils.

Some people seem to think that this shock treatment should be replaced by a continuous process of indoctrination which could and should be furnished by government officials. I am somewhat doubtful as to the efficacy of this.

Most Americans seem to be from Missouri. Seeing is believing. By and large, the press does a good job in this field. Its sources of information are wide and varied. Jeremiads from government leaders are generally regarded as tinged with political or budgetary motives. It was only by orbiting our own Explorer that an effective answer was made to the American people as to our own technical competence in the missile field. No amount of speech making would have done it.

Recently it has been hinted that if only the Central Intelligence Agency had been believed, everything would have been well. This is flattering but a great over-simplification. There never has been a time in history to my knowledge when intelligence has had as clear an opportunity to get its views over as it has had in this country in recent years. The National Security Act of 1947, creating the Central Intelligence Agency, has given Intelligence a more influential position in our government than Intelligence enjoys in any other government of the world. If in our government, intelligence estimates have not always had the impact that in the light of hindsight they may have deserved, responsibility must be shared by the intelligence producer. We have the chance to sell our wares.

No intelligence appraisal could have had the impact of a Sputnik.

Maybe it was necessary that over the last decade in our relations with the USSR, we had to have a series of political, economic and military Sputniks -- costly as some have been -- to keep us periodically alerted to our dangers, though once a particular crisis is over, we quickly forget the past.

First came the Soviet threat against Western Europe, Greece and Turkey after World War II. This led to the Marshall Plan and

the Truman Doctrine. Then there was the Berlin Blockade in 1948 and the Korean War in 1950. Each of these, plus the tragic loss of China and Czechoslovakia, has helped to alert us to the elements of political subversion and war by proxy in the communist menace. Hungary should have convinced us that the Soviet will not hesitate to use brute force in what they choose to call their area of influence. Now with the Sputnik and ballistic missiles, the free world knows better the nature of the competition we face in the field of science and military technology.

Knowledge of the nature of this particular Soviet scientific challenge has been brought home to the American people through the length and breadth of the land. It is the greatest advertising job ever done. The Soviet really wrote it in the sky.

For a time at least, it will not be hard to convince anybody that we really are up against a competitor with a highly developed scientific and technical competence. We can thank the Soviet that this particular selling job was done effectively in 1957 and not delayed until 1958 or later.

Under these circumstances we shall be better able than before to mobilize our assets, human and material.



What are the immediate issues, the challenges we face?

There is no evidence, as I see it, that the Soviet Union presently intends to follow a policy which in their view would involve the serious risk of nuclear war with the United States. They most certainly have a healthy respect for our present military capabilities and our great industrial potential. They recognize the present limitation on their own. They recognize that nuclear war at this time would result in devastating damage to them. They probably question their present capability to deal a knockout blow and consequently would expect that their own devastation under retaliatory attack would be very great.

Comparative estimates of military strengths do not lie in my field of particular competence. This much I can say. I do not know of any American experts in the field whose views I respect, who take the position that today the Soviet Union has an overall military capability superior to our own.

What rightfully concerns us, however, is the dynamic growth in Soviet military and industrial power. Their further successes in the ballistic missile field and in the development of an arsenal of weapons with nuclear warheads would tend to change the nature of the threat to our security.

I am by no means suggesting that our concern is solely in the missile field or that we take seriously Khrushchev's remark about treating aircraft as museum pieces. This quip was probably motivated, in part, by the desire to downgrade our own Strategic Air Command during a period when the Soviet were in a position to flaunt their success with the guided missile. After all, we do not credit the Soviet with the industrial potential of developing and producing at the same time and with equal priority and on a massive scale all possible weapons in the modern military armory. They must make choices just as we.

We do have some evidence, however, that as much as a decade ago the Soviet turned to the guided missile as a challenging competitor to the bomber. What we badly needed back in 1945 was a Billy Mitchell for ballistic missiles.

Today we need wisely to use the time, which intelligence appraisals indicate we have, to build up our own capabilities and to see to it that any gap in time, during which they may have any superiority in the missile field, is reduced to negligible proportions and counter-balanced by the use of our substantial geographic advantages and general retaliatory power.

In most of our scientific breakthroughs we have had the disadvantage of being the front runner; the pioneer. In guided missiles

we can profit by the experience of others and we have just received a fine dividend of confidence in our own achievements.

We are alerted to the problem, to the technical competence of the opposition. We are still moving from a position of strength and forewarned should be forearmed.

The mobilization of human and other resources to meet the Soviet challenge in the military field will be an easier task than to mobilize to meet international communism's programs of subversion and economic penetration. Yet the latter today are their first lines of attack, with the military buildup remaining in reserve.

They have given us nothing quite as dramatic as the Sputnik to advertise what they are doing in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Possibly they learned a lesson from the Marshall Plan and have no stomach for inciting us into a new competition on any grand scale in the uncommitted areas of the world.

But if we should ignore these warning signs and go missile-minded to the exclusion of adequate defense against other dangers, the Sputnik can become a kind of Trojan horse. We might win the military race and yet lose great areas of the world that are vital to our own national security.

The international communist apparatus with its communist parties and cells, its economic, technical, and military aid programs based on Moscow, Prague and Peiping, has a closely orchestrated, well disguised mechanism for the advancement of its cause. The economic side of it outwardly looks somewhat like our own -- until the objective is uncovered.

Communists work in and through the parliaments of many countries of the world. They try to use the democratic processes in order to defeat the basic aims of a free form of government. They had a part in writing many of the constitutions in the free world in the early post-war days and did so with the very objective of putting strong authority nowhere and helping to produce chaos everywhere.

The policy of keeping countries divided -- Germany, Korea, Viet Nam and until recently Austria and Laos -- was an example of their techniques. This development is beginning to boomerang as the free peoples in the divided areas are furnishing studies in contrast between what a people working in freedom can do as contrasted with people under the domination of Moscow or Peiping.

Soviet progress in the scientific and technological field is used as a powerful argument in their appeal to the uncommitted areas.

Well before Sputnik the peoples in these areas were deeply impressed by the fact that the USSR in less than four decades had come from being a backward country into the position of the second greatest power in the world and a leader in the scientific field.

Certainly we should be more effective in bringing home to these people what has actually transpired in the areas that have been subject to Soviet colonialism or have been the unwilling objects of Soviet exploitation and domination.

Unfortunately, distance seems to lend enchantment and we can hardly expect the people of Java, to take only one instance, to understand fully the dangers which Soviet communism means for them.

Meanwhile in the Middle East, Africa and in South and Southeast Asia, the Soviet programs of arms and economic and scientific aid have helped to fan the flames of nationalism and anti-colonialism. The total of communist aid, economic, scientific and military, does not approach ours but they have cleverly concentrated on certain particular countries where they feel they can make the most impact.

Soviet educational programs are helping to build up a reservoir of technicians equipped in the lore of foreign countries. They also bring to Moscow University and other Soviet and satellite institutions large numbers of native students for training, particularly in the scientific

fields. If the Soviet scientific educational program continues at its present pace, they will have a growing reserve of trained scientists for export.

I trust that one of the results of this meeting may be to help us to find in the free world competent technicians willing to journey to the four corners of the earth to help build up the indigenous capabilities of the new countries. In any study of our own human resources to meet the scientific challenge it is well to remember that this cannot be done solely on the drawing boards of our own scientific institutions. It will also have to be done in the steel mills of India, on the dams of the great rivers of Asia and Africa, and in the industrial plants of the newly freed countries.

The contest for the minds and allegiance of millions of people is just beginning to be engaged. We cannot afford to neglect it.

I have tried to sketch the nature of the military, subversive and economic challenges of the USSR as we face them today. As one looks at the longer perspective, it is necessary to take into account the plans of Communist China to press forward on its own program of industrialization and militarization.

We have the capacity to meet these present challenges. They are definite in nature, measurable in amount and have back of them

far less in the way of assets, human and material, than we and our allies can muster if we will. But this is not just one confrontation. The challenge may be one of considerable duration.

The Soviet Union is still programming a rapid increase in its industrial production. It boasts that it will eventually close the gap between its own production and ours. If this program is even partially realized and also assuming some increase in the consumer's share of the total national production, the Soviet, if they are so minded, can year after year put ever increasing amounts into their military establishment and foreign economic programs.

To the extent that the Sino-Soviet peoples are willing, with Spartan determination, or with unquestioning obedience to arbitrary authority, to follow such a policy, they can make the going harder and harder for us. Undoubtedly, no small segment of their future effort, as in their past, will go into science.

A distinguished Indian editor who visited successively the USSR and the United States, put this question repeatedly to the people with whom he talked, "What is the purpose of your system, of your society?" As well can be imagined, he received a multiplicity of answers from Americans, but in one form or another, they had to do with the improvement of the lot of the individual, man and

woman. In the Soviet Union, he reports, he received one universal response from people of low and high degree, "The purpose of our system is the advancement of science."

For many years I have felt that the greatest hope for the future in our relations with the Soviet Union lay in their advancement in education even though in the short run this has been largely harnessed to their military machine.

Education, particularly in science, was essential to permit the Soviet effectively to compete in the power struggle in which it had engaged itself. It has accomplished this initial purpose.

Great scientists are great thinkers and thought has no narrow military limitations. It would seem incredible if the horizons of Soviet scientists and educators do not become greatly widened over the years and their talents devoted more directly to meeting the needs of the Soviet people for a more satisfying form of life.

It would be pleasant indeed if an enforceable international agreement could be reached that no more than say 5 or 10 per cent of the gross national product of a country could be diverted from the needs of the people to the production of armaments. As this is hardly practicable we must place our hopes that the future education in the Soviet Union will produce so many people who will demand this



result that no government could act otherwise.

While we must be ready for those forms of sacrifice which are necessary to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union, we must also seize the opportunities offered to help their education build a new life for the Soviet people.

Education may then be the key to the solution of problems which otherwise would seem insoluble.

We have recently been celebrating the 150th anniversary of the birth of General Robert E. Lee. It is interesting to note a passage in the book by a German Major of the Royal Prussian Engineers who was in the United States as a military observer in the Civil War. He was commenting on the fact that Lee's philosophy in his role as commander was to get his forces to the right place at the right time, and then trust his division and brigade commanders to do the rest. As an instance of this he writes the following, "During the battle of Chancellorsville, May 3, 1863, at the height of the combat, I stood beside the General under pretty heavy fire and an interesting episode of the battle was taking place before us. In spite of the great excitement in which the progress of the battle kept the great leader, he spoke to me, to my great astonishment, about the future education of the people."

Robert E. Lee had the genius for getting at the basic truths.

February 27, 1958

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DATE 7/23/85 BY SP6/bja/lmw

Mr. Allen W. Dulles  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Administration Building,  
Room 123  
2430 E Street, Northwest  
Washington, D. C.

*Letter to A. Dulles  
2/27/58  
[Signature]*

Dear Allen:

It is a pleasure to autograph to you one of  
the first printed copies of the book "Masters of Deceit."  
The book, which is being forwarded under separate cover,  
will be released to the public by Henry Holt & Company on  
March 10th.

I am hopeful that this account of American  
communism from its beginning to the present will assist  
the American people in the struggle against the deadly  
menace of atheistic communism by explaining what can  
be done to combat it.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely,

*Edgar*

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Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
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FROM

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

See Me \_\_\_\_\_ ( )  
Note and Return \_\_\_\_\_ ( )  
Prepare Reply \_\_\_\_\_ ( )  
For Your Recommendation \_\_\_\_\_ ( )  
What are the facts? \_\_\_\_\_ ( )  
Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

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ENCLOSURE

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ENCLOSURE

moment in World history. The next half century will be full of change and growth and rising aspiration. We can assume that China and India, which number about half the human race, will reach industrial maturity by the end of the century. And what about all those other scores of millions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America?

This is one of the great watersheds of history. At the turn of the 21st Century it is certain that there will be in those areas great, powerful nations, capable of applying to their resources all that modern science can afford. Our children and our grandchildren will share the planet with the citizens of these newer nations.

What kind of world will that be? Will it be dominated by new and bitter conflicts, rooted in bitter memories from a difficult colonial past, in memories of racial discrimination, in memories of painful difficulty faced alone during the awkward transition to modernization? Or will it be a world held together by bonds of common humanity, by memories of shared adventure during the period of transition, by a common respect for the dignity and stature of the individual human being, by a common will to maintain a regime of international order on this tiny planet?

I am deeply convinced that the outcome depends on what the governments and people of the industrialized world do now—over the next decade.

The present generation in the West bears a heavy and inescapable responsibility for the kind of world in which their children and grandchildren will live. This is the ultimate stake—the ultimate interest—in what we call, so inadequately, foreign aid.



The Washington foreign aid conference was a bipartisan affair. Here, former President Truman (center), one of the main speakers, is greeted by (l to r) Sen. Wiley (R-Wis.), Dean Acheson, Senate Democratic Leader Johnson and Senate GOP Leader Knowland.

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By ALLEN DATES 7/23/85 BY apb

The subject assigned me this morning is the Soviet economic and trade offensive. I shall broaden the term "Soviet" to include what we often refer to as the Communist bloc, that is, the Soviet Union, the European satellites and Communist China. Each plays a role in the economic and trade offensive of international communism.

It is not always easy to get the facts regarding the Communist world. In the field of their trade and aid, however, many of the basic facts are well known.

Too often people tend to ignore the statements of those whose credibility they may have reason to question. Many years ago, Hitler in "Mein Kampf" wrote what he proposed to do. He did it. Little attention was paid to his book until after he had gone to war.

In the case of the Soviet Union there has been an extraordinary consistency over the years in basic policy declarations and the subsequent actions of the Communist leadership.

The statement issued by the Soviet Union and their allies and satellites in Moscow last November on the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution might well have been written by Lenin. The declaration of the recent Afro-Asian Conference in Cairo was on all fours with the program of the Congress of the Peoples of the East which the Soviet held in Baku in 1920. Lenin himself predicted in 1923 that the outcome of the struggle would be determined by the population masses of Russia, India and China.

Tactics change—the timetable is altered as circumstances demand. The overall objectives and strategy remain much the same.

The evidence as we now see it indicates that the USSR, in striving toward their objectives, do not propose to use their military power in a manner which would involve the grave risk of war. They probably still estimate that our power of retaliation could more than match their offense.

In any event they have now alerted us to the dangers which lie in their growing military capabilities; they have shaken our complacency, and shown us that we could not always expect to be first in all phases of military endeavor. Neither the U. S. nor any other country has any monopoly on brains.

Their Sputniks and missiles have also taught us that we cannot afford to be second in any important military field.

This particular conference is considering whether we can afford to be second to the Soviet in supporting friends and allies and in our relations with friends and allies and in our relations with the uncommitted newly developing countries of the world.

In pressuring for a period of relaxation of tensions and coexistence it seems clear that the Soviets desire this for two purposes: first, to build their military strength and to develop the highly complicated modern weapons—ballistic and nuclear—and second, to press forward in the area where they probably consider us most vulnerable; the winning of the allegiance and, eventually, the control of the uncommitted nations of the world by trade and aid, and by subversion.

They probably estimate that if they can induce us to devote our resources almost exclusively to the military field, they can the more easily break our economic and cultural ties with other nations and win them over.

This month is the 10th anniversary of the takeover of Czechoslovakia by communism. Not a shot was fired. It was not guided missiles but the so-called "guided democracy" which did the trick.

Prague last July, Khrushchev said, "We can fight

without bombs and we are convinced that our cause will be victorious."

Our own grandsons, he recently predicted to an American correspondent, "will live under socialism in America, too."

And, last October, he explained that "wars are not necessary for the victory of socialism, capitalism will inevitably vanish from the historical arena just as was the case of feudalism which made room for capitalism."

These are the theories they openly preach to the world and they propose to go out into the world with missionaries of trade and aid to spread this doctrine.

While the Communist leaders have suppressed and liquidated more peoples of alien races and views within their area of control than any dictator or conqueror of the past, they ally themselves abroad with nationalistic aspirations. While they deny freedom to their satellites in Eastern Europe, they attack those countries which, like Britain, have voluntarily given freedom to many more peoples than the entire population of Russia itself.

We would be negligent, however, to ignore the fact that their trade and aid programs, backed with subtle propaganda, have had a significant impact.

In effect, the [Soviets] will buy anything, trade anything and dump anything if it advances communism or helps to destroy the influence of the West.

The strings are invisible. The Soviets can move quickly. They have no budgetary limitations or legislative restrictions. They have vast stores of obsolete military equipment which looks new and shiny to countries in the infancy of military development. It can be given away without affecting the Soviets' own military position. They will take in barter payment agricultural products and raw materials which we,



Allen Dulles  
A lesson from Lenin.

because of our surpluses, find it impracticable to accept.

The total amount in credits and grants extended by the Sino-Soviet bloc for economic development and military aid to countries in the free world outside the bloc over the last three years amounts to the equivalent of about \$2,000,000,000.

Over 95 per cent of this aid has been concentrated on six countries—Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. In these countries over the past two and a half years Soviet programs in aggregate have been more than double those of the free world. Of course, many other countries have received attractive offers and many are today in the throes of deciding whether to seek aid from East or West.

The Soviet programs have also included a large-scale movement of technical personnel from the Communist bloc to the free world countries where aid is extended. More than 2,000 bloc technicians are now active in nine of the newly developing countries in which comparable U. S. personnel number less than 1,000. Also large numbers of technicians are going from these countries to Moscow, Prague and Peking for their training.

We believe the Soviets can and will continue their programs in free world countries at a scale at least as great as we now witness. Both intra-bloc and external programs combined will require less than 1 per cent of their gross national product. The net economic cost over a period of years will be even less than this because from this program they will receive some needed raw materials and consumer goods.

### Guns and No Butter

I mentioned the appeal of the Soviet program to the newly developing countries of the world. Many are too far away from Moscow to understand the meaning of Hungary, to analyze the dangers which communism spells for their newly found freedom.

They see that Russia, which economically and industrially was a backward country a couple of decades ago, has in some manner mysterious to them become in a relatively short space of time the second greatest industrial and military power of the world. They do not realize that much of this has been achieved by profiting from the industrial revolution of the West; that it has been developed at the expense of the standards of living of the peoples of Russia; that housing and road-building and consumer goods have been sacrificed to heavy industry and weapons of war.

They tend to feel that the American economic standards are too high, too distant, too hard for them to attain. They are not overly impressed by the fact that last year we made about 60 automobiles to the Soviet's one; or that there are wide disparities between the Soviet and ourselves in the standard of living. They do hope that they can eventually aspire to something like the economic and industrial advancement of the Soviet Union. When the missionaries of Soviet society appear with their offers, the temptation is great. If there are no clear-cut alternatives the reaction is often favorable.

To leave the field open to this type of penetration presents us with grave dangers. What use is it if we and our allies concentrate solely on building barriers against some future military attack while the Soviet envoys of trade, aid and subversion get behind those barriers?

On this day, 10 years since the takeover of Czechoslovakia, it is appropriate that you should be considering the countermeasures which will be most effective in meeting these threats to our national security. They most certainly can be met with the resources which his country can command.

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# It Happened all over...

By PAUL SANN, Executive Editor

**AMERICA '58**—In a trouhled moment when unemployment is around the 4½ million mark, what do you suppose turns up atop the list of best-selling songs? You guessed it: an item called "Get a Job."

**CAN SPRING BE FAR BEHIND?** The Yanks signed Mr. Mantle for \$70,000 (Post); \$72,000 (News & Trib), or \$75,000 (Times, Telley & Journal).

**TV HIGHLIGHT**—Dr. Alexander Sas-Jaworsky, a veterinarian born in the Ukraine but domiciled in Abberville, La., knows so much American history that he took The \$64,000 Question for \$128,000.

The doctor could have hung around and tapped the show for another 64 Big Ones without any extraordinary effort but he's a married man. You know what happened: wifey ruled he had been around New York long enough and told him to get the hell home.

**DIANA DORS**: "I would much rather be unhappy in luxury than in poverty."

**OUCH**—The government revealed that consumer prices had reached an all-time high during January.

**IS THIS GOOD?** Mike Todd discovered an equal-nay, an even better man—in Russia. A guy named Khrushchev, who's in charge of everything over there. "He's the greatest showman of our times," Mr. Todd said. "I couldn't even carry his bag."

**POLITICAL NOTE**—Sen. Knowland said that if he doesn't run for President in '60, he'll back Dick Nixon.

**THE WILD WEST COAST**—Two items of intelligence flushed out of a single Hollywood column:

1. Jerry Lewis made, oh, \$7,000,000 last year, give or take a dollar or two.

2. Kim Novak's new flop has three fireplaces. The one in the living room is purple. The one in the bedroom is suspended from the ceiling. The third one... darn it, the column didn't even say where the heck it was.

**HUSH HUSH STUFF**—Mrs. Margaret Kelly of the Philadelphia Kellys said Grace and Rainier had a name for the new baby, due soon, but it's a state secret.

**THE HAPPY PEOPLE**—Americans spent something like \$150,000,000 on tranquilizing pills during 1957.

**THE ROYAL FAMILY**—The British Dental Assn. made Philip an honorary dentist, whatever that is.

**ONE MAN'S ORDEAL**—Have a hot flash from Dorothy Kilgallen:

"If you think the title of the Vic Damone magazine story, 'How I Made a Mess of My Life,' is pretty bad, consider what it was called originally: 'I Was a Twerp.'"

Please, Vic, say it isn't so.



**THE WAR BETWEEN MEN & WOMEN**—This came smoking off the Reuters wire on a quiet afternoon: "Bristol, England, Feb. 25—A judge today rejected the story of a nursing home matron who claimed she committed adultery with a surgeon for over three years without either of them using the other's first name." It seemed a bit awkward to us, too.

**ONE FOR THE BLUENOSES**—In Bangkok, the local strippers were told to quit taking so much off.

**BIRTHDAY**—John Foster Dulles, 70.

## SPACE DEPT.



The radio transmitter that went dead in our baby moon a couple of weeks ago started sending fresh signals back downstairs one fine day this week. Spooky, isn't it?

**FOR THE MAN WHO HAS EVERYTHING**—You can now buy an 18-carat gold lawn-sprayer for \$12,500.

**BOBBY SHANTE** (the dandy little relief pitcher, sweating out salary terms with the Yankees): "They may be rich but they ain't careless."

**FATHER & SON**—This is borrowed from an Esquire article by John Lloyd Wright, an architect:

"My problem as a 'great man's' son started early in my life. For example, when I was young my father was so terribly busy establishing himself as The Architect of The Ages that he often forgot his children's names."



FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT

**THE POOR SPORT**—We flushed this one out of a society column in a morning rag:

"A big hassle started in Palm Beach the other night when one married man came up to a second married man and said belligerently: 'Who was that lady I saw you with last night?' The second man sneered: 'That was no lady, that was your wife.' Friends literally had to pull them apart. Now they're talking law suits..." In Our Set, the men don't take offense so easily.

**THE COLUMNISTS**—Lee Mortimer (Mirror), W. Winchell's stand-in, ran this squib Tuesday:

"Mystery mama Eva Bartok and Kurt Jurgens, a new London item. (He's her ex-husband.)"

But back further in the same edition Sheila Graham had it another way: "Curt Jurgens and Claire Bloom caught up with each other in London and here's a quote—reportedly from Miss Bloom: 'Maybe I will marry him.'"

The spelling, not the conflict of female interest, is what worried us. Is it Kurt or Curt?



**FOR THE WOMAN WHO HAS EVERYTHING**—Schlaparelli slapped together a pair of glasses in a platinum frame garnished with diamonds. The price is \$10,000. Lenses extra, presumably.

## SHOP TALK

This is a footnote to the lively municipal scandal that broke in Manhattan this week.

When Buildings Inspector Bernard Malone was arrested on perjury and contempt charges growing out of this newspaper's revelations about the rackets in the department, District Attorney Hogan issued this statement:

"I want to express my appreciation to The Post for giving us the information which led to the Grand Jury investigation and to this indictment and to thank them for their continuing cooperation."

Going further, Mr. Hogan told a press conference that his men were able to dig out the mess because reporter Bill Haddad and his editors around here had held certain ticklish facts out of the paper to keep the track clear for the investigators.

So what happened?

The other gazettes in the town all carried the breaking story but not one of them found room (it only needed a line or two) to tell their readers that the D.A. had credited The Post with the break.

Let the truth be told: Our little band of angels has sloughed off some of the competition's beats, too. But isn't it silly? Why don't we all take a bow for a noble profession when a piece of enterprise pays off?

The Buildings Dept. Scandal

INDICT KEY OFFICIAL

Hogan: Post Stories Sparked Probe

**BRINGING UP BABY**—Let's listen to James Mason's wife, Pamela:

"Our son Poopsie, 2, leads a baby's life but he is mad about cigarets. I thought, if you let them do what they want to do, they won't want to do it. We light the cigaret. Poopsie holds it and blows out. He doesn't inhale..."



**ELIZABETH TAYLOR**: "Russia fascinated me. It's like a Grade B motion picture."

**BRITAIN '58**—This London husband took pieces of the TV set to work with him so that his bride wouldn't languish before the little screen all day.

The courts called it grounds for divorce.

**AH, FAME!** The new Japanese Who's Who omits the name of Douglas MacArthur.

**HOME, SWEET HOME**—We were minding our own business, see? We were dawdling over the litting prose pain of Dylan Thomas' widowed Caitlin and listening to some fine piano on WPAT. Suddenly, this woman burst into the chamber and spoke as follows:

"Have you always been true to me, Bones?"

"Every day," we said, hoping she would go away.

"I know that," the woman snapped. "What about the nights?"

How can a man fight against such heavy odds?



HERSELF

Dennis



EVEN THE FILTER-TIPS MAKE ME SICK!





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

25 FEB 1958

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
*Handwritten: Kouch, Pappas*

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

Your publisher has sent me an advance copy of your book, Masters of Deceit, which I have read with great interest.

I think that unquestionably Masters of Deceit will do a vast amount of good in our fight against Communism in the United States. Your exposure of communist history, tactics, hidden aims, and real purposes will act as a warning that no citizen can ignore if he feels the slightest temptation to align himself with the Communist Party or any of its fronts. It should give an equally strong incentive leading those Americans now caught in the communist net to extricate themselves from it.

Congratulations on this excellent contribution to anti-communist literature.

16 MAR 19 1958

Faithfully yours, *W*

*Allen W. Dulles*  
Allen W. Dulles  
Director

FOI # 366904

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DATE 6/21/99 BY SP2 HLM/EHL

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57 MAR 31 1958

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3-25-58*

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DATE 7/23/85 BY 406 bja/mmw

# These Days

## Soviet Consistency

By George E. Sokolsky

Allen Dulles, director of Central Intelligence, occasionally delivers an address, which generally goes by unnoticed for some reason or other, but which contains essential truth that ought to make a profound impression on Americans. In one of the speeches, he said:



"In the case of the Soviet Union there has been an extraordinary consistency over the years in basic policy declarations and the subsequent actions of the Communist leadership."

"The statement issued by the Soviet Union and their allies and satellites in Moscow last November on the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution might well have been written by Lenin. The declaration of the recent Afro-Asian conference in Cairo was on all fours with the program of the Congress of the Peoples of the East which the Soviet held in Baku in 1920. Lenin himself predicted in 1923 that the outcome of the struggle would be determined by the population masses of Russia, India and China."

I RECENTLY came across a two-volume collection of letters and other documents, entitled "Correspondence between the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." The volumes were published in Moscow in 1957. Altogether 290 letters were exchanged between Roosevelt and Stalin. The 291st letter is Stalin's to President Truman expressing Stalin's regret that Mr. Roosevelt died.

From this correspondence, one discovers how continuous the Russian policy is. Friendship or enmity are all one; they are manifestations of the same policy and to me, at any rate, it is clear that Khrushchev, like Stalin before him and Lenin before Stalin, regards the economic war as of equal importance with the military war and that success is more likely in the economic field. On this subject, Dulles says:

"They probably estimate that if they can induce us to devote our resources almost exclusively to the military field, they can the more easily break our economic and cultural ties with other nations and win them over."

THEY HAVE several advantages over us, but with skill we could turn their advantages into disadvantages.

In the economic field, they have "no budgetary limitations, or legislative restrictions," as Allen Dulles says. On the other hand, if their satellites and uncommitted nations demand more and more, their capacity to supply would be exhausted. Dulles reports that the Sino-Soviet bloc, as he calls it, has extended about \$2 billion of credit and grants to other countries, 95 per cent going to Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. These are countries that are also being aided by the United States. They are the "honest" uncommitted nations, "honest" in the sense that they will take from both sides. Offers are also being made to many other countries. It is now known that Soviet Russia is pursuing its aid program in Central and South America.

Soviet Russia is required to provide aid to other Communist countries. Red China has received about \$2 billion over a decade as military credits and hardware and outright

cash. Toward the conversion of the indigenous economic and social system to Russian-style communism, \$900 million went to Poland, \$650 million to East Germany, \$450 million to Red China. In a word, Soviet Russia is throwing money around as though Henry Hopkins were in charge. That money is taken out of the standard of living of the Russian people. It does not matter whether an economy is capitalistic or socialistic, governments can only receive the bulk of their revenue from the earnings of their people.

WHILE IT is true that all this is a drain on Russia's economy, it is also true that Russia has managed to keep the standard of living of its people sufficiently down not to be a drain on its raw materials or competitive with its military or political program. Outside of Russia, the socialistic economy of Russia seems to be miraculous, although its basis is more than a century of experience in the West, particularly in the United States, Great Britain and Germany. This, Soviet Russia does not deny. Under Marxist theory, one system grows out of a previous one. The Socialist system is based on capitalism and will be followed by communism. This is the theory; in practice, it means that they do the best with our development that they can.

(Copyright, 1958, King Features Syndicate, Inc.)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Wash. Post and Times Herald *A17*  
Wash. News \_\_\_\_\_  
Wash. Star \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Journal-American \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Mirror \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
N. Y. Times \_\_\_\_\_  
Daily Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
The Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
New Leader \_\_\_\_\_

Date APR 16 1958

57 APR 21 1958

162-53331-0  
NOT RECORDED  
117 APR 18 1958



DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

11:20AM April 29, 1958

[redacted] in the office of Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, telephoned to extend an invitation to the Director to attend a dinner given by Mr. Dulles on May 12, 1958, at 8:00PM in honor of General Paul R. Grossin, Director of the French External Intelligence Service.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

b3 per CIA

The dinner will be held at the Alibi Club, 1806 I Street, N. W. and will be black tie.

[redacted] asked to be called and advised whether the Director could attend. She can be reached on Code 143, extension 601.

b3 per CIA

It is noted that the Director is scheduled to meet General Grossin and his administrative assistant, Colonel Louis Ramier, on May 13th at 10:00AM.

De

jwd

ENCLOSURE

16 MAY 2 1958

CRIME REC

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DATE 7/03/85 BY SPL/bja/lmw

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

April 30, 1958

I called [redacted] in the office of Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and expressed your appreciation for the kind invitation to attend a dinner given by Mr. Dulles on May 12, at 8:00 p.m., in honor of General Paul R.

Grossin.

[redacted] was advised that you regretted very much that a prior commitment would preclude your acceptance.

[redacted] stated Mr. Dulles would be advised of your declination.

1 - Telephone Room

FCH:rm  
(3)

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. Boardman ✓  
Mr. Belmont ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. Nease ✓  
Mr. Parsons ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Tamm ✓  
Mr. Trotter ✓  
Mr. Jones ✓  
Mr. Clayton ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Mr. Holloman ✓  
Miss Holmes ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓

b3 per CIA

b1 per CIA

1- ENCLOSURE  
(20-6) 3/4

REC

62-83338-40

16 MAY 2 1958

53 MAY 13 1958

CRIME RECORDS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/23/85 BY sp6 bja/lmw

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ab*

DATE: May 23, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *R*SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES  
DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Nease	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

On May 22, 1958, James Angleton, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised Agent Papich that according to all reports received, Dulles' performance before the Senate committee last week in connection with the anti-Nixon riots in South America went off very well. According to Angleton, Dulles was in the position to show that CIA had developed plenty of advance information indicating there would be troubles during Nixon's trip.

Later the Liaison Agent met Frank Wisner of CIA and Wisner commented that his "boss" had done a good job before the Senate committee. He commented "this is one time when we can produce the facts."

ACTION:

None. For your information.

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DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6/bia/lmw  
no deletions per OGA letter 9/7/10

SJP:bjt  
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Nease
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

REC-15

EX-117

62-8333841  
13 MAY 27 1958

66 JUN 2 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *abm 8-12-58*

DATE: August 11, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *B*SUBJECT: *0* ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY *wbf 3-1*

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Nease	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Clayton	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Dulles customarily takes a vacation in August. In past years he has traveled to Europe. The Liaison Agent has been informed that Dulles will not take any leave until the end of the month and he will then give consideration to making a trip, possibly to Europe.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:bjtlyt  
(4)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

REC-36 62-83338-42

EX-108

24 AUG 12 1958

LIAISON

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DATE 7/25/85 BY spc bja/lmw

*f/150*  
52 AUG 15 1958

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Boardman	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Mr. Parsons	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tamm	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Mr. Clayton	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Holloman	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

**Closeup**

# Allen Dulles Underplays

## Master Spy Role

*file*  
*3-1*

**BY ANDREW TULLY,**  
*Staff-Howard Newspapers.*

WASHINGTON, June 4.—In this era of the underplayed role, the understated premise, it is not surprising to find that America's boss spy looks more like a Yale professor than a secret wholesaler in cloaks and daggers.

The name is Allen Welsh Dulles, a big, broad-shouldered man with tousled white hair, a high forehead and an ample gray mustache.

His title is Director of Central Intelligence, and he sits—or strides—these days in a birch-paneled office in one of a cluster of nondescript buildings occupied by the Central Intelligence Agency in a grimy warehouse district of Washington's Foggy Bottom.

**Prime Red Target.**

Moscow undoubtedly would pay a fat fee for the head of this amiable 65-year-old, one-time schoolteacher. After all, he did his first spying for the United States in World War I and since has been readily available when a delicate job needed doing.

But he tells visitors he has never even been shot at—and I'm sure no one has ever tried to kidnap me." His booming, half-fellow laugh makes the thought ridiculous.

It is Allen Dulles' job, through his top-secret agency, to find out everything he can about the unannounced policies of the world's nations and pass it on, evaluated, to the White House for use in shaping our own foreign policy.

Thus for some months before the de Gaulle crisis in France, Allen Dulles was preparing President Eisenhower for the likelihood of a coup by the wartime resistance leader.

Mr. Dulles does not see Gen. de Gaulle as a would-be-Hitler—"after all, he got out before." He disagrees with many experts about Gen. de Gaulle's character—"he is not a man drunk with power for power's sake."

**Pooh-Poohs Critics.**

Gesturing with a corn-cob pipe, Mr. Dulles pooh-poohs critics who blame lack of intelligence for the insults suffered by Vice President Richard M. Nixon on his recent trip to South America. CIA had good information on anti-Americanism south of the border, he told a recent visitor, "but you can't predict when a mob will go berserk. We had to take some chances; you can't cancel a trip like that except for extraordinary reasons—you can't let people blackmail you."

CLIPPING FROM THE  
N.Y. N.Y. WORLD TELEGRAM & SUN  
EDITION NIGHT  
DATED 4 JUN 1958  
PAGE 11  
FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION  
RE: **ALLEN WELSH DULLES**  
**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**  
BUFILE -

*Parsons*

162-83338-11  
NOT RECORDED  
191 JUN 13 1958

63 JUN 18 1958

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DATE 7/24/85 BY sp6bjal/mw

These days, as for several months past, Allen Dulles and his CIA have been gathering intelligence bearing on the long-projected meeting at the summit between President Eisenhower and the heads of state of the Soviet Union and our Western allies. CIO suggests no policy, nor does it recommend or disprove a summit meeting. It gathers what Mr. Dulles calls the "pros and cons of the situation."

CIA, in effect, says to the White House and State Department: If you hold a summit meeting, here are the probable consequences. White House and State then add it up for themselves.

#### Routine Is Routine.

For a master spy, Allen Dulles' daily routine is startlingly similar to that of any other working executive. He leaves his home in fashionably bohemian Georgetown at 8:15 a.m. after listening to a world news roundup on the radio—"we get the secret information, but your news comes in a lot faster." At the office, he first wades through a pile of decoded incoming cables. Thrice weekly he has a staff meeting; once a week he meets with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the National Security Council and the

operations coordinating board—the latter an interdepartmental bottleneck-breaker.

Mr. Dulles tries to see as many people as he can, not only from his own organization, but from the outside. This is explained by an experience a much younger Allen Dulles suffered during World War I when he was working with cloak and dagger in neutral Switzerland. Somebody asked him to see an obscure Russian, then in a nearby Swiss city, because he had some interesting ideas. Mr. Dulles played tennis instead, and a few weeks later Nikolai Lenin be-

gan his trip by rail across Germany and into Russia—which was one of the turning points of the war.

In World War II, he set up operations for the Office of Strategic Services in Bern and built a spy network that covered Germany, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, North Africa, France, Italy and Austria. A contact with a Nazi counter-intelligence agent named Hans Gisevius kept him in touch with the plot against Hitler's life, and he produced the first reports on the Nazis' experiments with rockets.

Allen Dulles still finds intelligence work the most exciting assignment possible, though it is considerably streamlined from World War I days. For instance, "the beautiful female spy, unfortunately, has been replaced by the electronic gadget." As for his dealings with his elder brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the spy master admits to no sentiment.

"We get along fine," Allen Dulles likes to say, "but he knows he can't persuade me out of something unless he has the facts."



ALLEN DULLES.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ~~Mr. A. H. Belmont~~ *albr*

DATE: November 4, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *R*SUBJECT: *AWK*  
ALLEN DULLES  
DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Nease	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Clayton	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

You may be interested in the following information relating to Dulles' personal life. This data was obtained on a strictly confidential basis by the Liaison Agent. As previously reported.

b6  
b7C

Dulles' wife underwent a serious operation this last summer and she reportedly is in very poor health at the present time.

Dulles' real problem is

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:bjt *lyk*  
(4)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

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DATE *9/11/85* BY *SP6 bja/lmw*

REC-10

62-83338-43

NOV 11 1958

23 NOV 1958

NOV 12 1958 *FZ*

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: October 31, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

You may be interested in the following information developed by the Liaison Agent which touches upon CIA organization and personnel.

A few weeks ago, General Cabell received his fourth star as a general. The Liaison Agent has been reliably informed that Allen Dulles pushed this move very strongly in order to bring more prestige to "the intelligence community." Dulles allegedly told the President that it would add to the prestige of U. S. intelligence if CIA had a very high ranking military official. Dulles reportedly suggested that if Cabell were raised to a higher rank, intelligence interests would be best served.

Now that Cabell has acquired a fourth star, Dulles allegedly is ready to make his next move. He hopes to have a National Security Council (NSC) directive issued which will strengthen the responsibilities of the office of Director, CIA, bringing him closer to Cabinet rank. It is not known exactly how Dulles wants his responsibilities described but his motive is to bring more prestige and strength to the office which he now holds.

## ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:bjt  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Kuhrtz
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

62-83338  
NOT RECORDED  
17 NOV 1958

12 NOV 5 1958

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52 NOV 10 1958

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: November 5, 1958

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES  
DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Tolson	
Boardman	
Belmont	
Mohr	
Nease	
Parsons	
Rosen	
Tamm	
Trotter	
Clayton	
Tele. Room	
Holloman	
Gandy	

b6

b7C

While discussing other official business with Agent Papich on November 5, 1958, Allen Dulles brought up the following matters:

1. Dulles made reference to the recent "Nation" article which attacked the Bureau. He stated that many years ago he made up his mind that he would not read the magazine because he did not approve of the political line and had little use for most of the contributors. He stated that he had heard about the article attacking the Bureau, but had seen no reason to read it until recently when one of his subordinates suggested that it might be worthwhile to do so. Dulles stated that he read the article and that he was shocked at the extremes to which the writer had gone in striking at the Bureau. He referred to the material as "trash" and stated that he wanted the Liaison Agent to pass a message to the Director to the effect that if CIA's assistance was needed in running down any leads concerning any organization or individual involved in a plan to attack the Bureau, he would be most willing to give full cooperation.

2. Dulles made brief reference to Cyrus Eaton. He stated that several years ago he had personal dealings with Eaton when he was practicing law. He described Eaton as having been "very sharp," but he is of the firm opinion that Eaton is now "batty."

3. Dulles stated that he had been invited by Gordon Gray to sit in on a Cabinet meeting scheduled for November 6, 1958, at which the Director was to speak. Dulles stated he was looking forward with great interest to hearing the Director.

4. Dulles made reference to pending action concerning the implementation of National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 5, which deals with U. S. espionage and counterintelligence activity abroad. Dulles stated that it was his understanding that the Bureau was opposed to some of the language in the proposed implementing procedures. He asked the Liaison Agent for his observations. Papich told Dulles that the

1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. M. W. Kuhrtz  
1 - Liaison Section  
1 - Mr. Papich

REC-61

NOV 7 1958

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-90759-  
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 60-127094-

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Classified by 1259 JPA RB  
Exempt from GDS, Category 1  
Date of Declassification Indefinite  
7-1876522-011 6079978

declassified per CIA letter  
2/19/87 re: C. Eaton  
SP4 JLM/LVA  
9/3/88 11mw-7/05/88

Memo Roach to Belmont  
RE: ALLEN DULLES  
DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

proposed implementing procedures carry language which indicates that CIA would virtually control our Legal Attache operations abroad. It was pointed out that the language reflects that CIA possibly could examine or even inspect our Legal Attache system. Papich advised that the Bureau could never approve any language which would give such an interpretation and if CIA did not have such intentions it would appear that a modification of the language proposed would be in order. The Liaison Agent emphasized that the Bureau would not support any directive which would grant any other agency control of our activities. Dulles was taken back by the comments stating that he never realized that such an interpretation could be given to the proposed language and he emphasized that he had no intention to establish control over any of our Legal Attaches. He expressed the opinion that language could be introduced which would be satisfactory to the Bureau. Dulles also introduced the matter of coordination which allegedly is the main objective of the proposed implementing procedures. Dulles was told that the Bureau regularly is furnishing information to CIA abroad and at headquarters level concerning matters which relate to counterintelligence operations abroad. Liaison is closely following this matter and will keep you advised of developments. *u*

ACTION:

None. For your information.

*auth*

*would like more details to 4 items*

*K*

*memo 11/6*  
*by*

b6  
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: January 27, 1959

FROM : G. A. NEASE *gan*

SUBJECT:

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Nease	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

*D.C.*  
 Nelson Frank handed to me this morning the attached pamphlet, "How Mellon Got Rich," by Harvey O'Connor. This pamphlet was published in 1933. Frank called attention to the marked portion of the first paragraph on page 13 wherein it is stated that, "Allen W. Dulles, another former State Department official, joined Loomis in the fight for the Mellon-Morgan concession." He thought that due to the age of this pamphlet we may not have seen it or that this statement may never have come to the attention of Allen Dulles.

Frank also called attention to the last paragraph on page 23 which he feels is a stronger statement concerning capitalism than has been generally attributed to O'Connor.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this matter be referred to the Domestic Intelligence Division for its consideration in the event the attached pamphlet has not previously come to our attention.

ENCL. ATTACHED  
 ENCLOSURE

1 p.c. Boston office  
 REC'D  
 FORM 1-30-59  
 HOW FORM 2/5/59  
 BY JTB/GAS

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REC-74

62-83338-45

24 FEB 2 1959

EX-102

Enclosure

1-Mr. Belmont

1-Mr. Jones

GAN:jmr

(4)

60 FEB 6 1959

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DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6 bja/lmw



ENCLOSURE

62-350-45

No. 36

# HOW MELLON GOT RICH

by

**Harvey O'Connor**

240,403  
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## HOW MELLON GOT RICH

BY HARVEY O'CONNOR

### *The Mellon Fortune*

Towering among the financial giants is the Mellon family with its billion-dollar hoard, probably the largest in America. The Pittsburgh titans of finance capital, are directly interested in corporations with assets of \$10,500,000,000.

Although he is usually described as king of aluminum, Andrew Mellon, former Secretary of the Treasury, raked in his billion from an amazing variety of industries. In this the Mellons differ from the Fords and their auto fortune, the duPonts and their chemical millions, the Rockefellers and their oil empire. For the Mellons draw tribute from real estate, banking, steel, railway equipment, oil, coal and its myriad by-products, aluminum, utilities. Workers in almost every industry you can name are being exploited to enhance the financial power of the Mellons.

Count off the major enterprises of Mellon and you will include most of the basic industries. His hundred Pittsburgh Coal Co. and Koppers Coal Co. mines stretch all the way from western Pennsylvania through feudal West Virginia into Kentucky. He probably draws more interest and dividends from the labor of steel workers than any other person in America. His family has important interests in Pittsburgh Steel, Crucible Steel, and Bethlehem Steel and a sizeable block in U. S. Steel.

Coke links coal and steel. It is the pure fuel left when gases have been driven out of coal, and it is used to smelt iron ore. Through his Koppers Co., Mellon is the most important commercial coke producer in the United States and Canada. The by-products derived from coal constitute the base for explosives and all war gases. The Mellons hold key positions in the war industries through steel, coal, and by-products of coal gas and petroleum.

Bethlehem Steel cashes in handsomely by the sale of armor plate for battleships built in Bethlehem's own yards.

The Mellons sell the gas from their Koppers coke ovens to domestic consumers in scores of cities. They have become major owners of so-called public utility systems. Gigantic holding companies in which they have an interest include Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates in Boston, Plymouth and New Haven; United Light and Power, which sells gas and electricity in a thousand communities; U. S. Electric Power Corp., and others. They are big stockholders in the Philadelphia Co., the monopoly which controls all the gas, electricity and street car services in their home city, Pittsburgh. Their Brooklyn Union and Brooklyn Borough Gas companies "soak the poor" in Brooklyn. They make a minimum charge of \$1 a month, although most working class families actually never consume a dollar's worth of gas in any month.

Most famous of all Mellon's corporations is Aluminum Company of America, which, through its control of raw materials and patents, holds a 100 per cent monopoly on the manufacture of this extremely useful light-weight metal. Aluminum is one-third the weight of steel and just as strong when properly alloyed. Aluminum Co. of America, ever since its organization way back in the 80's, has enjoyed the express protection of the United States government through patents, tariffs and failure of government departments to prosecute it under the anti-trust law. Its tremendous profits have exceeded \$20,000,000 in one year. The sweatshop inquiry in Pennsylvania in 1933 found that Aluminum was firing men, earning \$4 and \$5 a day, from some departments, and hiring women to do their work at 18 cents an hour.

Biggest of all Mellon companies is Gulf Oil Corp. with gross assets of \$743,000,000, and exceeding those of the Ford Motor Co., whose owner has been considered the second richest man in the country. Gulf, like Aluminum, also profits from monopoly for it has quiet price-fixing agreements with Standard Oil and other big oil companies.

The full list of Mellon companies fills many pages. They are heavy stockholders in the Pullman sleeping car monopoly, Pittsburgh Plate Glass, American Tar Products, and National Lumber & Creosoting.



The Mellons are the perfect example of the fusion of industrial and finance capital. Their \$250,000,000 Union Trust Co. in Pittsburgh has the highest cash dividend rate in the banking world: 200 per cent. Their \$250,000,000 Mellon National Bank finances industries far and near. Another \$250,000,000 is represented in a chain of banks which covers western Pennsylvania. The Mellons maintain close relations with the Morgan and Rockefeller banking interests in Wall Street, and have considerable holdings in other corporations dominated by one or both of these groups.

### *Judge Thomas Mellon*

Andrew Mellon was born rich. His father laid the foundation of the family fortune in Pittsburgh as a corporation lawyer and money-lender. As soon as he was out of law school, Thomas Mellon began buying mechanics' liens, making loans on notes. Then he went into real estate. Through marriage he acquired control of East Liberty, most important of Pittsburgh suburbs, and made millions as the city grew, through mere ownership of land that other people had to have to build homes. He became the trusted confidential attorney of corporations and later he organized corporations of his own. After serving ten years as judge, he opened the T. Mellon & Sons bank in 1871. Here young Andrew learned the secrets of using money to make money.

Old Thomas Mellon was the perfect embodiment of the small competitive capitalist and money lender of the middle nineteenth century, before the age of imperialism. He was a studious old skinflint. More far-sighted than many, he foresaw the inevitable conflict between the classes. "The employees and their families in the larger manufacturing and mining establishments," he wrote in 1885, "are often designated each by his number and live in numbered tenements, and are all subjected to the same routine, and treated alike; too much like the soldiers of an army or inmates of a prison. The opportunity to work up and out and better their condition is rendered so remote as to appear to them hopeless."

But when the "hopeless" workers rebelled, Judge Mellon was for drastic action. "The vicious classes," he wrote, "seem to be greatly on the increase or at least show more boldness than ever

before. It indicates a demoralized condition of public sentiment, which may require blood to purify." Two years later the Haymarket anarchists were hanged in Chicago.\*

Judge Mellon hated Karl Marx and studied Herbert Spencer to find arguments against Marx's statement that labor is the author of all wealth. He believed in religion, not so much for himself as to assure the stability of the capitalist system.

Aside from amassing more millions, Judge Mellon's chief satisfaction in life was to see his sons develop into "smart business men." Very smart they were. The older brothers kept on subdividing real estate and selling it at a handsome profit. Then their lumber firm sold building materials for houses to be built on the lots. Their street car companies carried people back and forth from Pittsburgh to East Liberty.

When Judge Mellon retired, it was Andrew who took charge of the money-making end of his fortune, that of T. Mellon & Sons bank, already the largest in Pittsburgh. He early formed a close alliance with Henry Clay Frick, the coke king, whom Judge Mellon had helped by loans to acquire control of Fayette County, source of much of the country's finest coking coal. From Frick, Andrew Mellon learned the technique of open shoppery. Frick engaged in bloody wars with his coke workers until in 1889-90 by starvation and bullets, he stamped out their union. Carnegie took him into his steel corporation as general manager, and in 1892 he smashed the steel workers' union at Homestead and established industrial tyranny in the steel industry that was unchallenged until 1919, when William Z. Foster led the great steel strike.†

Frick sat on the board of Union Trust, Mellon's new bank, along with representatives of the Pennsylvania Railroad and the big corporations of the Pittsburgh district. The two men made millions speculating in downtown real estate. In one deal Mellon made as much as \$200,000, although he added not a penny to the real worth of the property.

\* See *The Frame-Up System*, by Vern Smith. International Pamphlets, No. 8.

† For the story of Homestead, the 1919 strike and other struggles of steel workers, see *Labor and Steel*, by Horace B. Davis. International Publishers.

## *War—Mellon's Ally*

War has been the Mellons' best ally. The peace-time stride of their fortune then quickens into the double march. The Mexican War started Pittsburgh off, and with it old Judge Mellon, chiefly through his transactions in real estate, laid the foundations for his fortune. The Civil War placed him in the millionaire class. The Spanish-American War, with its fat contracts for guns and ammunition, made his son Andrew a peer of Wall Street bankers and the lord of Pittsburgh, the seat of war industries.

The Mellons did not believe in fighting during the war. There was no money in that. Old Judge Mellon, instructing his sons during the Civil War, wrote: "It is only greenhorns who enlist. You can learn nothing useful in the army. . . . In time you will come to understand and believe that a man may be a patriot without risking his own life or sacrificing his health. There are plenty of other lives less valuable or others ready to serve for the love of serving."

The conquest of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the coming to age of imperialistic America, stuffed the Mellon banks to bursting with the profits wrung from the workers in Pittsburgh's glowing mills. Armed with the profits of war, promoters began forming whole industries into gigantic trusts. Mellon worked feverishly in Pittsburgh. He helped form two coal combines in 1900—or from which emerged Pittsburgh Coal Co., at that time a monopoly in western Pennsylvania coal mining. Mellon's banks sold their watered stocks to the public and then obtained mortgages on every scrap of the coal combine's property in return for floating bond issues. Crucible Steel and a score of corporations were products of Mellon financing in this era. Nearly every big enterprise in Pittsburgh was financed by the Mellons in return for mortgages which covered all their property and gave them the right to foreclose in case they didn't pay.

About this time Andrew Carnegie fell out with his general manager, Frick, over the division of the tremendous wartime profits which flowed into Carnegie Steel Co.'s treasury—\$40,000,000 in the year 1900. Frick was fired. In revenge he and Mellon formed Union Steel Co. and threatened to build mills

rivalling Carnegie's. A company town was built around the new rod and wire mill at Donora, Pa. Eventually the new Union Steel Co., Mellon and Frick threatened, would add blast and open hearth furnaces to offer thorough-going competition to Carnegie's mills.

Carnegie capitulated before this threat and settled with Frick to the tune of \$31,000,000. The bluff had worked so well for Frick and Mellon that Carnegie himself used the same tactics in forcing J. P. Morgan to pay a fancy price for Carnegie's steel mills when the New York promoter organized U. S. Steel.

Mellon watched the success of these tricks as used by Frick and Carnegie, and decided to take a hand at the game himself. So he announced that his Union Steel Co. would build a rail mill that would put the U. S. Steel Corp.'s rail mill at Braddock, Pa., out of business. Further, he would construct a railroad from Pittsburgh to Lake Erie to haul his iron ore cheaply. He bought out the Sharon Steel Co., a big independent, and was in position in 1902 to compete with the steel trust in nearly every branch of steel making.

The U. S. Steel Corp., thoroughly frightened, bought Mellon's company for \$75,000,000. Mellon had put only a few million into Union Steel. An example of his tremendous profit from this deal was an ore mine for which he had paid \$150,000 and which he sold to U. S. Steel for \$4,000,000.

It was a handsome piece of poker-playing that brought perhaps \$20,000,000 into the Mellon pockets.

### *Industrial Capitalist*

Up to the Spanish-American War, Andrew Mellon had been primarily a banker and real estate promoter. Then he began to blossom out as a first rate industrial capitalist. Back in 1888 the owner of patents for refining aluminum in electric furnaces sold a share in their Pittsburgh Reduction Co. to the Mellons in return for \$250,000 to set up a mill at New Kensington, Pa. This company controlled by the Mellons has grown into properties valued at \$300,000,000, known as Aluminum Co. of America and its Canadian affiliate, Aluminium, Ltd.

Monopoly is the essence of Aluminum's success. The government protected Mellon's monopoly rights through patents until 1909. From the first, subservient U. S. Senators saw to it that Mellon's company had a high tariff to keep out foreign aluminum. It has ranged from 2 to 7 cents a pound and is now 4 cents. The Mellon company has understandings with the European aluminum companies regarding production and prices. These agreements also provide that the Mellons are to be sole sellers of aluminum to the United States government, while the German, French and British companies are guaranteed no competition in selling aluminum, made into a multitude of war uses, to their respective governments.

Mellon's monopoly ran smack up into the opposition of powerful industrial interests—particularly automobile and airplane interests—who wanted to buy the lightweight metal cheap. They succeeded in 1912 in getting the U. S. Department of Justice to file suit against Aluminum Co. of America. The court ordered Aluminum Co. not to monopolize bauxite, the ore from which aluminum is refined, not to delay shipments, or ship defective material to companies which competed with Aluminum's subsidiaries in fabricating the raw metal into finished products.

How utterly useless the court order was, came to light in 1924 when the Federal Trade Commission found that Aluminum was not only continuing its price-fixing and its discrimination against competitors in fabricating aluminum, but had gained a 100% monopoly over the mining of bauxite and the refining of raw aluminum.

The full extent of this monopoly was brought out in court when George D. Haskell, a Springfield, Mass., manufacturer, sued for \$15,000,000 damages for conspiracy in restraint of trade. The jury awarded him an \$8,000,000 verdict, but the court of appeals, happily for Mellon, reversed the verdict. Haskell had formed an aluminum company with James B. Duke, the Carolina tobacco magnate who had cheap water power in Quebec. The Mellon company bought out Duke for \$15,000,000. Testimony also revealed that the Mellons had forced the Canadian government to get bauxite concessions in British Guiana for them, in return for furnishing aluminum during the war.

Aluminum was a gold mine during the war, for the Mellons charged the United States government 32 cents a pound for this indispensable war metal. After the war was over, the price dropped to 22 cents and even now the government has suits pending against Aluminum for wartime over-charges.

### *Oil and Imperialism*

When a penniless prospector struck the Lucas oil gusher in Texas in 1901, he unwittingly gave the Mellon family a big boost toward their \$743,000,000 oil corporation. This was the biggest gusher ever struck and the first one in the Southwest. Lucas and his backers, Pittsburgh men, had to turn to Mellon for cash to develop the new oil field. The result was Gulf Oil, a profitable and completely integrated independent oil company.

The Mellons had their hands in oil before. They speculated in the western Pennsylvania field and trimmed Standard Oil to the tune of \$2,000,000 when in 1895 they forced the Rockefeller company to buy their pipe line from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia. That involved changing the Pennsylvania law forbidding pipe line mergers, but the Mellons and the Rockefellers took care of that in the legislature, thus illustrating their control of the government machinery.

Gulf Oil Corp., in on the ground floor in the great Texas field, was too big for the Rockefellers to push under, especially when the Mellons stood behind it. So Standard Oil, Gulf and a few other big companies came to an agreement regarding prices and production and a virtual monopoly was set up. The little fellows, the owners of the wells, protested long and loud to the Federal Trade Commission and the courts against the price-fixing tactics of Standard and Gulf. But all to no avail. The big companies encouraged the little fellows to take all the chances in developing new wells. Standard, Gulf and others then stepped in and dictated the prices at which the small producer could sell. Profits naturally were fantastic. In one year Gulf made \$40,000,000.

"Oil is as necessary as blood in the battles of tomorrow," said Clemenceau, war premier of France. Mellon understood the patriotic importance of oil in the next slaughter; for that reason

his Gulf Oil Corp. made use of the U. S. State Department to gain vast reserves of oil in Colombia, to uphold, with other United States interests, the gruesome dictatorship of Gomez in Venezuela, and to change Mexican oil legislation.

Independent oil producers of the southwestern United States fought bitterly against the flood of Mexican, Venezuelan and Colombian oil which poured into the United States market, ruining them. They claimed the imported oil was "foreign"; but to the Mellons and the Rockefellers, the countries along the Caribbean are just as American as Oklahoma or Texas. As a matter of fact, from the towers of Wall Street, Colombia and Venezuela are even more American, for there are bigger profits in petroleum wrung from the forced labor of semi-colonial countries than in the domestic product.

For that reason the little independents were never able to get a tariff on oil comparable to the tariff that kept foreign aluminum from competing with Mellon's Aluminum Co. of America. They failed to understand that tariffs, as well as other government measures, are framed by the big industrial capitalists to suit their private interests, regardless of the effect on petty competitors or exploited workers.

Soon after the workers and peasants of Mexico declared a social revolution in 1910, the Mellons, along with the Dohenys, Sinclairs and Rockefellers, found themselves in mortal combat with theories of social ownership which declared Mexico's natural resources belonged to the people. For the next decade the oil interests played cleverly among the politicians and generals of Mexico, subsidizing this one, overthrowing that one, hiring guerilla bands of their own. All the while, the U. S. State Department threatened invasion to protect oil rights and twice American troops marched into Mexico.

In the meantime, oil was discovered around Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela, and there the Mellons followed Standard and Deterding's Dutch-Shell, to exploit rich concessions. Venezuela was different. There dictator Gomez, rivalled only by the recently overthrown Machado of Cuba, held power, thanks to his army and his jails. He gladly signed concessions giving British and American companies the right to Venezuela's oil in return for

subsidies to maintain his own rule. The oil companies thereupon threatened a boycott of Mexican oil. The Mexican government made peace by 1928. A branch of the National City Bank was opened in Mexico City. Dwight Morrow, until then a partner in Morgan & Co., was sent as ambassador, and Lindbergh, soon to be his son-in-law, flew down to cement good will between Wall Street and the rising bourgeoisie of Mexico.

With Mexico safe for Mexican Gulf Oil and Venezuela pouring liquid gold into Mellon tankers, the Pittsburgh bankers now turned their attention to Colombia. Right next to the Venezuelan border was the Barco concession, owned by a firm composed of H. L. Doherty, the oil magnate, and J. P. Morgan & Co. The Mellons paid Doherty \$1,500,000 for his share of the concession, which the Colombian government had just announced it was about to cancel.

If this cancelled concession was worth \$1,500,000 to Mellon, why did Doherty let go of it? There were two reasons. Millions of dollars would be needed to lay pipe lines and develop wells before the first barrel of oil was pumped into a tanker. Standard Oil already being busy in the Carare district of Colombia, the Mellon company was the only one with enough free capital to undertake the development. Even more important, however, were the diplomatic angles involved. Tremendous pressure would be needed to get the cancelled concession validated. Gulf Oil, whose proprietor, Mellon, was Secretary of the Treasury in the Harding-Coolidge Administration, could see that the proper pressure was applied.

Colombia had distrusted the United States long before the seizure of Panama in 1903 by Theodore Roosevelt who wished by building a canal there to assure United States naval supremacy in American waters. The United States government tried to buy off Colombia's hatred with a \$25,000,000 payment in a deal which let Standard Oil into the Carare district. This deal involved a scandal in Colombia comparable to the Teapot Dome exposé in the United States and resulted in the resignation of the Colombian president. The Colombian Congress thereupon passed legislation which stated that petroleum resources were national property, and that the Mellons must show documentary proof to their title in the Barco concession.



The Mellon and Rockefeller firms retaliated. They hired Francis B. Loomis, former State Department official who had helped Roosevelt in the Panama grab in 1903, to present their case to the State Department and President Coolidge. Secretary of State Kellogg ordered the United States minister in Bogota to intercede for Mellon. Allen W. Dulles, another former State Department official, joined Loomis in the fight for the Mellon-Morgan concession.

When Colombia refused to knuckle down, Herbert Hoover's Department of Commerce declared a practical embargo on loans to the Caribbean country. That crippled Colombia and, in the resulting industrial paralysis, discontent increased. At this juncture the presidential election was held, and the Colombian minister to Washington, Olaya, a man thoroughly imbued with the Wall Street point of view, campaigned for the presidency. He was elected by 121,000, a thumping majority in a country where workers and peasants have no vote.

President Olaya immediately invited National City Co. (National City Bank affiliate) to send a representative to Colombia, and he himself visited Wall Street and Washington where he talked with the bankers and with Secretary Mellon. Mellon, of course, later denied that he had mentioned his concession when he talked with Olaya.

As a matter of fact, Olaya shortly after the interview got a \$20,000,000 credit from the National City Co. and returned to Bogota to force Mellon's concession through Congress. With him went a Princeton University professor and the oil law expert who helped Ambassador Morrow clean up the Mexican oil tangle. As soon as the Mellon oil law was passed by the Colombian Congress and signed by Olaya, the National City Co. released the last \$4,000,000 of the loan.

All this came out in testimony before a U. S. Senate committee investigating the flotation of foreign loans. Witnesses revealed that excited cables flew back and forth between the State Department and Bogota while Mellon's concession was hanging fire and that Secretary of State Stimson was concerned in helping with the deal.

The upshot of this piece of dollar diplomacy was that the

Mellons were confirmed in ownership of oil lands valued by a U. S. State Department official at from \$350,000,000 to \$2,000,000,000, and all for the trifling price of \$1,500,000 plus the pressure of the United States government.

International diplomacy was again called into use when the Mellons shouldered their way into Iraq oil. When Standard Oil learned that the British oil companies had staked out the rich Mosul field in Iraq as their own, thanks to a British mandate from the League of Nations, it indignantly protested to the State Department that the principle of the "open door" for all capitalists was being violated. It was arranged finally that Standard Oil was to have one-fourth interest in the Turkish Petroleum Co.

When Gulf Oil executives heard that, they boiled over with indignation. They demanded that the State Department pry the door open even wider so they could get in. Accordingly, the Near East Development Corp. was formed by the Standard Oil companies and Gulf, and the Mellons were given one-fifth interest.

### *Profits in Explosives*

War brought another rich treasure to the Mellons. That was the Koppers Coke Co.

Dr. Heinrich Koppers was a German scientist who had come to America before the World War to introduce a type of coke oven which made use of the valuable gases which the old-fashioned beehive coke ovens wasted when converting coal into coke. When war broke out in 1914, Mellon saw that explosives meant millions, and these explosives were made out of those very gases that Dr. Koppers saved in his by-product coke ovens. So he bought out Dr. Koppers' patents and business giving him \$300,000 worth of shares in the new company and a salary of \$10,000 a year. Mellon proceeded to sign fat contracts with agents of the Allied nations.

When the United States entered the war in 1917, the "alien property" law was passed. The law declared that all German and Austrian property, including patents, in the United States, was to be confiscated.

Mellon's Koppers Coke Co. immediately informed the govern-

ment that one-fifth of its stock was owned by Dr. Koppers, a German citizen. Accordingly, the stock was confiscated and then offered for sale at auction in 1918. The Mellon company bought Dr. Koppers' share for a mere \$302,500. Profits for the first six months of 1918 alone easily exceeded what the Mellons paid for Dr. Koppers' one-fifth share in a \$15,000,000 company.

The Koppers company hastily erected by-product gas plants throughout the country during the war, to cash in on the high prices paid for ammunition. The government designated the Koppers units as "war order" plants whose products were essential to the manufacture of explosives. After the war was over, the Mellon company continued building these gas plants, and became a big factor in the so-called public utilities companies which sell gas to industrial and to domestic consumers. Koppers Gas & Coke Co. was organized and grew rapidly until in 1931 its assets were \$177,000,000. To control big gas properties in New England, the Mellons then organized Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, a \$203,000,000 firm. In 1931 this company alone had profits of \$5,775,000.

Through their control of valuable St. Lawrence River power for use in their aluminum plant at Massena, New York, the Mellons acquired 21% ownership in the Morgan-Niagara Hudson Corp., a vast holding company which controlled light and power throughout New York State. They became powerful in the United Light & Railways Co., a \$498,000,000 concern; in United Light & Power Co., a \$575,000,000 concern; and in U. S. Electric Power Corp., whose assets are \$1,257,000,000.

### *Low Taxes for the Rich*

Banker Mellon's rise to command of the U. S. Treasury was logical. What more reasonable than that one of the nation's greatest money masters should take charge of the nation's finances? A variety of reasons dictated the choice of Mellon as Secretary in 1921. First, the war had been terribly expensive, and the question came up as to who should pay for it. For the Republican Party there was only one answer. Those who had coined millions out of the war must not be called upon to pay for it. What better

assurance was there that taxes would be eased on the wealthy than to have the richest banker in the key tax position?

Second, the Republican Party had incurred a tremendous deficit in the 1920 campaign and somebody had to pay for that. Andrew Mellon made the biggest contribution, reported by the *New York Times* as \$1,500,000. He must be rewarded.

Mellon was glad enough to change from Pittsburgh to Washington. His corporations gathered dividends as the earth soaks up rain; the process was nearly automatic. Although he was on the top rung of the millionaire ladder, hardly anyone outside Pittsburgh had ever heard his name. He felt the need for public acclaim in keeping with his position. Further, no family ties bound him. His two children were away in private school and he had divorced his wife back in 1912.

That divorce showed Mellon's power. Mrs. Mellon came from a wealthy Irish brewer's family, liked gaiety, hated the smoke and grime and coldness of Pittsburgh and her husband's concentration on financial affairs. She obtained a legal separation, but Mellon refused to permit her to have their children part of the year. She defied him by moving back to the Mellon house in Pittsburgh. Thereupon he sued for divorce. The Pittsburgh newspapers refused to publish Mrs. Mellon's statements defending herself against his charges, and even the telegraph agencies helped to keep any news of the sensational divorce from getting out of the city.

Mrs. Mellon found a parallel between her position and that of thousands of foreign-born workers who toiled in Mellon mills. "It crept over me," she wrote, "that perhaps I, too, a foreigner like his Huns and Slavs, had been weighed coldly, dispassionately, on the scales of demand and supply and as a wife ranked merely as a commodity in the great plan of this master financier's life-work. The babies were there; even the male heir was there. Was the wife to be laid off like other hired help when the steel mills shut down?"

Mellon wanted no publicity on his divorce. Accordingly Boss Penrose had a law passed quietly in the Pennsylvania legislature providing for secret divorce hearings. Then the banker discovered he wanted testimony taken in Europe. This too was arranged by Penrose.

Nevertheless news leaked out and was published in certain eastern newspapers. Mrs. Mellon demanded a jury trial and the court granted it. Then Mellon was all for settling. Grounds for divorce were changed to simple desertion and the decree was granted in 1912.

The whole incident illustrated Mellon's influence on Pennsylvania politics in obtaining passage of special laws to suit his needs, in hushing publicity and controlling courthouse officials. Boss Penrose naturally was anxious to please the powerful Pittsburgher; Mellon was a heavy contributor to Republican Party funds. These gifts had run as high as \$150,000 at a throw. Penrose and other bosses of Pennsylvania, then as now, got their support from Mellon, General Atterbury of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Joseph Grundy of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers Assn., and similar big employing interests. No wonder all efforts to obtain minimum wage, child labor, and old age pension legislation invariably failed in the legislature!

In Pittsburgh, Mellon worked hand in glove with the Magee-Flinn Republican political machine and its successors, including the Coyne machine. Vice, poverty and corruption flourish, making the name of Pittsburgh pre-eminent in that regard among American cities. The big employers care not at all about that. Their workers live in miserable houses and shacks in the steel and coal towns surrounding the city, work long hours, or not at all, and get barely enough to hold body and soul together.

Senator Penrose and Senator Knox, faithful servants of the steel and coal interests and political messenger boys for the Frick-Mellon interests, both saw to it that their friend Andrew Mellon was made Secretary of the Treasury. Mellon's first job in Washington was to see that the excess profits tax on the fat earnings of the big corporations was done away with, and to reduce income taxes in the "higher brackets," that is, upon the very rich. Besides sparing the rich the burden of keeping up their government this also avoided leaving extra money in the Treasury for the veterans' bonus, for federal unemployment insurance or any other social legislation.

Money which might have gone into social insurance funds was dumped into the stock market, into further expansion of industrial

plants and into foreign loans. Building more factories when those already built were not being used to capacity hastened the inevitable crash of 1929, and the foreign loans brought nearer the day of United States participation in the next imperialist war.

Under the Mellon regime the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tremendous refunds to great corporations and wealthy persons. These refunds were returns to them of taxes on war-time profits years after the war ended. Refunds to the capitalist class totalled close to \$3,000,000,000.\* U. S. Steel alone received \$96,384,000. Mellon served not merely himself but his class, and in serving his class served himself. He made refunds to his own corporations totalling about \$14,500,000. His own personal refund amounted to \$405,000.

Mellon himself, as the result of these favors to fellow-millionaires, and corporations, became the idol of the Big Business press. He was regarded as more powerful by far than President Coolidge, and as the Greatest Secretary of the Treasury since Alexander Hamilton! He was undoubtedly the power behind the throne in Washington from 1921 to 1929.

As befitted such a power in finance and government, Mellon had his daughter married to the son of a reactionary Maryland Senator in a million-dollar wedding that was the talk of society, and recalled those feudal rites in Pittsburgh where Mellon girls were married to the sons of steel magnates in made-to-order medieval castles. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were lavished on these affairs, even though thousands of Mellon miners might, at the time, be living on starvation rations while striking against Pittsburgh Coal Co. On the very day Sarah Cordelia Mellon was married, Mellon coal and iron police were evicting miners from their homes.

The Mellons did not believe much in charity and gave little. One exception was the \$3,000,000 given to build the East Liberty Presbyterian Church in Pittsburgh, known locally as the "Mellon fire escape." Millions were invested in the Mellon Institute, a research laboratory for manufacturers and for Mellon corporations. The Mellons and allied magnates controlled the board of the

\* See *Wall Street*, by Anna Rochester, p. 12. International Pamphlets, No. 30.

University of Pittsburgh, which became notorious for firing professors and radical students and suppressing freedom of thought on the campus.

The Mellons continue to invest heavily in the Republican Party. They gave and lent \$250,000 in the notorious 1926 Republican primary in Pennsylvania. Mellon defended his gifts on the ground that they were the same as gifts to the church. Each vote for the Mellon candidate for U. S. Senator in Pittsburgh cost \$4.14. The Mellons also controlled the Democratic Party in Pittsburgh, through alliance with its chiefs, a fact that became doubly important after the Democratic victory in 1932.

### *Mellon's Workers*

Mellon is a staunch believer in long hours and low wages for his workers. The state sweatshop investigation in Pennsylvania in 1933, as we have noted, revealed that his aluminum factories paid 18 cents an hour to women. His aluminum plants worked the 11½-hour night shift even in 1933.

Strikes periodically convulsed his spy-ridden factories and mills. In 1913 his aluminum workers in New Kensington revolted, and wives of strikers used blacksnake whips to beat off strikebreakers. State police were rushed to the plant to break up meetings and picket lines. After six weeks, the workers were forced back under promise of arbitration.

In 1915, at Massena, New York, his aluminum workers struck, took possession of the aluminum plant and threw up a barricade in front of the main gate. Governor Whitman (Republican) of New York, sent in companies of militia which stormed the barricades and finally drove the workers out in a series of bloody encounters. Strikers' homes were raided and a strike leader later died of wounds inflicted by guardsmen. A hundred workers were jailed. The strike was soon settled with the company promising slight wage increases and correction of grievances over rents.

Again in 1916 the Aluminum workers in New Kensington struck, demanding the 8-hour day and recognition of A. F. of L. unions, but were defeated when the company shifted its war orders to other plants. The workers were forced back after three months.

In the Standard Steel Car Works at Butler, Pa., in 1919, state troopers beat back workers who joined the great steel strike. The troopers' horses were trained to kick in the doors of workers' homes and to enter, scattering terror among wives and children of the strikers.

In Pittsburgh Coal, however, the Mellon labor policy came to highest fruition. R. B. Mellon, once chairman of the company's board, practically admitted before a Senate committee that "you can't run coal mines without machine guns." Pittsburgh Coal, Charley Schwab's Bethlehem Mines Corp., and Rockefeller's Consolidation mines, took the lead in 1925 in breaking a contract with the United Mine Workers and smashing that union. Miners were evicted from the company towns in which they had been forced to live; coal and iron police, licensed by the state and paid by the coal and steel companies, terrorized strikers. Tear gas and machine guns helped the operators. When miners joined the National Miners Union in 1931 and conducted another great strike, Pittsburgh Coal Co. exceeded its previous efforts. Dozens of miners were shot, hundreds were gassed, others were sent to prison for long terms, their families evicted and starved. But a Pittsburgh Coal superintendent and a bunch of company guards at Arnold, Pa., who shot and killed John Philipovich, a strike sympathizer, were convicted of mere manslaughter and paroled. Two Pittsburgh Coal guards who tortured Mike Barkoski to death in their police barracks were given light sentences.

Company towns are an integral part of the Mellon apparatus of oppression. Andrew Mellon's partner, Henry Clay Frick, found the company store convenient in the hard times of the 1870's, for paying his miners and coke workers when he was short of cash. He gave them scrip redeemable at the company store, and found the practice so profitable that it was continued and adopted by other coal companies. Workers were forced to trade there, and high prices kept them in debt to the company. Popular outcry against these "pluck me" stores became so vehement that the Pennsylvania legislature abolished them. Thereupon the coal and steel companies organized dummy firms to operate them, and they flourish under this thin disguise to this day.

In the company town the company owns not only the stores, but



all the drab, monotonous shacks, the school, the church and everything else. The company is also the "law." It hires and pays the private police who patrol the streets and roads, help keep organizers out, spy on militant workers, and try to disrupt their organizations.

The East St. Louis race riots of 1917 were laid at the door of the Aluminum Co. and other employers by a Congressional investigating committee. Aluminum Ore Co., fighting its low-paid white workers then on strike, imported hundreds of Negroes from the lower Mississippi valley. So many were brought in that there were jobs for only part of them. Race hatreds were fanned. In the terrible riots that followed at least 25 Negroes, men and women, were burned to death, shot, drowned, hanged and their homes burned. The police and militia refused to interfere.

In 1933, the Aluminum Co. signed a code stipulating 30 cents an hour as the minimum wage in the industry. But even this hunger wage was too much to suit the Mellon company, and within a few weeks it was paying hundreds of its women workers at New Kensington, Pa., 25 cents an hour, in flat defiance of its own code. The workers at the New Kensington plant made their opposition felt by an overwhelming vote against the company union which was to be set up on the basis of the code.

Mellon's Pittsburgh Coal Co. signed a N.R.A. code and a working agreement with John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers which took away from the miners, on strike at the time, the right to strike. Under this agreement between Pittsburgh Coal and Lewis, the checkoff was forced on the miners, to be paid into the district office instead of to local unions, the previous practice. In this way the local unions were robbed of their financial autonomy.

### *The Panic Helps Mellon*

During the 11 years he held the office of Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon's private fortune and that of his family, leaped from the hundreds of millions to over a billion. The policies he sponsored—low taxation of the wealthy, easy money for speculators, unchallenged sway by the big corporations—padded his own fortune and those of his fellow-millionaires.

After the economic crash of 1929, his usefulness to the Republican Party declined. During the years of stock market prosperity he had been praised extravagantly as the author of good times; when stocks crashed, factories closed and millions roamed the streets looking for work, he was blamed. Veterans whose demand for a bonus he defeated; workers who knew his anti-labor policies had been responsible for low wages during "prosperity" and for lack of adequate relief and unemployment insurance during the crisis; and farmers who had been "deflated" since 1921 under his pro-corporation program, joined hands to denounce him. President Hoover thereupon sent Mellon as Ambassador to Great Britain. This, of course, meant no change in U. S. Treasury policy as millionaire Ogden Mills out-Melloned Mellon in his favors to his class.

Mellon used the crisis of 1929, as he had those of 1893 and 1907, and as his father had used the panic of 1873, to "clean up." His corporations, if necessary, paid interest and dividends out of vast surplus funds which had been piled up in good times. They bought up small companies in distress for a song. Mellon acquired numerous banks in western Pennsylvania when they became insolvent. He could have saved these banks and the workers money deposited in them. Instead he waited till they went on the rocks and then bought them up.

His Union Trust Co., keystone of his financial structure, continued to pay 200% annual dividends. An analysis of his family's income showed hardly any decline during years which saw at least 15,000,000 unemployed. In 1929 the Mellons received about \$35,000,000 in dividends alone. In 1930, their estimated income went up to \$38,000,000 and even in the panicky year 1931 the figure declined only to about \$33,000,000. (These figures are based on our estimate of Mellon share of control or ownership of particular companies.)

Despite this personal prosperity, however, his companies ruthlessly slashed wages and working forces. Some of his aluminum workers, by 1933, were working for as little as 18 cents an hour. Thousands were laid off by Gulf Oil. No unemployment insurance protected them. In 1931 Mellon and his brother gave a grudging \$300,000 to Pittsburgh charity, less than 1% of their income for

the year. Later they were obliged to contribute \$750,000 more. But that was just a fraction of the sum that Andrew Mellon spent in that year for art treasures alone! From Union Trust in 1931 his family drew dividends of more than \$2,400,000, and other banks yielded him a million more.

President Roosevelt, seeking desperately to save the capitalist system from collapse, announced the "New Deal" in 1933, and instituted the National Recovery Act. Mellon continued to fight unionism, higher wages, and shorter hours with all the forces at his command.

### *Mellon—A Class Symbol*

Mellon is the supreme expression of predatory, acquisitive capitalism. In this system of exploitation and individual acquisition, he did his best to search out, control, acquire and hold on to everything he saw that looked as if a profit could be made out of it. The more he, and all capitalists, acquired, the deeper in misery became the masses.

Mellon did not create this wealth, which he today controls. He sought only to gain control over wealth, that he might intercept the profits. And he used these profits to gain further control—the process being almost endless. But the source of this wealth and these profits remained as always—the exploitation of the resources of the country and the labor of the masses.

It is against this system of capitalism—mass exploitation for individual gain—that the workers fight. It is capitalism that produced Mellon, just as it produced the wretchedness of workers' lives, the horrors of our civilization and the army of half-starved unemployed.

Capitalism yesterday produced its great fortunes, today produces its Mellons and Rockefellers and Morgans, and tomorrow another set. Under capitalism all wealth becomes concentrated. It is for a new order of society, granting no place to exploiters, as in the Soviet Union, that we fight. The workers, creators of this wealth, will then have its use.

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*

DATE: November 14, 1958

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *R*

SUBJECT: WILLIAM TOMPKINS

FORMER ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Nease	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Clayton	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Reference is made to my memorandum of November 13, 1958, advising that Tompkins was meeting with Allen Dulles of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the same date.

On the evening of November 13, 1958, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent on a strictly confidential basis that he had developed the following information. Tompkins called on Dulles to discuss the appeal of Rudolf Abel which is now before the Supreme Court. Tompkins indicated to Dulles that he had been called in by the Department to assume the responsibility of preparing the Government's argument before the Supreme Court. Tompkins advised Dulles that the Department fully realizes that there is a good possibility that the Court will rule against the Government and the Department is already making preliminary plans for a new trial. Tompkins stated that if there is a new trial, Reino Hayhanen again will be a witness. Tompkins wanted to know if he could have legal access to Hayhanen for the next few weeks in order to go over testimony. Dulles took the position that at this time it was not necessary to make any kind of committal concerning Hayhanen and he told Tompkins that they could discuss the matter at a future time. Tompkins expects the Court to rule on the Abel appeal sometime in February, 1959. *(S-1)(X)(K)(C)*

Angleton did not know if other matters may have been discussed with Tompkins, but he is of the opinion that Tompkins' interest in Hayhanen may be related to another motive, namely the writing of a book concerning the Abel case. *(S-1)(X)(K)(C)*

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:jlkyk  
(6)DECLASSIFIED BY *SP7 clj/AB*  
ON *2/1/85* C.A. # *88-1846*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont *per CIA review of 12/5/94*
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 -
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

FOI/PA #

APPEAL #

CIVIL ACT. #

E.O. #

DATE *10/4/85* INITIALS *lmw*

S-1 is CIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT RECORDED

17 NOV 19 1958

13 NOV 18

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Declassify on: OADR

no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

68 NOV 24 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*

DATE: April 13, 1959

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *R*1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. Roach  
1 - Mr. PapichSUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY*DeLoach*  
*McGuire*  
*W.C. Sullivan*Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

You may be interested in the following comments which were volunteered to Agent Papich on 4-13-59 by James Angleton, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

As indicated in the press, the condition of John Foster Dulles is very serious. Angleton advised that there is considerable speculation within CIA concerning the possibility that President Eisenhower might appoint Allen Dulles as Secretary of State. Angleton made it very clear that as far as he knew, this was all restricted to speculation within his own Agency. However, he personally knows that Allen Dulles definitely would like to receive such an appointment.

With regard to Allen Dulles' meeting with the President this past week end, Angleton stated that the interview dealt with the international situation and he was quite certain that it had no relationship to the appointment of the CIA Director to the position of Secretary of State.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

*SJP:hrt*  
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6 bja/lmw

REG-44

62-83338-46

20 APR 17 1959

LIAISON

no deletions per OGA letter 9/7/10

62 APR 22 1959

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 15, 1959

FROM : R. R. Roach

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9/11/85 BY sp6bjal/mwSUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
DeLoach	_____
McGuire	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Reference is made to the enclosed copy of a Washington City news release dated May 12, 1959, which briefly describes a speech made by Allen Dulles before a group of businessmen at a meeting of the National Defense Executive Reserve. The article indicates that Dulles had been prepared to make some off-the-record remarks when he learned that reporters were present. After consultation with Defense officials, it was announced that Dulles would make off-the-record remarks in the presence of the reporters. His remarks apparently did not include anything that had not already been stated by other Government officials.

On May 14, 1959, [redacted] Assistant to Dulles confidentially furnished the following information to Agent Papich.

b3 per CIA

[redacted] advised that Dulles usually makes his speech from a prepared text. In the above-described instance he did not have such a text and talked from notes. [redacted] implied that some confusion resulted when Dulles learned reporters were present but no damage was done because Dulles actually did not get involved in any sensitive material.

Dulles has made speeches on an infrequent basis ever since he became director of CIA in 1953. Very interestingly, in the past year he measurably has increased the number of speeches before various groups throughout the country. The reason for this is not specifically known but CIA officials have remarked to the Liaison Agent that in some instances Dulles has made the talks at the request of the State Department, and more specifically, from his brother, John Foster Dulles. Comment has also been made to the Liaison Agent that Dulles has expanded all his public

SJP:sal (6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

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Declassify on: OADR

REG-95

83338-47

MAY 21 1959

MAY 27 1959  
EnclosureENCLOSURE  
Copy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
RE: ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR  
CIA

addresses in order to build prestige for himself and his agency in anticipation of possible opposition which might be encountered by CIA from a new Administration in 1961. In this connection, you may be interested to know that Dulles allegedly has a very strong ambition to continue as Director of CIA until the new building is officially inaugurated. Dulles wants to be Director of the agency when that takes place. The building very likely will not be ready for occupancy until the middle of 1961.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

ADP Q REC 5/16 ✓



UPI-188

(ALLEN DULLES)

ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR OF THE CIA SAID TODAY THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES RUSSIA DOES NOT INTEND TO START A GENERAL WAR.

HE SAID U.S. OFFICIALS BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION, RED CHINA AND RUSSIA'S EUROPEAN SATELLITES WILL AVOID ANY SITUATION WHICH COULD PRECIPITATE AN ALL OUT WAR.

DULLES SPOKE TO 750 BUSINESSMEN AT A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EXECUTIVE RESERVE SPONSORED BY THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT'S BUSINESS AND DEFENSE SERVICES ADMINISTRATION.

THE RESERVE IS COMPOSED OF EXECUTIVES WHO WOULD WORK FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN CASE OF WAR OR OTHER NATIONAL EMERGENCY.

DULLES ABRUPTLY SWITCHED TO AN OFF-THE-RECORD REMARKS IN THE MIDDLE OF HIS SPEECH. HE DID SO AFTER ASKING OFFICIALS IF THE CONFERENCE WAS OPEN TO REPORTERS.

A NEWSMAN TOLD DULLES THAT REPORTERS WERE PRESENT UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON THE RECORD.

AFTER AN IMPROMPTU CONSULTATION WITH CONFERENCE OFFICIALS, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT DULLES' ADDITIONAL REMARKS WOULD BE ON AN OFF-THE-RECORD BASIS.

IN THE REMAINING 25 MINUTES OF HIS SPEECH, DULLES SAID LITTLE IF ANYTHING THAT HE OR OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE NOT PUBLICLY STATED BEFORE.

5/12--N544P

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/24/85 BY spcbyd/mw

Enclosure to Memorandum Roach to Belmont dated  
5/15/59 captioned "ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY"

62-93338-47

b6  
b7C

## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6

b7C

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: 7-27-59

FROM :

Fol # 367904

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/LEHL

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

6/21/99

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR  
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

On 7-25-59 Allen Dulles personally asked Agent Papich if the Bureau would be kind enough to transmit a message for him to Governor Munoz Martin of Puerto Rico. Dulles advised that he had been invited to speak on 8-4-59 before the Governor's Conference. This is an annual conference held by Governors of all states, and will last for approximately 4 days beginning 8-3-59. Dulles stated he had not been able to confirm his attendance due to several pressing problems, and he is ~~not~~ anxious to get a message to Governor Munoz. Dulles explained that unfortunately his Agency has no means of fast and secure communication with Puerto Rico, and that he is very hesitant to use commercial facilities since he wants to avoid publicity. He commented that in view of the tense Caribbean political situation, advance publicity concerning his visit could be misinterpreted by the press. Dulles stated he would be most grateful if the Bureau could pass the message on to Governor Munoz and at the same time ask the Governor to withhold any publicity concerning Dulles' trip.

Dulles volunteered that his speech would pertain to the international situation as it might relate to the civil defense problems of the Governors. He will speak in general terms and will not touch on any classified information. He also plans to have a personal meeting with Governor Munoz, the objective of which is to obtain the Governor's views and observations concerning the Caribbean political situation. Dulles considers Governor Munoz an astute politician whose comments could be of value. Dulles also indicated that he would endeavor to pay a courtesy call on our Agent in Charge, San Juan.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent a teletype dated 7-25-59 to the Bureau regarding Dulles' visit to Puerto Rico, asking that a message be passed on to Governor Munoz. This teletype was prepared by one of Dulles' subordinates who had not been aware of the CIA Director's conversation with the Liaison Agent. On 7-27-59 the Liaison Agent was informed by Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, that the teletype could be disregarded and the Bureau instead act on the basis of the conversation between Dulles and the Liaison Agent. (S-1)(X)(U) 62-83338-48

SJP/nmp

(8)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donahoe
- 1 - Foreign Liaison
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

FOI/PA#

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E.O. #

DATE

7/24/85

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REC-56

EX-140

JUL 29 1959

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7-27-59

7/24/85

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/LEHL  
 ON 5/28/00  
 per OGA Review on 3/24/00

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont  
Re: ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ACTION:

Heretofore we have not received requests of this type from CIA, and we have always been most careful not to be doing leg work for that Agency. However, since this is a personal request from Allen Dulles, who has been most cooperative with the Bureau, it is believed that in view of the emergency circumstances described above, it would be advisable to transmit the message to Governor Munoz via our San Juan office.

There is enclosed herewith a radiogram to San Juan instructing the SAC to inform Governor Munoz that Dulles will be arriving San Juan 8-1-59 for speaking engagement scheduled for 8-4-59. Munoz will be informed that Dulles has asked that the Governor not issue any press release concerning Dulles' trip and speech.

SAC is being told that Dulles may pay courtesy call at his office. If so, SAC should extend usual courtesies and not get involved in discussions of a policy nature.

*H*

*DD*

*auth*

*Q*

*Keyne*  
*7/27*

*12-8*  
*7/27*  
*OK*  
*Q*

~~SECRET~~

1-Orig  
1-Yellow  
1-Mr. Belmont  
1-Mr. DeLoach

7-27-59

CODE 1-Mr. Baumgardner  
1-Mr. Donahoe  
1-Liaison  
1-Papich URGENT

RADIOGRAM

REC-362-83338-49  
TO SAC SAN JUAN

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR, CIA. INFORM GOVERNOR MUNOZ THAT DULLES  
ARRIVING SAN JUAN AUGUST ONE <sup>EAL EIGHT NAUGHT ONE</sup> FOR SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT SCHEDULED FOR  
AUGUST FOUR, GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE. ADVISE GOVERNOR DULLES ASKS THAT  
NO PRESS RELEASE BE MADE CONCERNING HIS TRIP AND SPEECH. FOR YOUR  
INFORMATION, YOUR OFFICE HANDLING THIS BECAUSE CIA LACKS APPROPRIATE  
COMMUNICATION FACILITIES. DULLES TO SPEAK CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL  
SITUATION AS IT MIGHT RELATE TO CIVIL DEFENSE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNORS.  
DULLES PLANS TO HAVE PERSONAL MEETING WITH MUNOZ TO DISCUSS CARIBBEAN  
POLITICAL SITUATION. HE ALSO MAY PAY COURTESY CALL TO YOUR OFFICE.  
EXTEND USUAL COURTESIES. DO NOT GET INVOLVED DISCUSSIONS POLICY  
NATURE.

1 - Foreign Liaison (detached)

SJP/

(9)

ENCLOSURE TO MEMO FROM BOSE TO BELMONT 7-27-59, RE: "ALLEN DULLES,  
DIRECTOR, CIA."

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DATE 11/1/85 BY SP6BZ/1mw

Tolson  
Belmont  
DeLoach  
McGuire  
Mohr  
Parsons  
Rosen  
Tamm  
Trotter  
W.C. Sullivan  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

JUL 28 1959

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/1/85 BY SP6BZ/1mw

53 AUG 13 1959

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

C. I. A.  
RELEASE

RR ESV

DE ESC 11

R 251650Z

GR86

Mr. Tolson ☒  
Mr. Belmont ☒  
Mr. DeLoach ☒  
Mr. McGuire ☒  
Mr. Mohr ☒  
Mr. Parsons ☒  
Mr. Rosen ☒  
Mr. Tamm ☒  
Mr. Trotter ☒  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan ☒  
Tele. Room ☒  
Mr. Holloman ☒  
Miss Gandy ☒

TO: DIRECTOR FBI

FM: DIRECTOR CIA

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ETHL

ON 5/28/00

PER OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/00

per OGA letter 9/7/10

FOL # 366904

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6/21/99 BY SP2 ALM/ETHL

~~SECRET~~

OUT 79295

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO YOUR OFFICE IN PUERTO RICO:

1. MR. ALLEN DULLES ARRIVING SAN JUAN BY EAL 801 ON 1 AUG  
TO ATTEND GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE. WOULD LIKE TO MEET BUREAU  
REPRESENTATIVES AND WOULD APPRECIATE THEIR TELLING GOVERNOR  
MUNOZ. WILL WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH GOVERNOR  
AND DISCUSS PROBLEMS WITH HIM. DESIRES NO PUBLICITY UNLESS  
RELEASED BY HIM.

2. NOTIFY MR. WILLARD GALBRAITH OF ABOVE.

TOT: 125/1956

TOR: 2571926Z

REC-38

62-13338-49

AUG 7 1959

b6  
b7C

**DECODED COPY**

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_

☒ **Radio**☐ **Teletype**

DEFERRED

7-28-59

TO DIRECTOR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

FROM SAC SAN JUAN

282105

ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR, CIA, REBURAD JULY 27, 1959. GOVERNOR MUNOZ WAS PERSONALLY CONTACTED AT HIS SUMMER RESIDENCE, CAYEY, PR, AND FURNISHED INFORMATION IN REBURAD. HE SAID HE WOULD MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS TO HAVE SOMEONE MEET MR. DULLES UPON HIS ARRIVAL. BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS NOTED.

RECEIVED: 7:21 PM RADIO

7:37 PM CODING UNIT

RWH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 9/11/85 BY SP6 BJA/mw

Classified by \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify on: OADR

no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

EX 109

REC- 23

62-83338-50

12 AUG 7 1959

Mr. Belmont

b6  
b7C

C. I. A.  
RELEASE

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RR ESV

DE ESC 13

R 292031Z

GR56

TO: DIRECTOR FBI

FM: DIRECTOR CIA

~~SECRET~~

OUT NUMBER 80537

REF: OUT NUMBER 79295

FBI # 366904

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6/21/99 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

b6 Per FBI  
b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/EHL  
ON 5/28/00  
PER OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/00  
per OGA review 9/7/10

1. PLEASE CHANGE ARRIVAL OF MR. ALLEN DULLES TO READ  
"ARRIVING SAN JUAN BY EAL 2801 ON 1 AUG LEAVING NEW YORK AT  
1215 HOURS; ARRIVE SAN JUAN AT 1650 HOURS."

EX 109 REC-23

62-83338-51

2. NOTIFY MR. WILLARD GALBRAITH OF ABOVE

12 AUG 24 1959

TOT: 29/2313Z

TOR: 29/2314Z

*Radiogram to San Juan*  
*7-30-59*  
*SP2/nnn*

*cc Mr. Belmont*  
*air*  
*L. A. [signature]*

*cc. [signature]*



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 8/6/59

FROM : SAC, San Juan (66-565)

ATTN: Liaison Section

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CIA

Reburads 7/27/59 and 7/30/59 concerning the arrival of DULLES in Puerto Rico.

I personally met Mr. DULLES on his arrival in Puerto Rico on 8/1/59 at 4:50 p.m. I remained with him until such time as his plane departed for the Dorado Beach Hotel where he was staying. He departed for Washington, D.C. on Tuesday, 8/4/59. During the time he was here I saw him on several occasions and extended the usual courtesies to him. He expressed appreciation for the Bureau's interest on his behalf.

2 - Bureau  
1 - San Juan

JFS:mls  
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9/11/85 BY SP1BJA/1mw

REC-93

62-83338-52

14 AUG 25 1959

77  
38 AUG 27 1959b6  
b7C



RA

- 1-Mr. Belmont
- 1-Mr. DeLoach
- 1-Mr. Baumgardner
- 1-Mr. Donahoe
- 1-Liaison
- 1-Papich

~~SECRET~~

7-30-59

REC-23

62-83338-57

RADIOGRAM  
EX 109

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TO SAC SAN JUAN

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR, CIA. REBUAD JULY TWENTY-SEVEN. ADVISE  
GOVERNOR MUNOZ DULLES DEPARTING NEW YORK AUGUST ONE TWELVE  
FIFTEEN P.M., EAL TWO EIGHT NAUGHT ONE, ARRIVING SAN JUAN FOUR  
FIFTY P.M. NOTE CHANGE FLIGHT NUMBER. ALSO ADVISE WILLARD  
GALBRAITH, CIA. (S)(X)(A)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ENL  
ON 5/28/00

1 - Foreign Liaison (detached)  
per OGA 9/7/10

Classified by SP6 bja/lmw  
Declassify on: OADR 7/24/85

SJP/nmn  
(9)

NOTE: Dulles scheduled to make speech at Governors' Conference, San Juan, 8-4-59. CIA does not have radio communication with San Juan and Dulles asked on 7-25-59 if we would send message to Governor Munoz through our office. San Juan was instructed to do so by radiogram dated 7-27-59. On 7-29-59 CIA advised that flight number of plane has been changed and instant radiogram therefore being sent to San Juan.

FOI/PA # 240,403  
APPEAL #  
CIVIL ACT. # 19356  
E.O. #  
DATE 7/24/85

FOI # 36694  
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ENL  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X N  
6/21/91

EBI  
DECLASSIFIED 209  
NR: 301717  
ENC: *[initials]*  
CK: *[initials]*  
APPROVED BY *[initials]*  
TYPED BY

- Tolson
- Belmont
- DeLoach
- McGuire
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

JUL 30 1959

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

2:16 PM - NH

~~SECRET~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1 AUG 1

*W. C. Sullivan*

**CIA Chief Speaks**

Allen W. Dulles, CIA chief, speaking:  
The evidence is overwhelming that the Soviets intend to use nuclear blackmail as a major weapon to promote their objectives — namely to spread communism throughout the world. They showed this intent at the time of the Suez crisis when they threatened England and France with ballistic attacks. They used these tactics again, chiefly against Turkey, at the time of the Middle East crisis about a year ago. They will use the same threat against this country. If due either to any weakening of our defenses — and all forms of protection against nuclear attack are important elements of our defense — or due to any failure to maintain our retaliatory striking power, we render ourselves susceptible to such nuclear blackmail, the security of this country and of the Free World would be gravely compromised. I have no reason to believe that we will fail to meet this challenge.

El Mundo  
San Juan, P.R.  
8/6/59  
Page 36, Col. 1-2

ALLEN DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CIA  
SJ 66-565

15 AUG 4 50 PM '59

162-8332-40  
**NOT RECORDED**  
149 AUG 21 1959

REC'D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6 bja/lmw

25 AUG 24 1959

b6  
b7C

noted



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. Belmont ✓  
Mr. DeLoach ✓  
Mr. McGuire ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. Parsons ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Tamm ✓  
Mr. Trotter ✓  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Mr. Holloman ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓

August 5, 1959

b6 Per FBI

b7C

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Department of Justice  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I have just returned from a brief visit to San Juan, Puerto Rico, in connection with a talk I made to the Governors' Conference, which assembled there.

During my visit your representative there, Mr. Joseph F. Santoiana, was most helpful to me on several occasions, and I want to express to you, and through you, to him, my appreciation of these courtesies.

Faithfully yours,

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

FOI #366904

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6/21/99 BY SP-2 ALM/ENL

no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

REC-37

62-83338-53

20 SEP 1 1959

EX-135

62 SEP 3 1959 107

EXP. PROC.  
AUG 7 1959

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *all/mw*

DATE: 11-2-59

FROM : b6  
b7C

3-

SUBJECT:

*esa*  
**ALLEN DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
DeLoach	_____
McGuire	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

For your information, there has been some rumor within Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Allen Dulles may be preparing to leave the Agency within the next three or four months. Apparently these rumors originated after publicity was given to the cornerstone laying ceremony which is to take place at CIA's new building on 11-3-59. One report was that Dulles wanted this particular ceremony taken care of before really cold weather set in, and furthermore wanted this done before the spring because he would not be with the Agency at that time.

This has been only rumor among certain employees. Officials such as James Angleton and Colonel Sheffield Edwards have advised that there is no basis for the reports. They stated that Dulles has not made any statement indicating that he would be resigning from his position. Angleton commented that if Dulles has such plans, he certainly has not been divulging his secrets to anybody within the Agency.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP/nmn  
(4) *nmw*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

REC- 10

EX 100

62-83338-54

NOV 5 1959

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/12/85 BY spc/bja/lmw

58 NOV 12 1959

no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

my 54

*He [unclear] [unclear]*  
*file*

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. McGuire	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Sullivan	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

**PAUL HARVEY:**

## American Spies Ineffective

Socially, Allen Dulles is something of a charmer. One gets the impression that he would like to be remembered by history but probably will not be.

As head man of our far-flung network of American spies (Central Intelligence Agency), he appears to be rather a cloak-and-dagger Harold Stassen, well meaning but ineffectual.

The Central Intelligence Agency is twice as big as our entire State Department!

It spends tremendous sums of your tax dollars with little or no supervision.

There is little accurate information available even to the members of Congress who must vote gigantic appropriations for this purpose.

Government "bureaus" are inclined to extravagance in spite of the most careful watchdog scrutiny by Congress and the public. Imagine the phenomenal waste that may be "cloaked" behind the "secret" label where no congressional eye is allowed to pry.

Harry Howe Ransom's recent book, "Central Intelligence and National Security," presents a frightening picture of this self-policing organization.

Perceptive students of public affairs visiting or working overseas often get the impression that C.I.A. agents, and the intelligence operatives of other government agencies, are operating in unco-ordinated fashion in every dark alley, behind every bush and apparently often in each other's hair.

If you want to know on which side your money is being spent in the Cuban revolution, for example, there is no way for you to find out. No way for your congressman to determine which side American spies and their limitless funds may be aiding.

But the testimony of foreign service officers; retired, before the Senate foreign relations committee; leaves the distinct impression that most of his organization's activities seem to have been blundering affairs and most, if not all of them, seem to have resulted to the disadvantage of the United States. Sometimes in failure of disastrous proportions.

Since nobody wants a row that would expose our hand in vital areas of intelligence, perhaps the only answer is for Congress to designate and authorize a committee of such approved Americans as Douglas MacArthur, Mark Clark and Al Wedemeyer ... to spy on the spies.

*Belmont + a [unclear]*

102 833 - A

NOT RECORDED  
149 SEP 17 1956

THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE  
9/4/59  
Houston, Texas  
HOUSTON DIVISION

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DATE 7/24/85 BY sp6 bja/mw

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

REGISTERED

ST  
Date: September 29, 1959

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Ottawa (80-100) (S) (u)

(u) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Subject: RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(Proposed Visit of Allen Dulles to  
Canada 10/2 - 9/59) (S) (u)

As the Bureau is probably well aware, Allen Dulles,  
Director of CIA, is scheduled to arrive in Ottawa, Ontario,  
Canada, on Friday, 10-2-59, and following a dinner with  
various Canadian officials on Friday night, will leave on  
Saturday morning accompanied by U. S. Ambassador Wigglesworth  
and a party of approximately thirteen, [redacted]

[redacted] and will fly to (S)  
Greenland, the various Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line)  
posts and will also fly over the North Pole. The party is  
scheduled to return to Ottawa on or about 10-9-59. (S) (u)

This office anticipated no contact with Mr. Dulles  
during his visit.

2 - Bureau  
1 - Ottawa  
MLI:jhc  
(3)

Classified by ~~SPUBJA/1mw~~  
Declassify on: OADR 7/24/85

FOI # 366904

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ETH  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

6/21/99

PER OGA REVIEW  
ON 5/24/00

162-83  
NOT RECORDED  
176 OCT 8 1959

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 06-14-2010

85  
57 OCT 13 1959

per OGA review 9/7/10

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-80350-3461

b1 per CIA  
b3

per OGA 9/7/10

~~TOP SECRET~~



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. Belmont ✓  
Mr. DeLoach ✓  
Mr. McGuire ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. Parsons ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Tamm ✓  
Mr. Trotter ✓  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Mr. Holloman ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓  
M. A. Jones ✓

CIA

VIA LIAISON

2 DEC 1959

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

Thank you very much for your thoughtfulness  
in sending me the memorandum on "Soviet Russia's  
and Red China's Reaction to Nikita Khrushchev's  
Peaceful Coexistence."

I have looked it over with interest and  
have forwarded it to some of my specialists  
here on a need-to-know basis for a further study.

With kindest regards.

REC-73

Sincerely,

62-83338-55

11 DEC 7 1959

*Allen W. Dulles*  
Allen W. Dulles  
Director

FOI # 366904  
EX 109  
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 6/22/99 BY SP2ALM/EHL

ENTIRE DOCUMENT  
IS DECLASSIFIED  
PER OGA REVIEW  
ON 5/24/00

57 DEC 10 1959

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS 172514 cy #1 of 7

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*

DATE: November 4, 1959

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES  
 DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 REMARKS BEFORE NATIONAL STRATEGY SEMINAR  
 NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, JULY 24, 1959  
 (CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTER)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
 b7C

In connection with Mr. Tolson's request this day for the full remarks of Allen Dulles before the National War College in which Dulles allegedly made statements deprecating the menace of communism, there is enclosed the full text of Dulles' speech.

It will be recalled that, by memorandum August 14, 1959, Sullivan to Belmont, captioned "National Strategy Seminar, National War College, July, 1959," W. C. Sullivan, who lectured at the Seminar, reported comments regarding Dulles' speech made by [redacted], one of the professors handling the Seminar. [redacted] had said that Dulles left the Seminar with the over-all impression that there was no crisis at the present time; that the problem generally was under adequate Government control; that the patient attitude on the part of Americans toward the Russians and other foreign communists should be adopted; and that some changes for the better could be expected to take place in the communist world.

The following are excerpts from Dulles' speech on that occasion:

"In dealing with analyses of the Soviet threat I find that there is often a tendency to go to extremes. There are experts in this field who tend to magnify all aspects of Soviet power and become prophets of gloom...." (page 1)

b6  
 b7C

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

- 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - [redacted]  
 1 - Mr. Sullivan  
 1 - Mr. Papich  
 1 - Mr. Gray  
 1 - Section tickler

AWG:ham (7)

ENCLOSURE  
 63 DEC 17 1959

7 DEC 10 1959

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 RESEARCH

24-38453  
 UNCLASSIFIED COPY FILED IN



Memorandum to Mr. Belmont  
Re: ALLEN W. DULLES

"...The threat of mutual nuclear destruction is a nightmare that cannot be dismissed, but even though International Communism expects to gain the world, it does not wish to acquire a world in ashes...." (page 3)

"Despite occasional missile rattling, as at the time of Suez, during the Middle Eastern crisis last year, and more recently in talks with Mr. Harriman and others, we do not estimate that it is the Kremlin's present intention to advance Communism by deliberately provoking war...." (page 5)

"The basic strategy of International Communism, with its primary emphasis on measures short of war, has remained remarkably unchanged over the years. So too have its objectives...." (page 6)

"...To a considerable degree the Kremlin's international objectives are not well understood or necessarily shared even by the Soviet people themselves with whom our tourists and exchange missions come in contact, and with whom as individuals the American people have so much in common...." (page 7)

"Today the Communists, with their progress blocked in Western Europe and to a great extent in the Far East, are concentrating a major effort in the newly emergent states of Asia and of Africa...." (page 10)

"...there is no reason to adopt an attitude of pessimism as we face this particular challenge of International Communism.

"We are far better prepared than is generally believed, to deal with the Communist political and subversive threat.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont  
Re: ALLEN W. DULLES

"In the last ten years, after going through far too long a period of naive complacency, this country has been awakened to the danger. We have also learned to understand Communist operating techniques. We know about the orders given in Moscow to leaders of other communist parties. This is not too difficult. The security of these parties as they operate in the Free World varies from medium to poor. We have ways of covering their activities and we get the basic information we need to gauge their strength and tactics. Like too many of the rest of us, they talk too freely for their own good.

"Furthermore, the efficiency of the Communist organization in the less developed areas of the world is itself not well developed. In the post-war days they had in many European countries, as in France and Italy, for example, sophisticated old-line Communists of the Thorez-Togliatti school. Through death and old age this type of leadership is wearing out in Europe, and it will be a long while, if ever, before such leadership could be developed for Asia, Africa, or Latin America.

"In area after area Moscow and Peiping, and their covert spokesmen in their far-flung apparatus, have overreached themselves...." (pages 11 and 12)

"Many of the states in Europe, Asia, Africa, and even in parts of this Hemisphere, which have tended towards neutralism, have markedly changed in their attitude about communism over the last few years. Their former complacent approach to the danger is being replaced by a far greater degree of sophistication. Here some of the initial appeal of communism is wearing off. The uninitiated are becoming initiated...." (page 13)

"Finally, there are signs of change within the Soviet Union itself which over the years might bring about some relaxation of the aggressive expansionist policy of the International Communist movement.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont  
Re: ALLEN W. DULLES

"The rigid police state of the days of Stalin has been relaxed...."  
(page 14)

"While the Soviet government is still a closely regulated autocracy, it is not today quite as free as under Stalin to disregard wholly the desires of the people among which the yearning for peace is foremost. As long as the Soviet people are only permitted to hear, to read and to learn what the Soviet government dictates, progress will be slow. But as long as there is some progress there is hope of gradual evolution. Increasing contact between the American and Russian peoples should contribute to this end...."  
(page 14)

Apparently aware that he might have left the Seminar members somewhat complacent about the threat of communism, Dulles, in the conclusion of his remarks, stated:

"I would not leave the impression, in concluding, that this listing of favorable trends should in any sense cause us to relax our sense of urgency in taking measures to counter Soviet political, economic and subversive penetration in the Free World."

"Quite the contrary, the moment a tide shows signs of slacking, then is the opportunity to drop holding operations and press the advantage. Since I appreciate there are many 'Doubting Thomas' on this score, I can assure you that we are better prepared and better coordinated to deal with this challenge, and are dealing with it more effectively, than many of you realize...." (pages 14 and 15)

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information.

✓

*over*

*Ant Am*

REMARKS TO THE NATIONAL STRATEGY SEMINAR  
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
By ALLEN W. DULLES  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
July 24, 1959 (8:00 p.m., EDT)

I appreciate the opportunity to make the concluding remarks to the National Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers. From the reports I have had of your meetings, and my intelligence on this is good, I realize that you have broadly covered the various elements of Soviet strategy and tactics, the nature of the Communist threat, the relative military strength of East and West, and the face of war in the nuclear age.

In dealing with analyses of the Soviet threat I find that there is often a tendency to go to extremes. There are experts in this field who tend to magnify all aspects of Soviet power and become prophets of gloom. Others tend to discount Soviet accomplishments and unduly magnify their internal difficulties. This could add up to an unhealthy complacency.

The first class of experts is the larger, though recently we have seen the other extreme in some magazine articles which have attempted to discredit, on what appears to me to be the flimsiest evidence, recognized Soviet accomplishments, particularly in the field of outer space.

Certainly it is more dangerous to underrate than to overrate, though the latter can well be expensive in terms of our budget.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6 bja/lmv2

ENCLOSURE

8338-56

In these estimates of where we stand in relation to the Soviet, one of the crucial areas where some tend to underrate the Soviets is in the assessments of the relative economic output of the two great power blocs.

True, the gross national product of the United States alone is over twice that of the USSR. If we add to U.S. production that of other countries of the Free World, while adding to Soviet production that of Communist China and the Soviet Satellites, the ratio is still more favorable to us.

But as against this we must recognize that the rate of growth of the Communist Bloc is substantially greater than that of the Free World, and will probably remain so for some time.

Even more important is the extent to which Soviet present production and investment are keyed directly and indirectly to their military power. In fact, Soviet military outlays are now about equal to ours in terms of what they would cost us. Similarly, their annual investment in industry - vital to military power as well as economic growth - is now equal to that of the U.S. To achieve all this from their lower economic base, they have to devote about twice the proportion of their gross national product to military purposes as we do.

Of course, to achieve such goals within their much smaller economy, they are forced to curtail consumers' goods. But by emphasizing guns instead of butter, they have greatly reduced the significance in the terms of the power struggle of the still great gap between their over-all economic strength and ours.

Naturally, Khrushchev would like to have his people believe that the USSR has already achieved a state of military parity, if not superiority. While it is not the role of intelligence to attempt detailed net estimates of our relative military position vis-a-vis the Bloc, we have good evidence on which to reject any such conclusion.

Furthermore, the theory that either of the great nuclear powers could destroy the other, without the attacker himself being devastated, is not, I believe, subscribed to on either side of the Iron Curtain. The threat of mutual nuclear destruction is a nightmare that cannot be dismissed, but even though International Communism expects to gain the world, it does not wish to acquire a world in ashes.

From Soviet statements as well as from other evidence available to us, it seems clear that the USSR is placing more and more reliance on the development of ballistic missiles as its chief instrument of strategic nuclear attack. But the Soviets are not immune to the many difficulties inherent in developing new and untried hardware into reliable weapons systems.

Meanwhile Khrushchev and his military aides have done their best to deprecate the manned bomber, both to their own people and abroad. In fact he has called them "museum pieces." This may be, in part, to quiet the fears of their people and to bolster their assertions of superiority in one key military field.

Last May, Khrushchev told a delegation of West German Social Democratic editors that, though the NATO countries really possessed a large air force, it was, he said, technically outdated and it could be shot down by ordinary anti-aircraft artillery, and even by ordinary fighters.

"Why then," said Khrushchev, "do the Western military leaders base themselves on bomber aviation and talk a lot about it? Because their rocket technology is still weak" . . . "Therefore it appears that talk about a large number of bombers is being indulged in for purposes of deceit."

From Khrushchev's viewpoint this is undoubtedly good propaganda if he can make it stick, since the USSR today is in a position of inferiority vis-a-vis the U.S. with regard to manned bombers. The tremendous effort which we see the Soviets putting into advanced radar, ground-to-air missiles, and other defenses against aircraft would seem to belie the deprecatory statements of Khrushchev about them.

Obviously both our military defenses and our ability to retaliate by missile and aircraft should together be kept adequate to meet the threat. Here is where the superior industrial capacity of the Free World and of the U.S. in particular can and must play its role.

In the past when a technical, scientific, or industrial problem, such as that we face today in the missile field, has been put up to the ingenuity of our scientists and production experts, we have not long remained in second place. It is certainly incumbent upon us to see to it that we do not fail in this instance.

If we do keep up our military defenses, the most immediate threat to us for the years immediately ahead is not likely to be physical destruction by all-out nuclear war. The danger is rather the slow attrition of the power position of the Free World by a combination of political warfare, and economic penetration and subversion.

Despite occasional missile rattling, as at the time of Suez, during the Middle Eastern crisis last year, and more recently in talks with Mr. Harriman and others, we do not estimate that it is the Kremlin's present intention to advance Communism by deliberately provoking war.



We cannot entirely discount the risk, however, that the Soviets might miscalculate Western strength or the firmness of our intentions, and adopt positions from which it would be hard for them to find an acceptable line of retreat. The Soviets have miscalculated before, as in the 1948 Berlin blockade and in Korea. We can hope that Khrushchev, after having castigated Stalin for adventurism in the famous speech of February 1956 will not fall prey to the same temptation at Berlin or elsewhere. Aggression by proxy against the newly emerging and less developed countries may be a tempting but it obviously is a dangerous course.

The basic strategy of International Communism, with its primary emphasis on measures short of war, has remained remarkably unchanged over the years. So too have its objectives.

These were never more bluntly stated than in Khrushchev's ebullient speeches in Poland these last days.

Obviously referring to the phrase attributed to him, "We will bury you," he explained that when he said that Communism would be the graveyard of Capitalism, he did not mean that Communists would take shovels and start digging; "History," he said, "would take care of capitalists." They too, he suggested, would become museum pieces, and added that "If there were a God and he could act, he would take a good broom and sweep you out."

Certainly Khrushchev pictures himself as devoted to the task of helping in this burying and sweeping.

The "we will bury you" theme has been the fanatical tenet and credo of communism, sophisticatedly preached by Lenin, brazenly carried out by Stalin, and more subtly practiced by Khrushchev.

If Soviet policy were restricted to building a better Russia for the Russians, we could not object. To the Kremlin leaders, however, the USSR is merely the base from which Communism is to be expanded to cover the world.

As we are entering a period of greatly increased personal intercourse between the two power blocs, with exhibitions, tourism, cultural exchanges, and the like, it is important not to lose sight of the fundamental nature of this conflict.

This is too often overlooked by the casual visitor to the Soviet Union. To a considerable degree the Kremlin's international objectives are not well understood or necessarily shared even by the Soviet people themselves with whom our tourists and exchange missions come in contact, and with whom as individuals the American people have so much in common.

We should remember that the Soviet Union is a dictatorship, run by the high command of the Communist Party, that the Party itself numbers only about eight million -- about five percent of the adult population of the Soviet Union and only about 13 percent of the number of actual voters in our own last Presidential election.

Furthermore, these eight million party members have no real freedom even in choosing their local party leaders much less the leaders in the Presidium. It is these latter who determine the policies on which the fate of the Soviet people depend, including the policy of the secretly subsidized export of Communism on a worldwide basis.

This policy is an insidious interference in the internal affairs of free countries. If the Communist program were advanced in the international field by open and peaceful means as a form of competition between two great conflicting views of how society and the lives of people should be organized, we could well accept this challenge. Let us compete, let the peoples choose and decide which system is the better. Khrushchev claims he is inviting us to such a competition.

But this is a mirage.

Where behind the Iron Curtain have the peoples themselves had a free opportunity to choose? Certainly not in Czechoslovakia in 1948, or in Hungary in 1956, or in East Germany today. And where in the Free World would Khrushchev give this choice, if our liberties had once been taken away. And if Khrushchev wants an open competition why does he shield the Soviet people from a full exchange of ideas, of information, and of persons? Why the almost pathological concern to hide things from us and from his own people also.

The answer is that Communism, despite its brazen ideological pronouncements, cannot tolerate free competition. Nowhere has a nation fallen under Communist domination and then been allowed to test its choice by resort to free elections.

Instead, peoples are faced with the fait accompli of being taken over before they realize what has happened. In Hungary this was helped on in the immediate postwar days by what I understand has been vividly described to you as the Rakosi "salami" technique -- biting off, bit by bit, elements of freedom until the whole structure was eroded.

In Czechoslovakia the popular front technique succeeded in putting a minority party into power. This illustrates the grave danger of a situation in any state where the Communist party and its allies succeed in gaining even a substantial minority position. Once in power, the voting ends and popular say has no peaceful way of recovering control. In the case of Czechoslovakia the danger point was reached when the Communists gained less than 40 percent of the electorate, with the non-Communist parties, as is so often the case, hopelessly divided.

Today the Communists, with their progress blocked in Western Europe and to a great extent in the Far East, are concentrating a major effort in the newly emergent states of Asia and of Africa. Here they exploit political weaknesses as well as dynamic nationalism and the surge of rising expectations which are not easy to satisfy.

Their weapons include economic penetration, the development of hard-core Communist parties -- underground or above-ground -- propaganda both open and black, and in the areas around the periphery of the Communist bloc itself, they maintain the overhanging threat of their military power.

Yet there is no reason to adopt an attitude of pessimism as we face this particular challenge of International Communism.

We are far better prepared than is generally believed, to deal with the Communist political and subversive threat.

In the last ten years, after going through far too long a period of naive complacency, this country has been awakened to the danger. We have also learned to understand Communist operating techniques. We know about the orders given in Moscow to leaders of other communist parties. This is not too difficult. The security of these parties as they operate in the Free World varies from medium to poor. We have ways of covering their activities and we get the basic information we need to gauge their strength and tactics. Like too many of the rest of us, they talk too freely for their own good.

Furthermore, the efficiency of the Communist organization in the less developed areas of the world is itself not well developed. In the post-war days they had in many European countries, as in France and Italy, for example, sophisticated old-line Communists of the Thorez-Togliatti school. Through death and old age this type of leadership is wearing out in Europe, and it will be a long while, if ever, before such leadership could be developed for Asia, Africa, or Latin America.

In area after area Moscow and Peiping, and their covert spokesmen in their far-flung apparatus, have overreached themselves. Their true hand has been shown in Hungary, Tibet, Egypt, and in many other countries that could be mentioned. It may be that in their over-eagerness to promote a Communist-dominated Iraq, the Communists have overplayed their hand with the new Iraqi leaders and damaged their position in the Arab world.

Here is an interesting sidelight on Tibet. The agreement of May 23, 1951, between the Peiping government and the local government of Tibet provided that the Chinese Communist army units entering Tibet should not "arbitrarily take a single needle or thread from the people." Eight years later they took the lives of many Tibetans, the liberty of all.

The Communists are fond of saying that the forces of history are on their side. One of the great forces at work today is that of nationalism, particularly in the newly emerging countries of the world. However, not the Communists, with their goal of domination, but the West, with its ingrained respect for self-determination, is coming more and more to be recognized as the ally of the new Afro-Asian nationalism. As anti-colonial feeling subsides in the new states, it is being replaced by growing realization that Sino-Soviet expansionism is a far greater threat to their cherished independence.

Soviet economic aid is beginning to run into the same type of problems we face in our own aid programs, including too many Soviet experts and technicians and here and there shoddy goods. Also the political petticoats of the programs have shown up badly in several instances, notably in Yugoslavia where aid was promptly terminated and half-built projects left to the weather, when Yugoslav policy no longer pleased the Soviet.

Here as in certain other instances the so-called "aid without strings" has been shown up as "strings without aid."

It is significant that little or no publicity is allowed to reach the Russian people themselves about the Kremlin's loans and aid to foreign countries. This leads one to believe that this use of their assets would not go down well with people who are themselves denied so many of the good things of life.

When things don't go as the Soviets want, they tend to lose their temper in public, as most recently in the cancellation of Khrushchev's Scandinavian trip and in the Chinese Communists' retort to India over Tibet.

Many of the states in Europe, Asia, Africa, and even in parts of this Hemisphere, which have tended towards neutralism, have markedly changed in their attitude about communism over the last few years. Their former complacent approach to the danger is being replaced by a far greater degree of sophistication. Here some of the initial appeal of communism is wearing off. The uninitiated are becoming initiated.



Finally, there are signs of change within the Soviet Union itself which over the years might bring about some relaxation of the aggressive expansionist policy of the International Communist movement.

The rigid police state of the days of Stalin has been relaxed. Education is being pressed and while special emphasis is being placed on education in scientific, technical, and engineering fields, which would add to their industrial and military strength, there is nevertheless, a general broadening of the educational base in the Soviet Union.

While the Soviet government is still a closely regulated autocracy, it is not today quite as free as under Stalin to disregard wholly the desires of the people among which the yearning for peace is foremost. As long as the Soviet people are only permitted to hear, to read and to learn what the Soviet government dictates, progress will be slow. But as long as there is some progress there is hope of gradual evolution. Increasing contact between the American and Russian peoples should contribute to this end.

I would not leave the impression, in concluding, that this listing of favorable trends should in any sense cause us to relax our sense of urgency in taking measures to counter Soviet political, economic and subversive penetration in the Free World.

Quite the contrary, the moment a tide shows signs of slacking, then is the opportunity to drop holding operations and press the advantage. Since I appreciate there are many "Doubting Thomas'" on this score, I can assure you that we are better prepared and better coordinated to deal with this challenge, and are dealing with it more effectively, than many of you realize.

But too much talking about plans and practices would only alert the challenger to our counter measures. Hence silence in face of criticism is better than any bragging about past accomplishment, or programs for the future.

One of the key purposes of this reserve officer seminar has been to alert a highly selected group to the nature and implications of the challenge which we face from International Communism. I would like to give my fullest endorsement both to the objective of the seminar and to the manner in which it has been carried out. But the job does not end here tonight. Each of you in turn can help to give the thinking citizens of your communities the benefit of your own impressions. In a free society like ours an informed public opinion is indispensable to give the backing to those men and to those measures that are needed to meet Khrushchev's challenge to us.

February 10, 1960

MR. MOHR:

FULTON LEWIS, JR.  
COLUMN REGARDING  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
2-10-60

The Director might be interested in taking a look at Fulton Lewis's attached column for 2-10-60. He really takes off on Allen Dulles, Director of CIA. Lewis hits CIA secrecy very hard. It is a very good column.

RESPECTFULLY,

C. D. DE LOACH

Enclosure

CDD:sak  
(3)

1 - Mr. Jones

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6 bja/lmw

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Belmont	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. McGuire	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W. C. Sullivan	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

REC-32

62-83338-57

FEB 16 1960

EX-132

ENCLOSURE

52 FEB 23 1960

(ONLY FOR PAPERS PURCHASING LEWIS COLUMN. OTHERS MUST NOT USE.)  
(CAUTION: ADVANCE LEWIS COLUMN FOR RELEASE WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10,  
A.M. AND P.M. PAPERS. MUST NOT BE PUBLISHED BEFORE THAT DATE.)

WASHINGTON REPORT

BY FULTON LEWIS, JR.

COPYRIGHT, 1960, KING FEATURES SYNDICATE, INC.

WASHINGTON, FEB. 9--Allen Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency director, is spending much of his time on Capitol Hill these days testifying in secret and open sessions about Russian affairs.

In recent months the C.I.A. chief has briefed Congress on the Soviet economy, the progress of the Red missile program, and overall Russian military capabilities.

As the guardian of America's "intelligence" secrets, Dulles speaks with an authority that few dare to challenge. His organization is shrouded in secrecy, invulnerable to Congressional scrutiny. Yet despite those barriers to knowledge, one thing is evident: The Central Intelligence Agency is by no means omnipotent, its half-billion dollar a year budget guarantees no truth. The C.I.A., for example, was totally unaware of the approaching Hungarian Revolution, of the all-important events in Lebanon and Iraq two years ago.

Congressional leaders are stymied when they try to delve into C.I.A. activities; little information, therefore, can come from them. The most voluminous source material is probably Harry Rowe Ransom, who wrote the semi-official, friendly story of the C.I.A., "Central Intelligence and National Security," in 1958.

Ransom quickly dispels the romantic notion that C.I.A.'s sources are furtive agents dashing over borders and through curtains of iron and bamboo with top-secret information. The major sources of C.I.A.'s "intelligence," instead, are "the college graduate or Ph.D. sitting at their desk creating a mosaic from multi-colored data gathered from around the globe, most likely from non-secret sources."

(MORE)

BY FULTON LEWIS, JR.

XX sources."

These "agents" spend their working hours wading through public information--radio broadcasts, military journals, newspapers and periodicals--that the Communists have made available to us. Dulles himself admits that "getting good information from behind the Iron Curtain is the toughest job intelligence has ever faced. American pipelines to the Kremlin are scarce, if they exist at all."

Ransom, rationalizing for Dulles, says: "It would obviously be a waste of effort and money--and possibly of human life--to attempt to procure information from behind the Iron Curtain which might be available otherwise from a translation of Pravda, or from monitoring a Russian radio broadcast."

There seems to be little realization that the Communists can easily plant false information to mislead the intelligence people themselves.

This is but one reason for the severe criticism that followed Dulles's recent testimony on Soviet economic growth. His official viewpoint was that the Russian economy is growing at a much greater rate than ours, and that the Reds are rapidly approaching the U.S. in economic output. His source: the official Red figures released to the West, not clandestine agents roaming behind the Iron Curtain.

Knowledgeable students of the Soviet economy, such as G. Warren Nutter and Colin Clark, later reviewed those statistics and found them to be grossly exaggerated. They declared the real industrial output gain to be a fourth of what the Kremlin claimed. Nutter put the Soviet economy at a state of development comparable to the U.S. economy in 1914.

All this makes Dulles's analysis of Red military power seem less authoritative than some would have us believe. It lends credence to the contention of Rep. George McMahon, chairman of a House Subcommittee on Military Appropriations, that the intelligence people are "unable to give Congress any estimate as to what Russia has in the way of weapons...intelligence representatives answer questions as long as we ask them, but they still don't have the facts with respect to the power of our opponent."

Tomorrow we shall examine a case history of U.S. intelligence, the air force "crisis" of 1956. Its lesson for today is great..

# # #

(F/S)

May 9, 1960

REC-77

PERSONAL

100  
62-83338-58


Mr. Harvey G. Foster  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
New York, New York

Dear Foster:

I have received your letter of May 2,  
1960, and appreciate your thoughtfulness in bringing  
to my attention the remarks made by Allen W. Dulles.  
I hope you will continue to keep me informed of matters  
of this nature in your Division.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/04/85 BY SP6/bj

1 - Sam Papich - Enclosure

1 - Personnel File of SA Sam Papich - Enclosure

NOTE: SA Papich mentioned in SAC Foster's letter EOD 3-10.

is assigned to Domestic Intelligence in GS-15.

Rep  
Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_

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(5)

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MAY 9 4 10 PM '60  
MAY 9 5 11 PM '60  
MAY 9 5 11 PM '60



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

New York, N. Y.  
May 2, 1960

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Parsons	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Callahan	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Malone	✓
Mr. McGuire	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tamm	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Ingram	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I attended the Communion Breakfast of the New York City Police Department St. George Association at the Waldorf yesterday. The Association's Golden Rule Award was presented to Allen W. Dulles of CIA. There are two things I thought you would be interested in knowing - first:

During his speech, Mr. Dulles paid tribute to you and to the organization led by you, for your most effective combatting of Communism in this country.

Secondly, during a conversation with Mr. Dulles, he commented about Special Agent Sam Papich as being an outstanding liaison officer. He advised that he has found him to be a "tough", hard man whose word is his bond, and who is respected and trusted by himself, Mr. Dulles, and his staff.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6BJA/MLW

Sincerely,

H. G. FOSTER  
Special Agent in Charge.

HGF:MT

REC-77

EX 109

7 MAY 12 1960

8 apr  
PERS. FILES

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RA **Memorandum**

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: 6-3-60

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES

DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6 bjallmn

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

You may be interested in the following observations which were volunteered to Agent Papich on 6-2-60 by Dulles.

Dulles referred to his recent appearance before congressional committees relative to the U-2 incident. He commented that he actually had not been treated roughly, but was asked many sensitive questions which were difficult to answer because he did not wish to reveal vital intelligence information. He stated that Senator Gore of Tennessee, was by far the most capable interrogator. He described Gore as one who asked very intelligent and penetrating questions.

Dulles is of the belief that the Democratic critics of the Administration will not be picking on him any more. In his opinion the Democrats feel that there is nothing to be gained politically by hitting the CIA Director. He is certain that the Democrats will continue using the U-2 incident and the Summit failure during the election campaign. He stated that it was "tragic" that the President would continue being a target of the Democrats in connection with the U-2 matter.

Dulles was not specific, but did leave the impression with the Liaison Agent that he might be concerned over allegations that he let the President down when he appeared before the congressional committees. He emphatically stated that although the President had made the final decision (apparently concerning the last U-2 flight) he told the Congressmen that he personally would have made the same decision.

Dulles commented that from a propaganda standpoint Khrushchev is continually gaining advantages being made available as a result of this being an election year. He referred to the letter which Democratic

SJP/nmn

(5)

REC-14

62-83338-59

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

JUN 8 1960

Liaison

52 JUN 13 1960



Memorandum for Mr. Belmont  
RE: ALLEN W. DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

leaders Adlai Stevenson, Lyndon B. Johnson, Sam Rayburn, and William Fulbright had sent to Khrushchev asking him to prevent the collapse of the Summit Conference. This letter was sent shortly prior to the time when the Conference was to convene. Dulles explained that Khrushchev has now answered this letter, which will be publicized throughout the world. It has given him an excellent opportunity to expound his views in typical Soviet fashion. In Dulles' opinion, the Democrats made a mistake when they sent the letter. He commented that there was much to be done by the U.S. to combat Khrushchev's propaganda, but unfortunately, "Nobody knows how to play." By this he implied that there was not the leadership, organization and unity to effectively combat Khrushchev's tactics.

Dulles is making available a copy of the statement which he made before the Senate committee. He stated that if the Bureau was interested in reviewing the complete text of his testimony, which apparently would include questions and answers, he would permit the Liaison Agent to review the material.

ACTION:

For your information.

*AD*  
*202*  
*202*  
*are for*

*D* *AD* *✓* *AD*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont *also*

DATE: 6-30-60

FROM : R. O. L'Allier *L'Allier*SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY *3*

As you know, Dulles has been in Europe for the past three weeks and for your information he is scheduled to return July 5, 1960. The Liaison Agent also has been informed that Dulles will again leave the country either in August or in the fall of this year. He is scheduled to make a trip to Africa where he will make stops in practically every country.

The Agent was told that Dulles prefers to be outside of the United States during most of the election campaign. Central Intelligence Agency officials take the position that by being outside of the country Dulles can maintain a nonpartisan position in the political picture.

ACTION:

None, for information.

SP:bas *bas*  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

EX 100

REC-73

62-83338-60

18 JUL 6 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6 bja/mw

Tolson	✓
Mohr	✓
Parsons	✓
Belmont	✓
Callahan	✓
DeLoach	✓
Malone	✓
McGuire	✓
Rosen	✓
Tamm	✓
Trotter	✓
W.C. Sullivan	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Ingram	✓
Gandy	✓

64 JUL 13 1960

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: July 7, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to the enclosed article which appeared in the "American Weekly" section of the Washington Post, Sunday, July 3, 1960, authored by K. S. Giniger. The article is a favorable account of Dulles' activities in the intelligence field. All of the information has been previously printed before and is well known to us. Giniger indicates that Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) annual budget amounts to \$350,000,000 and the Agency employs as many as 16,000 people. Very interestingly, it is believed that these figures are close to being fairly accurate. Brief reference is made to Dulles' employment in the State Department many years ago and his well-known connection with Office of Strategic Services.

[redacted]  
 indicate that as of 1958 [redacted]

[redacted] New York, New York. By letter dated July 23, 1958, [redacted] transmitted to the Director a copy of a specially bound edition of "The Catholic Bible in the St. Peters' edition." Receipt of the book was appropriately acknowledged by letter dated August 7, 1958.

b6  
 b7C

Our files further indicate that in the past [redacted] reportedly was an associate of [redacted] former member of the Communist Party and for the past several years connected with the New York Post. In 1952 we received information indicating that [redacted] and a third unknown person spent some time in the Statler Hotel, Washington, D. C., with three "trollops."

SP:bas  
 (5)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6/bja/lmw

EX 109

REC-52

62-83338-61

10 JUL 18 1960

no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

ENCLOSURE

67 JUL 13 1960

b6  
b7C

Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont  
Re: ALLEN W. DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

While [ ] was connected with CIA one of his responsibilities allegedly was the preparation of the history of the Agency. He also had occasion to handle matters of a public relations nature. In view of this background, it would appear logical that [ ] would be readily used by CIA for publicizing the Agency.

ACTION:

For your information.

V. [ ] [ ]

(u)

[ ]  
[ ]

Per

significant

A


Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons *also* \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont ☒  
 Callahan ☒  
 DeLoach ☒  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

# Chief Spy

*The story of Allen Dulles*

"We tell the Russians too much"

*Papilio*



2430 E ST. N.W.

THERE'S NOTHING SECRET about the location of the most secretive agency of the U. S. Government.

By K. S. GINIGER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 7/24/85 BY sp6bjd/lmw

The Washington Post and Times Herald *4*  
 The Washington Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Evening Star \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Journal-American \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Mirror \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Post \_\_\_\_\_  
 The New York Times \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
 The New Leader \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Wall Street Journal \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date \_\_\_\_\_

JUL 3 1960

ENCLOSURE

62-83335-61

In the basement of the big, steel and concrete building . . . a light over a door changed from red to green . . . The Chief sat behind a desk on which an enormous green marble paperweight held down a single sheet of paper. A . . . glass of milk, a bottle of grey pills . . . stood by the black telephone. (The red one was for scrambling.) His black morning coat, black tie and black monocle hiding the left eye gave him the appearance of an undertaker, just as the basement had the effect of a vault, a mausoleum."

That's how writers of spy stories like to describe the headquarters from which the world's spymasters operate. The example quoted here is famed novelist Graham Greene's portrait of Britain's intelligence chief in his London headquarters.

I know, from my own experience, that it is nothing like that. And neither is the headquarters of his opposite number in the United States, Allen Welsh Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence and head of the Central Intelligence Agency, most secretive of America's government agencies.

If you had visited Allen Dulles in the midst of the recent furor over the downing of the U-2 photographic intelligence plane, presumably piloted by a C.I.A. civilian agent, your taxi would have taken you to the administration building of C.I.A.

Set in a cluster of marble and red-brick government buildings of a type common to Washington, this structure is clearly identified by signs leading to it. The door is guarded by security police and no one not an employee of C.I.A. goes through it without a C.I.A. escort.

The corridors carry the usual security posters warning against loose talk. Through the open doors of various offices, banks of locked safes and file cabinets can be seen; opened ones carry large signs saying "Open" as a reminder that their secrets must be locked in again before the user leaves the room.

Mr. Dulles' own office is no basement hideaway but a sunlit room on an upper floor. His desk and

tables are covered with papers, bound reports and books of all kinds. But Dulles himself is not often behind the desk, especially when he is receiving a visitor. He prefers to stride back and forth across the room, an ever-present pipe in hand.

On his wall there is an architect's rendering of the new multimillion-dollar C.I.A. headquarters building now being erected across the Potomac in Virginia.

From this room, Allen Dulles advises the President and various government agencies on what is going on all over the world. Russia is not America's only intelligence target; it is important sometimes that we know what our friends as well as our foes are planning.

To accomplish this, Dulles spends an amount believed to be as high as \$350,000,000 a year and employs possibly as many as 16,000 people at home and abroad. What the real figures are is a closely guarded secret known only to a few members of Congress and to top officials of the Agency itself.

Who is this man who, as critics have charged, has the power to take steps that may, as in the U-2 incident, lead us precipitately into an atomic war? And where did he obtain the experience that has led our government to trust him with huge expenditures of money and manpower "without," as the law creating his job specifically states, "regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds"?

Now 67, Allen Dulles entered into the arena of foreign affairs at the age of eight, when he wrote a pamphlet on the Boer War, then in progress. This was proudly published by his family who saw signs that the youngster would follow the path already marked by older members of the family.

His father was a Presbyterian minister and his mother was the daughter of Benjamin Harrison's Secretary of State. One uncle had been ambassador to England in Rutherford Hayes' administration, while another was to become Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State.

In a family such as this, it could be expected that Allen, his brother, John Foster, and his sister, Eleanor Lansing, might be attracted by the lure of serving their country abroad, as all of them eventually did.

Allen Dulles entered this country's foreign service in 1916, after having received his bachelor's and master's degrees from Princeton and teaching in India for a year. World War I and the years following saw him holding posts in Vienna, Bern, at the Paris Peace Conference, in Berlin and in Constantinople.

He returned to Washington in 1922 to head the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department for four years, during which he also

attended the Geneva Disarmament Conferences of 1925 and 1926. At night and over the weekends, he studied law, receiving his degree from George Washington University in 1926.

By then he was a family man, having married Clover Todd, daughter of a Columbia University professor, in 1920, and facing the problems of raising a family that now numbers two daughters and a son.

The State Department offered him a promotion but, unfortunately, no raise went with it. He resigned to join his brother, John, in the important Wall Street law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, using the incident to create a storm of protest about State Department salaries.

Over the next 16 years he practiced law in New York and served as legal advisor for various government missions abroad. When World War II broke out, and General William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan was asked by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to form a secret espionage agency, Allen Dulles, because of his knowledge of strategic European areas, was a logical choice for chief of the new O. S. S. in Switzerland.

In the fall of 1942 he set up headquarters in Bern, the wartime spy center of Europe, and soon established contact with a German intelligence operative, to this day identified only as "George." George hated his Nazi masters and was willing to do everything he could to destroy them.

The result was a constant flow of German war secrets, including more than 2,000 documents from "George" to Dulles to the various Allied headquarters concerned. Among these were the documents which gave away the secret of the famous "Operation Cicero," involving the valet to the British ambassador at Ankara as the key figure in a Nazi spy ring.

The greatest of Dulles' World War II "cloak and dagger" exploits was his work as the liaison between the Allies and German officers who were plotting to assassinate Hitler. Although their plot failed and Hitler was only injured, the contacts developed in this work led to the famous "Operation Sunrise," the surrender of the German troops in North Italy in 1945. For this Dulles was decorated not only by our own government but by the Italians, French and Belgians.

After the war, Allen Dulles returned to Sullivan & Cromwell. The O. S. S. became merely a collection of files marked "Top Secret" in a Washington basement. However, important officials were convinced that the U. S. needed a full-time, permanent intelligence organization to coordinate all foreign intelligence activities.

A Central Intelligence Group was set up by President Truman in 1946. In 1947, the new

National Security Act superseded this with the Central Intelligence Agency. But not until the outbreak of the Korean War, did the C. I. A. begin to assume its present proportions.

In 1947, President Truman appointed Allen Dulles to a panel created to survey American intelligence needs and procedures. Like so many such reports, this one gathered dust until it came into the hands of General Walter Bedell Smith, newly appointed Director of Central Intelligence, in 1950. Smith read it carefully and telephoned Dulles: "We'll do what you recommend," Smith is said to have told him; "only you'll have to come down to Washington and show us how."

Dulles agreed to take a short leave from Sullivan & Cromwell so that he might serve as a consultant to C. I. A. Smith persuaded him to resign his highly profitable law partnership to become the \$20,500-a-year deputy director of the Agency. He again immersed himself in the job of controlling and directing our intelligence activities in the critical years of the Korean war.

A personal tragedy overshadowed this period for Dulles: his only son, Allen, a Marine in Korea, was severely wounded in the fighting there, and is still going through a series of operations in the hope he can recover his health.

When the war in Korea ended and Bedell Smith retired, Dulles was the obvious choice for Director of Central Intelligence, a position to which he was named in 1953. A raise of only \$500 went along with the promotion but, by then, his private fortune, gained in his law practice, made it unnecessary for him to repeat his protest of 1926.

Today he is healthy, vigorous and active. He plays tennis regularly although he has had to abandon singles in favor of doubles. He gets in an occasional game of golf and, when he can't get outdoors, enjoys bridge.

His favorite relaxation probably is swimming. He enjoys travel and mixes business with pleasure by spending as much time as he can away from his office seeing for himself what C. I. A. people are up to all over the world. He makes a particular point of taking such trips during election campaigns to minimize the possibilities of the Agency being involved in politics.

Busy now defending the Agency against the charges growing out of the U-2 incident, he resists the idea that C. I. A. should be more closely supervised. He does not believe that operations of this kind can be run by committees and he tells friends that he does not feel he could continue in his post if the present closely guarded barriers of secrecy surrounding the agency were removed.

"We tell the Russians too much," he has said, and Washington observers believe that the decision to acknowledge U. S. responsibility for the U-2 flights over Russia was one with which he did not agree.




Although he is opposed to greater Congressional supervision of Agency activities, he points out that the individual members of Congress who serve on the sub-committee that approves the C. I. A. budget knew of the U-2 program from the beginning. No secret this important or involving this many people—in the C. I. A., in Congress, in the various other agencies and aircraft companies concerned with the U-2—has ever been kept for so long a time.

The world now knows this secret, but Allen Dulles has lots of others. Most of them none of us will ever know. Those we do find out usually will be the secrets of plans and operations which have gone wrong. We can only hope that few of them do.



ALLEN DULLES (right) reminisces about the 1944 plot to kill Hitler with Dr. Hans Gisevius, one of the conspirators whom Dulles helped to escape.





UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*gm*  
**Memorandum**TO : MR. BELMONT *also*

DATE: July 27, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER *W*SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*✓* Tolson ☒  
 Mohr ☐  
 Parsons ☐  
 Belmont ☐  
 Callahan ☒  
 DeLoach ☒  
 Malone ☐  
 McGuire ☐  
 Rosen ☐  
 Tamm ☐  
 Trotter ☒  
 W.C. Sullivan ☐  
 Tele. Room ☐  
 Ingram ☐  
 Gandy ☐

Agent Papich has been informed that Dulles is leaving for Texas today for the purpose of giving Senator Lyndon Johnson an intelligence briefing concerning sensitive situations throughout the world. Dulles is expected to return on July 28, 1960.

ACTION:

For your information.

SJP:bas  
(5) *bas*

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
  - 1 - Mr. Belmont
  - 1 - Liaison
  - 1 - Mr. Papich
- 7/27*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6 bja/lmw *me*

SENT DIRECTOR

7-27-60

REC-64

62-83338-62

EX-102

AUG 2 1960

51 AUG 5 1960

F B I

Date: 7/27/60

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Via AIRTELDATE 7/24/85 BY spt-bja/1mw (Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. McGuire	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
Washington Field Office  
FROM: SAC, WFO (62-0)

\_\_\_\_\_ - COMPLAINANT  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 12:45 p.m., this date, \_\_\_\_\_ telephonically contacted the WFO stating that he was at the \_\_\_\_\_ in Rockville, Md., and that he has been at \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he is \_\_\_\_\_ that he once lived at \_\_\_\_\_ New York, N.Y., and that he was a \_\_\_\_\_ that he was \_\_\_\_\_ and is currently receiving \_\_\_\_\_ said that \_\_\_\_\_ Mr. and Mrs. A. A. DULLES, 2723 Q Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., had \_\_\_\_\_ in the \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ said he spent considerable time at the \_\_\_\_\_ and that he wants to be transferred to \_\_\_\_\_ He stated he felt that \_\_\_\_\_ and that he was being kept there against his wishes. He stated that the \_\_\_\_\_ and the \_\_\_\_\_ will do nothing for him in his effort to \_\_\_\_\_

- ③ - Bureau  
1 - Baltimore (Info)  
1 - WFO

LGB:lbh  
(5)

C C - Wick

AIRTEL

SENT DIRECTOR

MCT-1

REC-3

Approved: James H. Gale/cjs  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_

10 AUG 1960

53 AUG 1 1960

62-83338-63  
TOLSON

WFO 62-0

[REDACTED]

It is noted ALLEN W. DULLES, Director of CIA,  
resides at 2723 Q Street, N.W., [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was advised that the matter of his  
desiring [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] would not be within the jurisdiction of the  
FBI. He was further advised that his allegation concerning  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would not be within the  
jurisdiction of the FBI. WFO indices were negative regarding  
the captioned individual. This is being furnished for information  
and no further action contemplated.

One copy being designated to BA for info inasmuch  
as [REDACTED] in BA territory.

*Handwritten:* ✓ 4/20/68 *Signature*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont *AHB/RS*

DATE: August 2, 1960

FROM : R. G. Alter *h*SUBJECT: 

INFORMATION CONCERNING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6 bja/lmw

Tolson	✓
Mohr	✓
Parsons	✓
Belmont	✓
Callahan	✓
DeLoach	✓
Malone	
McGuire	
Rosen	
Tamm	
Trotter	
W.C. Sullivan	
Tele. Room	
Ingram	
Gandy	

Reference is made to WFO airtel dated July 27, 1960.  of Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), telephonically called the Washington Field Office from  located near Rockville, Maryland, and complained that he was being held in the  explained that he had been  and claimed that  had.  WFO politely told  that there was nothing to be done within the jurisdiction of the Bureau.

b6  
b7C

*M.Y.* Since Allen Dulles was out of town, the Liaison Agent furnished the pertinent information to  to Allen Dulles, on July 28, 1960.

b6  
b7CFor your information. 

On July 29, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent that he was extremely grateful to the Bureau for the manner in which the incident was handled. He explained that the case of  has been a dilemma for which he has no answer at the present time. He has given some consideration to  to an

b6  
b7CACTION:

EX 100

None, for your information.

SJP:bas  
(5) *bas*

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

10 AUG 9 1960

53 AUG 15 1960

REC-3

62-8338-14

*W.C. Sullivan*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont *WLB*

DATE: 7-29-60

FROM : Mr. L'Allier *L*

1 - Mr. Parsons  
 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Mr. L'Allier  
 1 - Mr. Papich

SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CIA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/24/85 BY SP7Bja/

SP7madm

You may be interested in the following information which was furnished to Agent Papich on July 29, 1960, by Dulles. *3-1*

Dulles referred to his intelligence briefing of Senator Lyndon Johnson and commented that the Senator has an unusually good grasp of sensitive situations throughout the world. Johnson told Dulles that he personally wanted the August session of Congress to be as brief as possible. Johnson stated that in his opinion there were 4 bills which should be acted on and then they can recess. According to Dulles, 2 of the bills mentioned dealt with health, education and welfare and with foreign aid. Johnson stated that he was leaving for Massachusetts to confer with Kennedy and that en route he would visit with Harry Truman. Johnson hopes that Kennedy will share his views with regard to the bills which require action. Dulles received the definite impression that Johnson was most anxious to finish his congressional business and to settle down to campaigning. *Wash D.C. 8-1*

*Richard M.* Dulles was most complimentary concerning Vice President Nixon's convention speech. He referred to it as a "real thumper." He then commented that he very likely would cancel his planned trip to Europe and Africa next month. He stated that there was no question in his mind that communism and Soviet Russia would be key issues in the campaign and he did not think it would be wise to be away from the country.

Dulles stated that he stayed overnight at the Johnson *Wash D.C.* ranch home and another guest was Congressman James Wright of Texas. It is Dulles' understanding that if Johnson is elected Vice President, Wright will be promoted as Johnson's successor to the Senate.

## ACTION:

For your information.

REC-52

147507  
EX-104

83338-65

AUG 9 1960

sjp;mtb

59 AUG 12 1960

SENT DIRECTOR  
 7-30-60

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 94-16-1



~~SECRET~~

Legal Attache, Rome

Director, FBI

ALLEN DULLES


DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- Orig. & 1  
1 - Yellow  
1 - Mr. Parsons  
1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. Papich

September 8, 1960

GR 3-  
(L)

The Bureau has been informed that Dulles will be in Rome, Italy, during the latter part of September, 1960. The purpose of this visit is unknown.



(S)

ALLEN W. Dulles possibly may pay a courtesy call at your office. In accordance with previous instructions issued to you, do not get involved in any discussions of a policy nature.

b1 per CIA

b3

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 06-14-2010

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SJP:bas  
(8)

classified per OGA 9/7/10

See memorandum L'Allier to Belmont dated September 7, 1960, captioned, "Allen Dulles," SJP:bas.

6/22/99

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ELH  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

Classified by SP-6 bja/lmw  
Declassify on: OADR

Fol # 366904

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ELH  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
REVIEW OF 5/14/00

MAILED 3  
SEP 9 1960  
COMM-FBI

REC-34

EX 109

19 SEP 12 1960

62-83338-66

- Tolson
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Belmont
- Callahan
- DeLoach
- Malone
- McGuire
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

50 SEP 14 1960

~~SECRET~~

*61d*  
*ST*  
**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

**TO : The Director**

**DATE: 8-29-60**

**FROM : J. P. Mohr**

**SUBJECT: The Congressional Record**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/05/85 BY spubj/mw

1868

Original filed in: 66-1731-

Pages 16785-16787 Senator Keating, (R) New York, submitted an address by the Honorable Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Detroit, Michigan, August 28, 1960. Mr. Keating stated "it has long been my profound conviction that the awesome reality of the Communist design for world conquest has been grasped only partially by the citizens of our Nation. - - - The theme of his outstandingly fine and timely speech was precisely the 'know thine enemy' admonition which constitutes the basic and indispensable first line of defense for human freedom."

*280*  
In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for 8-27-60 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

162-83338  
NOT RECORDED  
184 SEP 6 1960

51



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. Belmont *MB*

DATE: September 7, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'Allier *L'*

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Dulles has advised Agent Papich that he plans to leave for Europe during the latter part of this month and would remain there for approximately two weeks. He indicated that he would spend most of his time in Italy. *J' Allier*

ACTION:

b1 per CIA  
 b3

Enclosed herewith is a letter to our Legal Attache, Rome, advising him concerning Dulles' visit to Italy.

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
 DECLASSIFICATION  
 AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
 EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
 DATE 06-14-2010

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont *gpe*
- 1 - Liaison *9/8*
- 1 - Mr. Papich

Enclosure

FOI/PA # 240/403  
 APPEAL # \_\_\_\_\_  
 CIVIL ACT. # 12356  
 E.O. # 12418  
 DATE 1/24/85 INITIALS lmw

57 SEP 16 1960

FOI # 366904

REG-56

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/CHH SEP 13 1960  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X-1

6/22/99

SP2 CLASSIFIED  
 PER OGA  
 REVIEW ON 5/21/00

classified per OGA 9/7/10

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

per OGA no deletions 9/7/10

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/04/85 BY SP0064/mw

6-18-87 208715108

256,269

Tolson ✓  
Mohr ✓  
Parsons ✓  
Belmont ✓  
Gallagher ✓  
DeLoach ✓  
Malone ✓  
McGuire ✓  
Rosen ✓  
Tamm ✓  
Trotter ✓  
W.C. Sullivan ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Ingram ✓  
Gandy ✓

Allen Dulles volunteered the following information to Agent Papich on September 1, 1960.

Dulles stated that shortly prior to August 20, 1960, Senator Gore (Democrat, Tennessee) and Senator Church (Democrat, Idaho) advised him that Soviet Ambassador Menshikov had extended a luncheon invitation to the two senators. They told Dulles that they were clearing with the State Department and also wanted to know if Dulles had any objection to their meeting with the Soviet official. Dulles stated that he informed the senators that this was a decision for them to make but he would appreciate receiving any information of interest developed from the contact.

Gore lunched with Menshikov at the Soviet Ambassador's summer home on Chesapeake Bay on August 21, 1960. He drove to the residence accompanied by Anatoli Y. Kornienko, one of the Embassy Attaches. There was a 45-minute conversation before luncheon dealing with numerous generalities. During the luncheon the conversation touched on United States elections, Africa, disarmament, and the banning of nuclear tests. Menshikov very obviously was fishing for Gore's opinion regarding the outcome of the forthcoming election. Gore stated that as a Democrat he naturally expected Kennedy to win. He did emphasize that with regard to any dealings with Russia, there would not be any differences between the Republican and Democratic parties. Gore told Menshikov that Khrushchev's attacks on Nixon were actually helping the Republican candidate. Menshikov immediately became incensed and said that this could not be so. (It is interesting to note that within the last few days Khrushchev made an announcement that there was no difference between the two candidates).

With regard to Africa, Menshikov took the line that the continent was big enough for both countries and that they should resolve differences in an amiable fashion. Gore, in turn, accused

SJP:bas  
(6)

EX 107

Classified by 9803 RDD/KFA

Declassify on: OADR

# 89-0306

256,269

EX 107

EX 107

EX 107

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

REC-33

62-83338-68

SEP 20 1960

SECRET

LIAISON

50 SEP 22 1960

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C94-37110-  
62-103617-

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN

per OGA review  
on 5-14-10  
CLASSIFIED BY SP0064/mw  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
6/22/99

COPIES  
U.S.S.R.  
10/21  
(u)

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont  
Re: ALLEN DULLES (X)(u)

the Soviets of stirring up trouble. Menshikov was highly critical of United States use of NATO countries in stirring up troubles and had no regard for our program to control nuclear tests. (S)

Gore received the definite impression that Menshikov was a "lonely man" and that he enjoyed conversing with an American. Gore noted that there were no other Russians at the residence other than Kornienko, who served as an escort for Gore. (S)

Senator Church lunched with Menshikov at the Soviet Embassy on August 25, 1960. The Senator asked the Ambassador if it were true that there was considerable anti-Jewish activity in the Ukraine. Menshikov immediately stated that there was no such atmosphere in Russia and anything to the contrary was sheer propaganda. The Ambassador then initiated a discussion of developments in Africa and made several derogatory remarks concerning the "colonial powers," Church retaliated by referring to the expansion of the "Russian empire." Menshikov very hotly denied any Soviet desires to acquire additional territory. (S)

The Ambassador raised questions concerning the coming elections and Church followed a line very similar to that of Senator Gore. Church felt the Democrats would win but very strongly pointed out that both parties would follow the same line with regard to Russia. (S)

Menshikov denied that the Soviets were trying to move into Cuba but commented that there was nothing wrong in doing so, particularly when the United States has encircled Russia with bases in foreign countries. He stated: "We have surpassed you in military power and you can't catch up." (S)

Menshikov briefly referred to the U-2 flight and stated: "One or more U-2 flights will mean war between us." (S)

A discussion developed on the subject of treaties and negotiations with Russia. Church emphasized to Menshikov that Soviet officials quite often forget how our system of Government operates. He pointed out that no United States President, whether (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont  
Re: ALLEN DULLES (X) (4)

he is a Democrat or Republican, can establish a treaty with a foreign country without a two-thirds Senate ratification. He cited the example of President Wilson, who failed to obtain the Senate's support in his objective to make the United States a member of the League of Nations. Menshikov then "exploded." He ridiculed the Senate, stating that: "Many members ought to be in cages and be taken off to medical laboratories for examination." He immediately cooled off and stated to Church that he meant "no personal offense." (S)

A lengthy discussion was held concerning the banning of nuclear tests. Church held to the position that nothing will ever be accomplished unless the Soviets accept an inspection system. (S)

Dulles made the observation that in his opinion Menshikov undoubtedly is doing everything possible to collect information which might assist the Soviets in predicting election results in November. According to Dulles, it is very possible that Menshikov's future in the diplomatic service will depend on the accuracy of his reports to Moscow. Dulles feels that Menshikov may be contacting other Congressmen. In this connection, Dulles heard that the Ambassador may have tried to contact Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, but he was not certain if this took place. (S)

Dulles stated that he contacted the Liaison Agent because he had informed both of the Senators that in his opinion it was necessary that the Bureau be advised of the above-described meetings with the Soviet Ambassador. (S)

ACTION:

For your information.

OK 9/2/54

Gushy

~~SECRET~~

It is astounding that any Senator would so lower himself as to accept any of Menshikov's insinuations to be in -  
[illegible] by him. J. K.

(S) (4)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont *also*

DATE: September 30, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'Allier *L'*SUBJECT: <sup>①</sup> ALLEN DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Tolson	✓
Mohr	
Parsons	
Belmont	
Callahan	✓
DeLoach	✓
Malone	
McGuire	
Rosen	
Tamm	
Trotter	
W. J. Sullivan	✓
Tele. Room	
Ingram	
Gandy	

You previously have been informed that Dulles was to travel to Europe at the end of September, 1960. For your information, the Liaison Agent has been informed that Dulles has canceled his trip. This change of plans allegedly is attributed to Dulles' concern over the imprisoned Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) undercover agents in Cuba and the two CIA intelligence officers who are missing in Russia. In addition, Dulles feels that he cannot leave the country during the present United Nations crisis.

ACTION:

For your information.

SJP:bas *bas*  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/24/85 BY SPUBJA/1m10

no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

REC-3

EX-107

62-83338-69

4 OCT 5 1960

62 OCT 11 1960

COPY TO MR. TOLSON

LIAISON

1 - Orig.  
1 - Yellow  
1 - Mr. Parsons  
1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. Papich  
10-21-60

CODE

CABLEGRAM

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 06-14-2010

URGENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TO LEGAL ATTACHES [LONDON] - 552  
[PARIS] - 864  
[ROME] - 279  
[BONN] - 585

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

ALLEN DULLES, INFORMATION CONCERNING. DULLES DEPARTING OCTOBER  
TWO TWO FOR TRIP TO [ENGLAND, FRANCE, ITALY AND GREECE. WILL BE  
CONTACTING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY OFFICIALS.] IF HE  
CONTACTS LEGAL ATTACHES, EXTEND USUAL COURTESIES. DO NOT GET  
INVOLVED IN POLICY DISCUSSIONS. (\$)(u)

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

Classified by SP6 bja/lmw  
Declassify on: OADR  
7/24/85

SJP:bas  
(6)

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ETH  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
6/22/99

[ ] CLASSIFIED PER  
OGA/REVIEW  
OF 5/24/00

REG-12

62-83338-70

17 OCT 25 1960

CABLE

OCT 21 1960

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR.

ENC.

CK.

APPROVED BY

TYPED BY

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

52 OCT 31 1960

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*ess*  
**Memorandum**~~SECRET~~TO : Mr. Belmont *W*

DATE: October 21, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'Allier *L'*SUBJECT: <sup>0</sup> ALLEN DULLES  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

Dulles advised Agent Papich on October 20, 1960, that he was departing for Europe on October 22, 1960, and that he would return in time for election day. [Dulles advised that he will be contacting intelligence and security officials in England, France, Italy and Greece.] He plans to take a few days vacation in Switzerland. Dulles has no intention of discussing any business with any of our Legal Attaches, but as in the past he might make a courtesy call on Bureau representatives. *(S) (u)*

ACTION:

*sent 10/21 Jan*  
Enclosed herewith is a cable to appropriate Legal Attaches in Europe alerting them to Dulles' trip. Although Dulles did not mention [West Germany] it is always possible he can stop in this country and Legal Attache, [Bonn], is being advised. *(S)*

JJP:bas  
(6) *bas*

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

Enclosure

FOI # 366904

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ELH

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

6/22/99

[ ] CLASSIFIED PER  
OGA REVIEW OF 5/24/00  
Classified by *sp6 bja/mw*  
Declassify on: OADR  
7/24/81

EX-102  
REC-25  
EX-102

62-83338-71  
18 OCT 25 1960

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 06-14-2010

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons ☒ \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont ☒ \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: October 24, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

b1 per CIA  
 b3

Liaison has previously advised that Dulles was leaving for Europe October 22, 1960, [and would be in contact with various foreign intelligence and security officials]

As you know, CIA did receive a detailed report from us which was disseminated to interested key agencies. [redacted] pointed out that the State Department disseminated to the British Foreign Office a paraphrased report based upon the information disseminated by the Bureau. This was done with Bureau approval. [redacted]

Pursuant to instructions, the Liaison Agent advised [redacted] on October 21, 1960, that the Bureau has given MI-5 a copy of the detailed report concerning the Soviet-Chinese Communist differences. It was impressed upon [redacted] that this was given to MI-5 on a highly restricted basis and with the understanding that the British impose very strong controls in handling the information.

ACTION:

For your information.

SJP:bas  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papic

63 OCT 31 1960

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
 DECLASSIFICATION  
 AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
 EXEMPTION CODE 25X(lu/baw 60324)  
 DATE 09-10-2010

Classified by *SPUBJA/1mw*  
 Declassify on: OADR

per OGA review 9/7/10

13 OCT 25 1960

~~SECRET~~

7: P2 CLASSIFIED  
 CLASSIFIED BY SP3 ALM/ELC of 6/24/00  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
 6/22/99  
 FBI # 366904



OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC

DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

EXEMPTION CODE 25X(uc/baw 60324)

DATE 09-10-2010

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coachMalone  
McGuire  
Rosen  
Tamm  
Trotter  
W.C. Sullivan  
Tele. Room  
Ingram  
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 28, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.b6  
b7CSUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES,  
DIRECTOR,  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)(S)  
Reference is made to my memorandum dated October 27, 1960, advising that Dulles would be visiting [redacted] in Western Europe.(S)  
[redacted] a copy of a report prepared by a highly sensitive Bureau informant dealing with the conflict between the Russians and Chinese communists. CIA felt that the Bureau material would be most useful to Dulles in handling any discussions with the [redacted](S)  
On October 27, 1960 [redacted] advised the Liaison Agent that [redacted] concerning a report which the State Department had disseminated to the British Foreign Office concerning this matter. As you know, we permitted State to disseminate a paraphrased report predicated on information developed by our informant. [redacted](S)  
[redacted] advised that CIA does not know [redacted] concerning the receipt of the report from the Bureau. [redacted](S)  
The Agency now fears that Dulles will be left in a potentially embarrassing position, if he doesn't know how much [redacted] knows about the report prepared by the Bureau informant. [redacted](S)  
[redacted] stated that the matter of the alleged conflict between Russia and Red China is a hot issue. Dulles very [redacted]Enclosure *sent 10-31-60*

SP:hke (6)

1-Mr. Parsons

1-Liaison

1-Mr. Belmont

1-Mr. Papich

1-Mr. Baumgardner

~~SECRET~~Classified by *SPUBJA* NOV 17 1960

Declassify on: OADR

b1 per CIA  
b3

67 NOV 9 - 1960

FOI #366904, 6/24/99  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ELH  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X, 6ALL EXCEPT  
PS-1, PS-2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7  
PS-2, PS-3, 4, 5, 6, 7  
ALL EXCEPT  
PS-1, PS-2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7  
ALL EXCEPT  
PS-1, PS-2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7

FILED IN 62-80750

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from Mr. L'Allier to Mr. Belmont  
RE: ALLEN DULLES,  
DIRECTOR,  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b1 per CIA  
b3

[REDACTED] (S)

ACTION:

If you approve [REDACTED] (S) will be informed that CIA  
[REDACTED] the information which came from our informant  
and which was disseminated to CIA by the Bureau. The Liaison  
Agent will make it very clear that the information should be  
used on a strictly need-to-know basis and it should not be  
utilized in any intelligence operation without first checking  
with the Bureau. (S) (u)

Attached also for approval is a cable to Legal Attache  
Bates, London, instructing him to advise [REDACTED] (S)  
that we [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] CIA  
ADVISED PER ABOVE

10/1/60

ADP

*OK but I am not  
overly enthusiastic  
about it. We gave  
what we could to  
CIA & the British (S) (u)  
& that should suffice.*

2

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

To : MR. MALONE

DATE: 1/27/61

FROM : MR. H. L. EDWARDS

SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES  
SPEECH BEFORE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA)  
COMMITTEE ON TEACHING COMMUNISM AND THE  
BILL OF RIGHTS; STATLER HOTEL, 1/26/61

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6 bja

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Barnes \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
W. C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

[redacted] for the American Bar Association, telephoned me today. He was in town for some of the ABA meetings of the Board of Governors and the special committee which was meeting with educators to discuss the proposal of encouraging the teaching of Communism and the Bill of Rights in American schools.

[redacted] gave me a rundown on the committee meeting which was substantially the same as [redacted] had reported to me earlier and on which I sent a memorandum through.

[redacted] also stated that at the luncheon meeting Allen Dulles, the guest speaker, gave a very fine "off-the-cuff" talk. It was largely his own personal views of the dangers of Communism and the need for educating people along these lines. [redacted] stated that Dulles paid the Director and the FBI an excellent compliment in stating that the Director and the FBI have done a splendid job of keeping tabs on the Communists in this country. Apparently Dulles was making the point that if this was the only issue involved we would not need to do any more than the FBI is already doing. However, he stated that it was essential that we educate the Americans and particularly the student group to the dangers of Communism and its fallacies and to the advantages of Democracy and the Bill of Rights.

**ACTION:**

None . . . . informative.

HLE:wmj ( 4 )

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

57 FEB 9 1961

2 FEB 1 1961

CRIME RESEARCH



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

VIA LIAISON

RECEIVED FROM  
FEB 16 1961  
C.A. SJP

16 FEB 1961

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Parsons	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Callahan	✓
Mr. Conrad	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Evans	✓
Mr. Malone	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tavel	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Ingram	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Thank you for your letter of 10 February concerning  
the forthcoming visit of Premier Khrushchev to the United  
States.

I very much appreciate your thoughtfulness in bringing  
this information to my attention and I have forwarded it to  
some of my people here on a need-to-know basis.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

*Allen W. Dulles*

Allen W. Dulles

Director

FOI# 366904

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6/22/99 BY SP-2 ALM/EHL

ENTIRE DOCUMENT

IS DECLASSIFIED

PER OGA REVIEW

OF 5/4/00

per OGA letter 9/7/10

REC- 96

12 FEB 24 1961

52 MAR 3 1961

b6 Per FBI  
b7C

FEB 17 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: 2-7-61

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

Pages A741-A742. Congressman Evins, (D) Tennessee, extended his remarks to include an article entitled "Kennedy Leadership Gives Nation New Direction" which appeared in the inaugural issue of the Democratic Digest. Mr. Evins advised that the article records highlights of the 73-day transition period between election day and inauguration day. The article points out "The tone was set with announcement of the first decision on appointments, assuring the retention of Allen W. Dulles as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and J. Edgar Hoover as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This decision, the Washington Evening Star commented, constituted gratifying recognition of both the nonpolitical nature of their jobs and the value of their services to the Nation."

Original filed in: 66-1731-912

162-83338-  
NOT RECORDED  
176 MAR 14 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6BJA/mw

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for 2-6-61 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

57 MAR 17 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Malone

Attn: Mr. Edwards

FROM : H. L. Sloan

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
LUNCHEON - QUANTICO, VA. 3/3/61

DATE: 2/24/61

Mr. Tolson	/
Mr. Parsons	/
Mr. Mohr	/
Mr. Belmont	/
Mr. Callahan	/
Mr. Conrad	/
Mr. DeLoach	/
Mr. Evans	/
Mr. Gale	/
Mr. Rosen	/
Mr. Sullivan	/
Mr. Tavel	/
Mr. Trotter	/
Mr. Tele. Room	/
Mr. Ingram	/
Miss Gandy	/

b6

b7C

Lt. General E. W. Snedeker, Commandant Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va., today advised that Mr. Allen Dulles, Director, C.I.A. will address the combined Junior and Senior Schools of Marine Officers on the morning of March 3, 1961 and that he would like for the writer to attend a luncheon being given for Mr. Dulles at Waller Hall at 12:20 PM that date, which I accepted.

For your information Mr. Dulles has visited the Academy in previous years during the Secretaries' of Defense Conferences and if you have no objection I will invite him to again visit the Academy following lunch.

## ACTION:

Informative, if you have no objections, I will informally invite Mr. Dulles to visit the Academy following lunch at Waller Hall, March 3, 1961.

HLS:wgp

(3)

ENC  
2/28

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 7/24/85 BY sp6 bja/lmw

Luncheon cancelled  
 as Dulles has to  
 return to DC.  
 immediately  
 after his talk  
 Gen H. L. Sloan  
 9:40 am 3/3/61

REC-71

62-83338-76  
5 MAR 7 1961

51 MAR 13 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 1, 1961

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2 AUM/ELH  
ON 5/28/00

PER OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/00

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

The following information was furnished to Agent Papich  
 March 1, 1961, by James Angleton, Central Intelligence Agency  
 (CIA) on a strictly confidential basis. (S)(U)

Allen Dulles possibly may be called to testify before  
 the Joint Atomic Energy Committee relative to United States'  
 dissemination of U.S. atomic energy developments to the British  
 Government. According to Angleton, Senator Clinton Anderson of  
 the aforementioned Committee recently expressed concern over  
 the advisability of further dissemination of sensitive information  
 to the British. Senator Anderson's concern is based on reports  
 which he allegedly has received concerning the Lonsdale case in  
 Great Britain. The Senator and possibly others are assuming that  
 the Soviet spy network headed by Lonsdale obtained information  
 concerning our nuclear submarines. If Dulles is called, he very  
 likely will be asked to express his views with regard to further  
 dissemination of information to the British. (S)(U)

Angleton advised that he was quite certain that the  
 Lonsdale case had not disclosed any evidence indicating that  
 the Soviets acquired any information about our nuclear subs. (S)(U)

ACTION:

For information.

SJP:jad (4)

ene  
3/3

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

CLASSIFIED BY SP 2 AUM/ELH  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

6/22/99

Classified by SP 6 bja/lmw  
Declassify on: OADR

REC-85

12 MAR 7 1961

EX-108

~~SECRET~~

52 MAR 10 1961

FOIA/PA \_\_\_\_\_  
 APFAL \_\_\_\_\_  
 CIVILIAN \_\_\_\_\_  
 E.O. \_\_\_\_\_  
 DATE \_\_\_\_\_ INITIALS \_\_\_\_\_



- 1 - Liaison  
- 1 - Cotter

SAC, Miami

March 16, 1961

Director, FBI

*✓*  
**ALLEN DULLES**  
**DIRECTOR**  
**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**


On 3/10/61 an official of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advised he was becoming somewhat concerned about propaganda attacks of Castro government against that Agency. CIA representative pointed out that Cuban propaganda organs were characterizing Director Dulles of CIA as individual responsible for the worsening in Cuban - U. S. relations and as individual responsible for planning invasion of Cuba. He noted that Cuban fanatics might attempt to physically attack Mr. Dulles either at his home or while he was traveling to various cities for conferences.

CIA official said that he would appreciate receiving any information which might come to Bureau's attention relative to plans of pro-Castro elements to attack Mr. Dulles. Offices receiving this letter should be most alert for any such information and should promptly advise Bureau under this caption, if such data should be received.

- 2 - New York
- 2 - San Juan
- 2 - Washington Field

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/24/85 BY SPUBJA/11mw

RDC:jwh  
(11) *jwh*



Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. Belmont *also*FROM : R. O. L'Allier *L'*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 7/25/85 BY spubja/lmw

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLESCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) *LT*

On March 10, 1961, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, CIA, advised that he was becoming somewhat concerned about the propaganda attacks of the Castro Government against CIA. Edwards commented that Cuban newspapers and radio programs are now characterizing Allen Dulles as the one responsible for the deterioration in relations between the United States and Cuba and Dulles is also being pictured as the individual responsible for the planning of an invasion against the country.

Edwards stated that CIA can readily accept these attacks but feels that Castro supporters could become excessively emotional and might plan some bodily harm against the CIA Director. Edwards stated that Cuban fanatics would not find it extremely difficult to physically attack Dulles at his home or while he was moving about the city to conferences. It was explained that his security officers do furnish a certain amount of protection to Dulles but the CIA Director has made it clear that he does not want a bodyguard.

Edwards advised that he would appreciate receiving from the Bureau any information coming to our attention relating to any Cuban plans to physically strike at the CIA Director. The Liaison Agent informed Edwards that if any information of this type was received the Bureau would disseminate the data in a most expeditious manner. It was explained to him that we would act accordingly regardless of the Federal official involved.

For your information, we have not received any information indicating that the Cubans are "after" Dulles. We are very familiar with the press attacks and we are disseminating all pertinent information received or developed by us.

ACTION:

For information.

SJP:ban  
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Donahoe
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

51 MAR 23 1961

EX-113

REC-61 62-83338-79

12 MAR 17 1961

LIAISON

1 - Mr. Gurley

April 26, 1961

REC- 60

EX-113

62-83338-80

[REDACTED] ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
New York, New York HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Dear [REDACTED]:

DATE 7/24/85 BY SP6 bja/l

I have received your telegram dated  
April 21, 1961.

Your interest and courtesy in furnishing  
this information to me, as well as your kind  
offer to be of assistance, are indeed appreciated.  
Should the occasion arise, we will not hesitate  
to call upon you.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

NOTE ON YELLOW:

No communist literature is being  
sent [REDACTED] in view of his concern over the  
Cuban situation.

Due to the nature of his comments  
and his references to the press, it is felt  
the above answer to his communication is  
sufficient.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO:

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

2 MAY 2 1961

LTG:bgc  
(3)

TELETYPE UNIT



NOTE ON YELLOW FROM PAGE TWO:

Bufiles reveal that Norman Cousins is Editor of "Saturday Review," a general magazine of information and opinion. Cousins has not been investigated by the Bureau; however, his name has often appeared as a member or sponsor for a number of organizations, many of which are of doubtful background. 62-90451

b6  
b7C

Bufiles contain no identifiable references to 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
APR 21 1961  
WESTERN UNION

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. Parsons ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. Belmont ✓  
Mr. Callahan ✓  
Mr. Conrad ✓  
Mr. DeLoach ✓  
Mr. Evans ✓  
Mr. Malone ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Tavel ✓  
Mr. Trotter ✓  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Mr. Ingram ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓

BIA003 1033A EST APR 21 61 RA089

R MB013 LONG DL PD AR NEW YORK NY 21 828A EST

J EDGAR HOOVER

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHDC  
DO NOT ALLOW ALLEN DULLES TO BE INTIMIDATED OR BLAMED BY THE  
LEFT WING PRESS FOR THE TEMPORARY CUBAN SET BACK WE IN THE  
RECENTLY FORMED "COLD WAR COUNCILS" ARE BEHIND HIM FULLY WE  
ARE ASKING THE FBI TO IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBLE  
COMMUNIST AND FELLOW TRAVELLING NEWSPAPER REPORTER SOURCES  
OF THESE ATTACKS ON HIM AND HIS IMPORTANT ORGANIZATION THESE  
INCLUDE SUCH AS NORMAN COUSINS THE NEW YORK POST AND THE CBS  
WASHINGTON RADIO CORRESPONDENT IS THERE ANYTHING WE CAN DO  
HELP YOU

REC-60

62-83338-80

EX-113

APR 27 1961

NEW YORK CITY ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/24/85

BXSPC/bjall/mr

cc Mr. DeLoach

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: July 5, 1961

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES  
 DIRECTOR  
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] advised on July 3, 1961, that  
 Allen Dulles is in the process of writing a book on international  
 communism. The book may not be published for several months. He  
 is also organizing material for one other book, the subject of  
 which is unknown at this time. (S)(1)(C)(u)

ACTION:

For information.

SJP:ban  
 (5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

Classified by SP6BJA/lmw  
 Declassify on: OADR

FBI # 366904  
 CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ELH EX-116  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
 6/22/99

REC- 62 62-83338-81

FOI/PA # 240,403  
 APPEAL # \_\_\_\_\_  
 CIVIL ACT. # \_\_\_\_\_  
 E.O. # 12356  
 DATE 7/25/85 INITIALS lmw  
 S-1 is CIA

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ELH  
 ON 5/28/00  
 PER OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/00

JUL 12 1961

56 JUL 18 1961

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: July 13, 1961

FROM : Mr. R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Tolson ☒  
Belmont ☐  
Mohr ☐  
Callahan ☐  
Conrad ☐  
DeLoach ☒  
Evans ☒  
Malone ☐  
Rosen ☐  
Sullivan ☐  
Tavel ☐  
Trotter ☐  
Tele. Room ☐  
Ingram ☐  
Gandy ☐

[redacted] furnished Referral/Consult  
information to Agent Papich on July 13, 1961, on a strictly  
confidential basis: (S)(X)(u)

Referral/Consult

b6 Per FBI  
b7C

ACTION:

For information.

SJP:fag  
(5)  
1 - Sullivan  
1 - Papich  
1 - L'Allier  
1 - Liaison

FOI 366984  
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ETHL  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
6/22/99

Classified by SP6BJA/1mw  
Declassify on: OADR 7/25/85

FOI/PA # 340/403  
APPEAL #  
CIVIL ACT. #  
E.O. # 10356  
DATE 7/23/85 INITIALS 1mw

S-1 p DIA

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ETHL  
ON 5/28/00  
PER OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/00

20 JUL 19 1961

EX-103 REC-17 62-83338-82

58 JUL 25 1961

COPY TO MR. TOLSON ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 27, 1961

PERSONAL

Honorable Allen W. Dulles  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Administration Building, Room 123  
2430 E Street, Northwest  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen: DULLES

On the occasion of your retirement as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I want to express my warm thanks for the cooperation and assistance you have given this Bureau over the years.

Certainly, you may take deep pride in the accomplishments of the CIA during your tenure of service, and I am sure public-spirited citizens throughout the country are most appreciative of the contributions you have made toward the welfare and security of our Nation. Your work in this most difficult assignment has been characterized by ability and honor, and your friends in the FBI join me in extending our very best wishes for every possible success in your future endeavors.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,  
EDGAK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/35/85 BY SP6BJA/1mw

1 - Liaison Section

NOTE: Prior correspondence with Mr. Dulles has been on a first-name basis.

CBF:dkp (4)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

67 OCT 2 - 1961

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

FBI - JUSTICE  
REC'D - 2 OCT 1961

REC-3 62-83338-83

OCT 2 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: July 21, 1961

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

You may be interested in the following comments which were volunteered to Agent Papich on July 20, 1961, by Lyman Kirkpatrick and [redacted] CIA.

b3 per CIA

Kirkpatrick stated that there was no doubt in his mind whatsoever that many changes would be taking place in CIA. He commented that there would be reorganization and very likely changes in top personnel.

[redacted] advised that on the night of July 20, 1961, Dulles was a dinner guest at his home. [redacted] fully expects Dulles to leave the Agency but he can't see the President removing Dulles until the Berlin crisis is resolved one way or another. [redacted] has the definite impression that so far Dulles has been a key figure in many discussions which have been held relative to Berlin and as far as he knows, the CIA Director would continue participation in further conferences.

## ACTION:

For information.

SJP:ban  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 7/25/88 BY SP6 BJA/1mw

JUL 26 1961

162-83338  
 NOT RECORDED  
 145 JUL 27 1961

67-54  
 JUL 27 1961  
 31 1961

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-80750-3781



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: 11/24/61

FROM : W. C. Sullivan *WCS*cc Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. Bartlett

Tolson	✓
Belmont	✓
Mohr	
Callahan	
Conrad	
DeLoach	✓
Evans	
Malone	
Rosen	
Sullivan	
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Ingram	
Gandy	

SUBJECT:

~~NATIONAL SECURITY MEDAL~~  
to be presented to  
CIA Director Allen Dulles  
by the President, 11/28/61

The Director has accepted an invitation to attend the presentation by the President of the National Security Medal, to Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of CIA. This presentation is to be held at 11 a.m., Tuesday, 11/28, at the new CIA Building in Langley, Virginia.

Today I received an invitation, through the office of the Naval Aide to the President, at the White House, to attend this presentation as a member of the US Intelligence Board.

In view of the fact that the Director is attending this ceremony and representing the Bureau, I see no actual need for my being present. However, if the Director thinks I should accept the invitation, naturally I would have no objection.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That I be advised of the Bureau's wishes in this matter.

WCS:CSH. (4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/25/85 BY *SPC/bja/lmw*

REC-91

62-83338-84

12 NOV 28 1961

57 DEC 4 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : MR. SULLIVAN *WCS*

DATE: 9-28-61

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER *L'*

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/25/85 BY SP6BJA/1Mw

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Wick	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

At the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting today, Allen Dulles opened the meeting by commenting upon the appointment of Mr. John McCone as his successor as Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). *End*

Dulles reported that in August of this year, he advised the President that he had completed 10 years of service as Deputy or Director of CIA and felt it was time for a change. He requested that the President select his successor if possible before the first of the new year. *mt*

About two weeks ago, the President indicated to Dulles that he had decided on Mr. McCone and as a result, had offered the position to him. Approximately one week ago, McCone had notified the President of his acceptance and came to Washington for conferences.

Dulles pointed out that the results of his and McCone's conversations with the President at Newport, Rhode Island on 9-27-61, were very accurately reported in the 9-28-61 edition of "The New York Times." (Clipping attached). As a matter of interest, Dulles advised the USIB that McCone had inquired of the President and Dulles if they were committed to any immediate changes in the administrative organization of CIA.

McCone obtained the assurances of both Dulles and the President that no such commitments for changes in the administrative setup of CIA had been made and that any such changes will not be made until after McCone has had sufficient time to participate in any recommended changes.

It was announced that McCone had indicated he would like two weeks on the West Coast to handle his personal business affairs, which would include a short holiday. He expects to come to Washington thereafter and spend four to six weeks working with Dulles before taking over the administration of CIA. During this time, it is quite possible that both he and Dulles might make an inspection tour of CIA installations in Europe.

It was quite apparent that Dulles desired the Board to know

ENCLOSURE

WOC:jad(7)

1-Belmont; 1-Sullivan; 1-Evans

1-Papich; 1-Liaison; 1-Cregar

55 OCT 9 1961

NOT RECORDED

149 OCT 3 OCT 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-80750-3830

Memo L'Allier to Sullivan  
Re: CIA

that he was not retiring as the result of ill health or "senility." He also made the point that contrary to the newspaper articles, he would not serve in the future as a consultant to the President, but rather as a consultant to McCone as the Director of CIA.

ACTION:

For information.

*mcg*

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

*[Checkmark]*

*GRC*

# PRESIDENT NAMES M'CONE TO C. I. A.

Visits Naval War College to  
Announce Change—Dulles  
and Successor on Hand

Transcript of remarks made  
at ceremony, Page 20.

By TOM WICKER

Special to The New York Times.

NEWPORT, R. I., Sept. 27—  
President Kennedy announced  
today his nomination of John A.  
McCone to succeed Allen W.  
Dulles as director of the Cen-  
tral Intelligence Agency.

The President made the an-  
nouncement at an appearance  
before the Naval War College  
here. Mr. McCone, Mr. Dulles  
and Vice Admiral Bernard Aus-  
tin, president of the war college,  
were with him on the stage of  
the War College Auditorium.

The President paid tribute to  
both Mr. McCone and Mr. Dul-  
les, and he took pains to empha-  
size that Mr. Dulles was not  
leaving the C. I. A. under du-  
ress.

"I know of no man who is a  
more courageous, selfless public  
servant than Mr. Allen Dulles,"  
the President said. He expressed  
"profound regret" at Mr. Dul-  
les' retirement after ten years  
as a leader in the intelligence  
agency.

Of Mr. McCone, a Republican  
business man who served in  
both the Truman and Eisen-  
hower Administrations, Mr.  
Kennedy said:

"He has had broad experi-  
ence. Coming once again to  
Washington represents a real  
sacrifice for him. I know that  
all of us who are concerned  
with our present responsibili-

Continued on Page 20, Column 3

# KENNEDY NAMES M'CONE TO C. I. A.

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

ties are extremely happy to  
have his counsel, extremely  
happy to have him associated  
with us."

The transition will be made  
in November, the President  
said. He said Mr. McCone would  
come to Washington in about  
two weeks to work with Mr.  
Dulles.

Mr. McCone and Mr. Dulles,  
calling each other "John" and  
"Allen," responded briefly.

Dulles Hails Successor

Mr. Dulles said he was  
"deeply touched" by the Presi-  
dent's tribute.

"In these troubled times," he  
continued, "the importance of  
intelligence is emphasized as  
essential to policy. I know of  
no better time to turn from this  
job to others than after having  
served for ten years and then  
to have found what I feel is  
the ideal choice for a man to  
carry on this important work."

Mr. McCone, taking note of  
the President's remark about  
sacrifice, said that in his mind  
an "opportunity to serve my  
country in this capacity is a  
very definite privilege."

He said to Mr. Dulles that  
he was "not unmindful of the  
fact that it will be extremely  
difficult to fill your shoes be-  
cause of your long experience  
in this particular field."

Many Officers Present

The ceremony took place in  
an auditorium filled with the  
high-ranking officers who are  
attending the war college. Most  
were in civilian clothes.

That Mr. Kennedy chose such  
a forum, and that he had both  
Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCone on  
hand, underscored the impor-  
tance that is attached to the di-  
rectorship of the C.I.A.

It had been understood for  
some months that Mr. Dulles  
would resign in November, fol-  
lowing an understanding that  
he had reached with Mr. Ken-  
nedy when the latter asked him  
to continue in office shortly af-  
ter the election last year.

After the abortive attempt  
to topple the Castro regime in  
Cuba, widely regarded as a  
C.I.A. project, there were re-  
peated reports, always refuted  
by the White House, that Mr.  
Dulles was on the way out.

Mr. Kennedy noted that Mr.  
Dulles was retiring of his own  
volition, after having served  
the year that he had promised  
last November.

Fly In C. I. A. Plane

Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCone  
flew this morning from Wash-  
ington to Quonset Point Naval  
air station, near here, in a  
C. I. A. plane. They went at  
11:15 a.m. to the Hammersmith  
Farm, where Mr. and Mrs.  
Kennedy are on holiday.

The three men conferred for  
about a half-hour on the patio.  
The White House press secre-  
tary, Pierre Salinger, said it was  
at this time that Mr. Kennedy  
had made his final decision to  
nominate Mr. McCone.

After the patio conference,  
the President and his two visi-  
tors crossed Newport Harbor, a  
twenty-minute cruise, in the  
Honey Fitz, the Presidential  
yacht. This brought them to the  
naval base and the War College,  
a gray stone building standing  
on a hill above the harbor.

Immediately after the cere-  
mony, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Mc-  
Cone took off in a helicopter for  
Quonset Point and the return  
flight to their homes.

Mr. Kennedy recrossed the  
harbor in the Honey Fitz, picked  
up Mrs. Kennedy and their two  
children, Caroline and John, Jr.,  
at the Hammersmith Farm land-  
ing, and departed on a cruise.

Mr. Kennedy's sleep was in-  
terrupted twice last night, Mr.  
Salinger said, because of the ad-  
journment of Congress. He was  
awakened at 2:30 A. M. by Rep-  
resentative Carl Albert of Okla-  
homa, the assistant Democratic  
leader of the House, who said  
that body was ready to quit.

At 6:12 A. M., Senator Mike  
Mansfield of Montana, the Dem-  
ocratic majority leader, called  
to say that the Senate had fin-  
ished its business. Such calls are  
a customary part of the Con-  
gressional ritual however they  
may interrupt a President's  
slumber.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/25/85 BY SP6 Bja/1mw

62-83338-

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

## Retirement Of CIA Chief Announced

Associated Press

The White House said yesterday that Allen W. Dulles intends to retire as director of the Central Intelligence Agency by the end of this year.

Press Secretary Pierre Salinger declined comment on reports that Fowler Hamilton, Wall Street lawyer and veteran of Government service, is in line to succeed Dulles.

Administration sources have said off the record in the past that Dulles, when President Kennedy asked him last year to continue on the job, expressed the hope to retire in about a year. They added that the year ran from last November, after Mr. Kennedy's election.

Dulles, brother of the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was appointed director of CIA during the Administration of former President Eisenhower.

Salinger, in saying Dulles wanted to retire by the end of the year, said there had been no change in the status, meaning that this had been Dulles' intention all along.

His remarks were in response to questions about the report that Hamilton would succeed Dulles, carried in an article to be published in the Aug. 7 issue of Newsweek magazine. The article says Hamilton, 50, is to succeed Dulles as head of the controversial hush-hush agency in October, after several months of working with Dulles.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/25/85 BY SP6DJA/1mw

162-83338-A-  
NOT RECORDED  
176 AUG 3 1961

The Washington Post and Times Herald A-2  
The Washington Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
The Evening Star \_\_\_\_\_  
New York Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_  
New York Journal-American \_\_\_\_\_  
New York Mirror \_\_\_\_\_  
New York Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
New York Post \_\_\_\_\_  
The New York Times \_\_\_\_\_  
The Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
The New Leader \_\_\_\_\_  
The Wall Street Journal \_\_\_\_\_  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

AUG 1 1961

50 AUG 8 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: Nov. 27, 1961

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT:

A [ ] (phonetic) in the office of [ ]  
 [ ] at the White House called my office at approximately 5:35 p.m.  
 [ ] said that [ ] was extending an invitation to me  
 to attend the presentation by the President to Allen Dulles tomorrow morning  
 at 11:00 a.m. in the new CIA building in Langley, Virginia.

b6  
 b7C

It was requested that my appreciation be expressed to [ ]  
 [ ] for his thoughtfulness and the invitation was declined on the basis  
 of prior commitments.

ACTION: For information.

AHB/meek (3)

RECEIVED  
 12 NOV 28 1961  
 12 NOV 28 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 7/25/85 BY sp6bjal/mw

REC-33

62-83338-85

NOV 28 1961

EX-113

CORRESPONDENCE

63 DEC 4 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *ABH*

DATE: November 24, 1961

FROM : W. C. SULLIVAN *WCS*SUBJECT: PRESENTATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY MEDAL  
TO CIA DIRECTOR, ALLEN DULLES

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

The Director has accepted an invitation issued by the White House to attend the presentation of the National Security Medal to CIA Director, Allen Dulles, on Tuesday, November 28, 1961, at the new CIA Headquarters Building, Langley, Virginia. The presentation will be made by the President.

Liaison has determined that in addition to the Director, other honored guests will include the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mrs. Dulles, and members of the U.S. Intelligence Board. The President will arrive by helicopter, and the guests have been requested to be seated in the lobby inside the main entrance of the building by 10:40 a.m.

The distance from the Justice Building to the new CIA building is ten miles and will require approximately twenty-five minutes driving time. The most direct route will be via Memorial Bridge and the George Washington Parkway directly to the new CIA building. Liaison Agent [ ] will meet the Director at the CIA building upon his arrival and will escort him to his seat. Following the ceremony, [ ] will escort the Director to his car.

ACTION:

For information.

OHB:hke  
(8)

- 1-Mr. Ingram
- 1-Mr. Belmont
- 1-Mr. Mohr
- 1-Director's Telephone Room
- 1-Mr. Sullivan
- 1-Liaison
- 1-[ ]

REC-45

62-83338-86

5 NOV 30 1961

66 DEC 5 1961

b6  
b7C



## Allen Dulles Retires

The retirement of Allen W. Dulles as director of the Central Intelligence Agency is inevitably related in the public mind to some of the misfortunes that have befallen the CIA—for example, the shooting down of the U-2 plane over Soviet Russia and the Cuban fiasco. In a long public career there are certain to be many vicissitudes, however, and these should not be allowed to obscure long-range achievements. On the basis of his four and a half decades of public service Mr. Dulles is entitled to a generous salute from the American people. President Kennedy recognized this yesterday when he flew to the CIA headquarters to present the much-decorated Mr. Dulles with the National Security Medal.

Like his brother, the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles grew up with a keen interest in foreign affairs. It seems to have been related to the fact that their maternal grandfather, John W. Foster, had been Benjamin Harrison's Secretary of State and an uncle, Robert Lansing, had been Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson. Allen Dulles joined the foreign service in 1916, and had a wide experience in many lands before he resigned to practice law with his brother. While he was in private practice he served as adviser or counsel to several international gatherings, and after the United States entered World War II his knowledge of European finances and strategic areas led to his association with the Office of Strategic Services.

As OSS director in Switzerland, Mr. Dulles learned of the German generals' plot to assassinate Hitler six months before the bomb went off without achieving its intended purpose. He was also credited with maintaining an agent in the Nazi Foreign Office and with engineering a revolt in Italy that gave the Allies a notable advantage. It was natural that, after the war, he should be summoned to Washington to head a three-man team to study the United States intelligence system. He was also a member of the Committee on the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery. President Truman brought him back to Washington as deputy director of the CIA, which he had helped to establish, and in 1953 President Eisenhower made him director.

Through his numerous assignments Mr. Dulles has demonstrated a large capacity for objective judgment. It has been said of him that, while Foster was master of the deadpan, he is master of the smile. Whether or not this is accurate, he has willingly undertaken some extremely difficult tasks and has brought to them dedicated effort and balanced judgment, qualities still needed in the CIA as it now strives for more efficient organization and better checks against error.

Tolson ☒  
 Belmont ☒  
 Mohr ☒  
 Callahan ☒  
 Conrad ☒  
 DeLoach ☒  
 Evans ☒  
 Malone ☒  
 Rosen ☒  
 Sullivan ☒  
 Tavel ☒  
 Trotter ☒  
 Tele Room ☒  
 Ingram ☒  
 Gandy ☒

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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 DATE 7/25/85 BY spc/bja/lmw

The Washington Post and Times Herald A-17  
 The Washington Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Evening Star \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Journal-American \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Mirror \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Post \_\_\_\_\_  
 The New York Times \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
 The New Leader \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Wall Street Journal \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date \_\_\_\_\_

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149 DEC 6 1961

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51 DEC 6 1961



April 28, 1962

Honorable Allen W. Dulles  
2723 Q Street, Northwest  
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/15/85 BY SPL bja/lmw

Dear Allen: DULLES

I was privileged to hear you last Thursday evening during your appearance on television. Your presentation was excellent, and I want to thank you for your kind comments concerning the FBI and me. Your cogent observations are certainly indicative of the high quality of service which you have rendered so many years for your country.

Sincerely,

Edgar

REC-12

62-83338-87

10 APR 30 1962

EX-114


NOTE: Address per current telephone directory. He is on the mailing list for reference only; he is addressed as "Dear Allen." See Jones to DeLoach memo dated 4-27-62 captioned "'The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles' CBS Documentary, 4-26-62, Channel 9." FCS:par

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
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REC.D WV



W68 JFCS:kmd

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67 MAY 1 1962  
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: April 26, 1962 *WCS*

FROM :

[Redacted]

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES  
FORMER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
TELEVISION APPEARANCE, 4/26/62

Tolson ☒  
Belmont ☒  
Mohr ☐  
Callahan ☐  
Conrad ☐  
DeLoach ☐  
Evans ☐  
Malone ☐  
Rosen ☒  
Sullivan ☒  
Tavel ☐  
Trotter ☐  
Tele. Room ☐  
Holmes ☐  
Gandy ☐

[Redacted] of the Central Intelligence Agency advised our Liaison Agent today that Allen Dulles will appear on Television Channel 9 at 10:00 p.m., 4/26/62 on the Eric Sevareid Show. The title of the show is "The Hot and Cold War of Allen Dulles."

## ACTION:

The Domestic Intelligence Division will monitor the show.

DJB:mls *mb*  
1-Mr. Belmont  
1-Mr. Sullivan  
1-Mr. Papich  
1-Liaison

no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 7/25/85 BY SP6 BJA/IMW

[Redacted]

*Monitoring & preparing  
memo*

*4/27/62*

REC- 57

ST-105

9 APR 27 1962

58 MAY 3 1962

*Liaison*

b6  
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 4-27-62

FROM : M. A. Jones

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/25/85 BY SP6BJA/MMW

SUBJECT: "THE HOT AND COLD WARS OF ALLEN DULLES"  
CBS DOCUMENTARY  
4-26-62, CHANNEL 9

Tolson ☒  
Belmont ☒  
Mohr ☒  
Callahan ☒  
Conrad ☒  
DeLoach ☒  
Evans ☒  
Malone ☒  
Rosen ☒  
Sullivan ☒  
Tavel ☒  
Trotter ☒  
Tele. Room ☒  
Holmes ☒  
Gandy ☒

b6  
b7C

Wash. D.C.

The above-captioned program (an hour in length) was monitored by the Crime Research Section.

## BRIEF SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Wash. D.C. The program consisted of a dialogue between Allen Dulles and CBS correspondent, Eric Sevareid. The program was planned so that Sevareid would ask questions and allow Dulles to answer in great detail. The point of the program was to allow Dulles to reminisce and set forth his opinions on various topics.

Virtually, the entire program was devoted to Dulles' opinions on international events. Dulles indicated that the CIA, which he was Director, had failures, but also successes. He talked about his wartime experiences with the OSS in Switzerland. Here, he indicated he was able to secure confidential information about anti-Hitler activities in Germany. He indicated he had prior information concerning the unsuccessful attempt in 1944 to assassinate Hitler. He told how a bomb was planted under a table in a room where Hitler was being briefed concerning military operations. Just before the bomb exploded, Hitler moved to another area of the room. The explosion blew the German out of the room, but did not injure him seriously.

HITLER

Dulles mentioned a brief talk he had with Mr. Khrushchev when the latter visited the United States. He laughingly stated that Khrushchev mentioned, in this connection, that he was reading CIA reports.

Other topics covered during the interview concerned the U-2 incident. He indicated that these flights provided valuable information and that he did not share the criticism against pilot Francis Powers. Dulles stated that on the whole Powers handled himself properly. In this connection, Dulles stated that the CIA had informed Congressional leaders concerning secret operations including the U-2 flight. He made mention of a speech by Congressman Clarence Cannon on the House floor in which Cannon mentioned that this information was available to selected Congressional leaders.

1 - Mr. Papich - Room 845

ST-115

REC-9

62-83338-89

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CRIME RESEARCH

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Jones to DeLoach Memo  
RE: Allen Dulles, Channel 9

Mention was made of Cuba, but here Dulles obviously did not desire to answer the questions in detail. He indicated that the CIA did not inform the Cuban underground concerning the invasion date. It was a complete surprise as to the place of landing.

After the abortive invasion, the President set up a committee to look into the episode. Dulles stated that he would not deny that this committee felt that the CIA had exceeded its authority in this situation.

Sevareid brought up the recent controversy between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kennedy over the briefing given during the 1960 Presidential Campaign, in which Nixon claimed Kennedy had acted unfairly. Dulles said he did not want to go into these charges and that there had been an honest misunderstanding.

Dulles indicated that, in his opinion, there was no conflict between CIA policy and our foreign policy. At the present time, CIA is being "credited" with many things, such as manipulating the ouster of King Farouk of Egypt and replacing him with Nassar, which is not true.

Sevareid asked Dulles his opinion what would happen if we followed a "soft line" concerning communism. Dulles replied that disaster would follow and that it was necessary to face the communist peril wherever it appeared and not be guilty of appeasement as in the case of Hitler. He mentioned the communists' technique of "overload" which he defined as the communists starting many "small things" around the world in order to divert our attention. He indicated that the Soviet <sup>danger</sup> in the Congo had been overrated but that the situation in South Viet Nam was most serious. The Soviets like to believe that communism is the wave of the future and though the United States is not going communist in the next decade or so, it would be encircled by the communists. He indicated that the communists were thinking in terms of economic pressures against this country. He also commented about how the communists often gain leadership of the "disaffected" elements to stir up agitation.

Dulles stated that, in his opinion, the splits in the communist world were undoubtedly one of Khrushchev's great preoccupations. It's really something to see a small Nation like Albania throwing out Soviet diplomats. The strain between Russia and China is very serious and Dulles felt that it was probably Chinese pressure which had forced Russian technicians from China.

Dulles stated that a new generation was rising in Russia and it was his opinion that some of these younger Russians, when they learn more about what is going on in the rest of the world, will push for more freedom. Obviously, the younger generation is confused with the denouncing of Stalin. These younger Russians see the falsity of Russian history. At this point, he commented that one of CIA's important accomplishments was the securing of the text of Khrushchev's

Jones to DeLoach Memo  
RE: Allen Dulles, Channel 9

speech before the 20th Party Congress denouncing Stalin. This speech was not publicly released at that time inside Russia.

MENTION OF THE FBI:

The FBI was mentioned very briefly toward the end of the program. Sevareid commented that communism in the United States was not under Dulles' jurisdiction, but under the FBI. Dulles stated that due to the work of the FBI and what J. Edgar Hoover has done, communism is much less of an internal menace here than in other countries. The discussion then shifted to what people in the United States can do to fight communism. Dulles mentioned certain "aberrations," by which he meant the right-wing extremists. People want to do something to fight communism, but they do not know what action to take. As a result, many innocent people are led astray. In this connection, Dulles emphasized that people should learn more about the communists, that our free system is more effective than the communist system. Moreover, citizens should support the Government's action against communism such as in Berlin. At the very end Sevareid, echoing Dulles' opinions, asked whether a good recipe on how to fight communism in the United States would be (1) be informed (2) believe in your country (3) don't let them scare you.

OBSERVATIONS:

Dulles actually gave very little new information in his interview. Most of this data has previously been published. The first part of the program was somewhat "slow" in that Dulles was hesitant to speak directly and appeared very passive. The tempo of the program picked up considerably in the last half hour. It might be noted that Sevareid's questions closely followed material set forth in the recent book by Andrew Tully entitled "CIA--The Inside Story."

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

*I saw it and thought it was a poor performance. Dulles' answers were too subtle, in many instances, for any T.V. audience to grasp.*

*John.*

*I thought it was pretty good*

ALLEN W. DULLES  
MAIN POST OFFICE, BOX 1513  
WASHINGTON 13, D. C.

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. Belmont ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. Callahan ✓  
Mr. Conrad ✓  
Mr. DeLoach ✓  
Mr. Evans ✓  
Mr. Malone ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Sullivan ✓  
Mr. Tavel ✓  
Mr. Trotter ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Miss Holmes ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓

14 May 1962

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I have just returned from a brief European trip and find your kind letter of April 28, 1962, about my television appearance. I keenly appreciate your kind comments.

I would add that what I had to say about you and your organization was, as you know, the expression of a very deep feeling of appreciation I, as an American, have for what you have accomplished.

Sincerely yours,

*Allen W. Dulles*  
Allen W. Dulles

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DATE 7/25/80 BY spc/bja/mw

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62-83338-90

16 MAY 17 1962

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58 MAY 22 1962

MAY 15 1962

# Hitler, Khrushchev, Cuba, and the U-2 27

## America's Master Spy

## Recalls His Wins and Losses

Tolson ✓  
Belmont ✓  
Mohr ✓  
Callahan ✓  
Conrad ✓  
DeLoach ✓  
Evans ✓  
Malone ✓  
Rosen ✓  
Sullivan ✓  
Tavel ✓  
Trotter ✓  
Tele Room ✓  
Holmes ✓  
Gandy ✓

Allen Welch Dulles has been called "America's Master Spy." For more than eight years, from 1953 until his retirement late last year, he headed The United States Central Intelligence Agency. During World War II he was an intelligence officer in Europe. His agency's occasional failures often made him the center of controversy.

Few people are more qualified to discuss the nature and methods of the Communist menace. With this in mind, CBS News correspondent Eric Sevareid chatted for an hour with Mr. Dulles last Thursday evening on the television program, *CBS Reports*. Their talk ranged from Cuba to the Congo, from Nikita Khrushchev to Adolf Hitler. Here are the highlights:

**Mr. Sevareid:** Mr. Dulles, when Khrushchev was here, did you get a chance to talk with him at all?

**Mr. Dulles:** Yes. I didn't have a long talk with him, but I had a very — quite an amusing encounter with him. It took place at the dinner that President Eisenhower gave for Khrushchev, and the President introduced him, and said: "This is Mr. Dulles. You may know Mr. Dulles." He turned to his reporters, kind of a twinkle in his eye, because he's got a keen — you must admit, he's got a good sense of humor; and he said: "Oh, yes, I know you. I read your reports."

**Mr. Sevareid:** Really?

**Mr. Dulles:** Yes. And I said: "I hope you get them legally." And, "Oh," he said, "you know, you know how we get them. We all pay the same agents and we all get the same reports." And, "Well," I said, "That's kind of sharing the wealth, isn't it?" And then we had a laugh and that ended it.

### The Briefcase Bomb

**Mr. Sevareid:** Did he mean your public or your private reports?

**Mr. Dulles:** Ah, he never told me. I think he had in mind that he read agent reports.

**Mr. Sevareid:** Do you think it's possible that he has?

**Mr. Dulles:** Every once in a while somebody gets caught, but that game goes both ways.

**Mr. Sevareid:** Mr. Dulles, would it be accurate to say that because of your work in World War II, in Switzerland, Washington kept informed on plots against Hitler's life?

**Mr. Dulles:** They knew about the last plot. I did have the details of the last and most serious plot that almost succeeded on July 20, 1944. Hitler was having a briefing at the time. He was up on the East Front in East Prussia, and he was having his regular morning briefing, and Stauffenberg, who had the bomb, was in the room. He was — had a special message for Hitler, so he was admitted. He put the bomb down in this briefcase against a leg of a table. It was a — you know, one of those long tables that are in barracks with legs at various intervals. He put it down on the leg nearest to where Hitler was. Here was a long map, 20 feet or

*Filed 8/1/71*  
*Wash Post*  
*NY Times*  
*NY Herald Tribune*  
*NY Journal-American*  
*NY Mirror*  
*NY Daily News*  
*NY Post*  
*NY Times*  
*The Worker*  
*The New Leader*  
*The Wall Street Journal*  
*The National Observer*  
*22*

The Washington Post and Times Herald  
The Washington Daily News  
The Evening Star  
New York Herald Tribune  
New York Journal-American  
New York Mirror  
New York Daily News  
New York Post  
The New York Times  
The Worker  
The New Leader  
The Wall Street Journal  
The National Observer  
Date: APR 29 1962

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Eric Sevareid

more long, with maps of the East Front, the West Front, and so forth, and so on. And Hitler was being briefed there, and just before the bomb went off, Hitler went off here to see how the front was, let's say, in Pinsk, and that took him 10 feet away from the bomb. The bomb went off and he was blown out of the building, but he wasn't seriously wounded. It was a shack—it was just a barracks there.

Mr. Sevareid: It must have been a great disappointment to you and every one else?

Mr. Dulles: Well, it was. I was waiting to see whether they'd get hold of the radio that day, and they never got hold of the radio. You know, that's one of the modern revolutions — one of the great things to note is, have they got control of the radio, and again and again as I've sat back, either when revolutions were upcoming, the indication to you as to whether one side or the other is winning, is who has got control of the air?

Mr. Sevareid: You apparently knew very early in '45, Mr. Dulles, that the Japanese were in very bad shape. How did you know that?

Mr. Dulles: Eric, at that time, I had access to information that was reaching the German Foreign Office . . . messages from the German Ambassador in Tokyo, the German Air Attaché and the German Army Attaché. Those cables showed, very clearly, the plight of the Japanese Air Force and the plight of the Japanese

Navy. By the end of '44 and early '45, their position, both air and sea, was becoming almost untenable, far more than the public realized. Word came through to me from certain Japanese sources with whom I was in contact, that the Japanese would like to find a way of negotiating for a surrender.

They made quite interesting proposals, and as a result of these proposals I was asked to go up to Potsdam in the time of the Potsdam Conference, when President Truman met there with Stalin, you remember, and Churchill. I took to (Secretary of War Henry) Stimson, at that time, the proposals that had come through this channel with regard to an early Japanese surrender.

### *Were A-Bombs Necessary?*

Mr. Sevareid: Do you think that the dropping of those first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary in terms of bringing about the Japanese surrender?

Mr. Dulles: Well, that's an awful hard question to answer. I have the deepest respect for the men who made that decision. I do feel that there was a failure to interpret available intelligence as to the extent of the Japanese collapse, and their inability really effectively to carry on the war.

Mr. Sevareid: Is there anything you'd like to say, Mr. Dulles, about the pilot of the U-2, Francis Powers?

Mr. Dulles: I never shared some of the public and maybe of the press criticism of Powers. While it was difficult to tell until after we—the agency—had talked with him and had made (our) report how well he had done, I think on the whole he handled himself properly. You must remember that he was an aviator. He was a great navigator. He had a very difficult assignment merely on the aviation-navigation side and to expect of him—to make of him a great undercover agent was impossible—one of these two professions took all a man's time—all a man's concentration and thought, and I'm not sure that point has been brought out fully enough.

### *No Suicide Commitment*

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Dulles, some people said that the pilot, Mr. Powers, should have taken his own life. Is there any way you can have a man sign a contract to commit suicide?

Mr. Dulles: No—no—you couldn't—first place, it would be ineffective, of course. In the second place, I think it would be immoral and we just didn't do it. We said, "Here, you have this. If you get into a situation where you think that death is better than what awaits you, use it."

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Dulles, about the foulup on all the explanations of the U-2 affair when it first happened. The Government went through a lot of agony. We looked very silly. Now, is it necessary that we go through all that? Do we have to explain?

Mr. Dulles: I doubt whether, in the two



situations to which you probably refer—one the U-2 and the other Cuba, probably, too—one could have ever rested on the answer "No comment."

I mean this: Do we have a kind of a government here that would let, say, me, as then Director of Central Intelligence, send an airplane, even 70,000 feet high, over Russia? Is that a responsible kind of government? Or mount an expedition, or have something to do with an expedition for the training of Cubans that were going to Cuba? It seems to me that that kind of thing can only be done with the approval of the highest authority, and the American people or the world began to think that we had a government here where that kind of thing could be done without approval by the highest authority.

There might be a feeling of uneasiness, that there are some people here who could do things that might lead to serious international complications without knowledge at the highest level. So could the President have declined knowledge of these situations, or said, "I won't say anything about them?"

Mr. Severeid: Mr. Dulles, there's been much criticism that we took much too long to recognize the danger of Castro and tried to do something about it.

### Timing Vital in Cuba Attack

Mr. Dulles: Maybe we were slow about it. Certainly we got disturbed about Castro at a fairly early date, but what were you going to do about it? Castro was in there, with the great support of the majority of the people, and if we had planned any expedition at an earlier date, that might not have been of any more success than the one that we did after rather mature preparations.

Mr. Severeid: Mr. Dulles, if you can, would you tell me, in regard to the Cuban affair of last spring, where you think the central basic mistake was?

Mr. Dulles: I'd rather limit my remarks to pointing out that there were certain factors which bore upon the timing of any operation if it was carried out—namely, that we knew that Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia, that MIGs were in crates in large numbers in Cuba and that if these trained pilots got back and these MIGs became operative, the possibility of any invasion by a Cuban force, or even by an American force, would be greatly—the dangers and the problems would be greatly increased.

Mr. Severeid: But what about the philosophical and the legal argument that the Cuban invasion was both immoral and illegal?

Mr. Dulles: Well, I think I'd respond to that by asking you a question. Here you had a group of fine young men—these Cubans—formed the brigade that went into Cuba, who asked nothing other than the opportunity to try to restore a free government in their country, who were ready to risk their lives and have done so, whether they should have been told that they would get no sympathy, no support,



Allen W. Dulles

no aid from The United States. That's the question.

Mr. Severeid: Is it true that we did not inform the Cuban underground in Cuba of the date—the place and the timing of that landing?

Mr. Dulles: Eric, we didn't inform them. As I recall, we informed very few people when we started the invasion of France in June of '44. You can't do that. We did not inform the Cuban underground of the time and place of the invasion. To do so would have been informing Castro and it would have been catastrophe for the invading force.

Mr. Severeid: We did achieve some element of surprise, did we?

Mr. Dulles: Complete surprise was achieved as regards the place of landing.

Mr. Severeid: But not timing, because that was published.

Mr. Dulles: No they did not know the exact timing. They had been crying invasion for weeks and months before, and as you note, they're even now crying that invasions are being planned.

Mr. Severeid: Mr. Dulles, some Europeans—Jean Monnet, for example—say that Americans are much too obsessed about Russian communism. Do you think this is true?

Mr. Dulles: I think that is true in a

sense, and not true in another sense. I think that the one grave peril that we face is the Communist peril. That is the only peril to our freedoms, to our institutions, to everything that we hold dear. Now, I think that it is true that the Communists practice on us and on other countries towards which they're directing their attack, they try on us what I would call the overload theory. They will start a lot of petty annoyances in various parts of the world, without knowing whether they are going to seriously push them ahead, in order to divert our attention, maybe, from the major points of their attack.

Mr. Severeid: Could you give any concrete examples of what has turned out to be minor or major?

### South Vietnam Threat Serious

Mr. Dulles: Well, I think we overrated the Soviet danger, let's say, in the Congo. They went in there with great fanfare. They supported Gizenga. They established a Lumumba Institute in Moscow, and it looked as though they were going to make a serious attempt to take over in the Belgian Congo. Well, it didn't work out that way at all. Now, maybe they intended to do it, but they didn't find the situation ripe, and they beat a pretty hasty retreat.

Mr. Severeid: Would you call Vietnam a serious threat or just a tactical operation?

Mr. Dulles: No, I think that's a serious threat. I consider South Vietnam of a major importance, and not just one of the overload theory type of operations.

Mr. Severeid: Don't (the Russians) already have perhaps too much on their plate? They can't control Albania, or Yugoslavia, or China—all Communist systems and states. May it not be that a pluralistic communism around the world would be anti-Moscow?

### Freedom Alive in Russia

Mr. Dulles: That's quite true, but difficulties at home have rarely stopped countries in foreign adventure, sometimes has pushed them on. I believe that the splits, the fissures, the differences between various Communist countries is today one of the greatest preoccupations that Khrushchev has.

After all, he said what he calls the socialist world, if the world becomes all socialist, they'll all live—lie down in peace, and live together. Well, that isn't what's happened, and when you see little Albania, practically throwing out the Russian representation there, both civil and military, that is really something. Why they went, hard to tell; obviously, at that time they felt that they would have to use force to stay, and they didn't want another Hungary on their hands at that moment.

A new generation is coming on in Russia, and I have a feeling that some of the younger generation of Russians, as they learn more about what goes on in the rest of the world, are going to bring great pressure to get more freedom. They'll want to hear your radio and see your television. They'll want to learn what goes on in the rest of the world. They'll begin to see the basic falsity of the whole history of Russia.

They've having a terrible time now in getting out their histories. What do you say about Stalin? Twenty-five years of rule. Twenty-five years the great hero. Stalingrad. Stalin in the tomb. In 1956, came out the great speech of Khrushchev's—denigrating Stalin, but they never dared let that speech circulate in Russia. They leaked little parts of it and they had to go back to the attack now—that was at the Twentieth Party Congress—but the Twenty-second Party Congress, these had to go back to the attack, because they hadn't gotten over to the people.

Mr. Severeid: Wasn't it your agency that got hold of that speech originally?

Mr. Dulles: I'm willing to accept that charge. Khrushchev charged me with it at one time. You'll find it in one of his statements back two or three years ago.

Mr. Severeid: Well, you have to rank that rather high among the accomplishments.

Mr. Dulles: I think it was one of the really important accomplishments.

Mr. Severeid: Mr. Dulles, I know the problem of communism inside The United States is not—has not been under your jurisdiction, but the FBI, but what are your feelings about it? Is it a serious matter?

### *Red Menace Exaggerated*

Mr. Dulles: Well, I think that's due to the vigilance of the FBI and what J. Edgar Hoover has done, it's probably much less of an internal menace here with us than it is with many other countries. I think that the frustration of the American citizen and of the citizens of other countries who are told, "Here's this great menace. You must do something to meet this menace." And yet the ordinary man, the man in the street, the man and woman, he doesn't know how he can contribute.

He agrees as to the judgment that there is a menace, that our society is menaced by communism, but what's he to do, and that has resulted in certain aberrations that I don't need to define, because you and those who are listening and hearing and seeing will probably know what I have in mind, and I think a great many innocent people without realizing the harm they are doing, they get led astray by this.

Well, now, there's certain things one can do. In the first place, we ought to learn what we can about it. We can do it by understanding that our great strength is showing that our system, our free system, is more efficient and more effective than the Communist system, and we all, on these issues, we will rally together in support of the actions our Government has taken strongly to defend our positions where they may be threatened by communism, whether it's Berlin, or Laos, or Vietnam, or wherever it may be.

Mr. Severeid: Mr. Dulles, would this be a fair summation of your recipe for the average American? Be informed. Believe in your country, and as the late Elmer Davis put it, "Don't let them scare you."

Mr. Dulles: I'd like to leave it at that.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN *WC See*

DATE: May 31, 1962

FROM :

[Redacted]

b6

b7C

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES  
 FORMER DIRECTOR  
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

For your information Dulles was rushed to the hospital on May 25, 1962, after he had been taken suddenly ill and was suffering severe abdominal pains. A kidney stone, which was the source of this illness, was removed on May 28, 1962, and Dulles is expected to return to his home today, May 31, 1962.

ACTION:

For information.

SJP:ban  
 (5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

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JUN 5 1962

51 JUN 8 1962

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN *WCS*

DATE: November 2, 1962

FROM :  *GR*SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Special Agent Papich saw Dulles for a few minutes on November 1, 1962. You may be interested in the following:

b6  
b7C

Allen W. Dulles stated that he is spending most of his time on his book which probably will not be finished for several weeks. This book will essentially concentrate on Soviet efforts to subvert and dominate the world. He hopes to describe Soviet techniques and methods giving concrete examples on a world-wide basis. One of his problems is to make certain that he does not use any classified information and he therefore is continually checking with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for clearance. He has one secretary, a former CIA employee. He is also assisted by  a CIA intelligence officer who is now on leave without pay.

b3 per CIA

Dulles advised that he is also practicing some law in New York City and is a member of several boards and committees. He is very active as a trustee of Princeton University.

Dulles spoke very favorably concerning the Director's recent book and the Director's speech before the American Legion.

He expressed his concern over the Cuban situation by commenting that he did not like to see the fate of the U. S. in the hands of United Nations officials.

Although Dulles did not volunteer any hint, there has been a definite split between him and McCone. Dulles discontinued the use of CIA space which he had been utilizing for research on his book. He also dropped a CIA secretary. All of this allegedly took place as a result of pressures coming from McCone.

ACTION:

For information

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:bjm (5)

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Tolson ☒  
 Belmont ☒  
 Mohr ☒  
 Callahan ☒  
 Conrad ☒  
 DeLoach ☒  
 Evans ☒  
 Malone ☒  
 Rosen ☒  
 Sullivan ☒  
 Tavel ☒  
 Trotter ☒  
 Tele Room ☒  
 Holmes ☒  
 Gandy ☒

Mr. Casper

b6  
b7C

## Dulles Belittles Cuba's Importance As Base for Soviet Spying on U. S.

Allen W. Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said yesterday Russia does not need Cuba as a spy base, but will find it useful mainly for infiltration into other Latin American countries.

The Soviets have plenty of ways of getting their agents into this country without using Cuba, Dulles told a reporter after speaking to a meeting of the American Society for Industrial Security at the Statler Hilton Hotel.

In his talk, he said "We must not carry secrecy to a point where a potential enemy might misjudge our strength. The great deterrent today is that the Soviet Union and Communist China have a clear realization of our strength."

However, he said "I believe we give away too many secrets unnecessarily" by publishing details of defense projects "before they are too widely known." The foreign intelligence agent's job is thereby greatly facilitated, he said. Another speaker at the meet-

ing, Col. Sidney S. Rubenstein, USAF (ret.), said American security regulations put U. S. firms at a disadvantage in competing for business in Europe.

A former NATO security adviser who is now a consultant on security for the Defense Department, Rubenstein said the European Common Market makes revision of these regulations urgent.

Under present rules, for instance, an employee with a U. S. firm holding a defense contract loses his security clearance if he is out of the country for four months, even if he is abroad with his own company, he said.

Such "security shackles" are

a detriment to our economy, he said, as aircraft and weapons developed here are now in production in Europe for NATO countries.

File 5 - Dp 22

The Washington Post and Times Herald 0-12  
 The Washington Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Evening Star \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Journal-American \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Mirror \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Post \_\_\_\_\_  
 The New York Times \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Worker \_\_\_\_\_  
 The New Leader \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Wall Street Journal \_\_\_\_\_  
 The National Observer \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date \_\_\_\_\_

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